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This thesis is a study of the process of negotiating funding by a voluntary
organisation from statutory sources. It is a case study which focuses on one
organisation's attempts to obtain resources for a supported accommodation
project for people with a mental handicap. This is approached from a focus on
the inter-organisational network as a political economy. This view observes
that in such networks, organisations are competing to gain two scarce resources,
authority to operate in a domain and money to fund those operations. Thus the
funding relationships have to be viewed in a broader policy context. The
methodological approach is qualitative and relies mainly on unstructured
interviews and documentary evidence in offering an account of the process of
negotiation.
In the case study, four stages in the process of securing funding are examined:
firstly, the establishment of the organisation and the way it gained legitimacy:
secondly, the development of the idea of the project through attempts to achieve
the organisation's objective through other agencies: thirdly, the attempt to
secure funding from central government through Urban Aid, where the fit
between the objectives of the funding programme and those of the project was
tenuous. Finally, the successful application for Support Finance from a health
board is examined. This highlights the complexity of the environment with
which a voluntary organisation has to negotiate. It seems that ultimately
success was more dependent on the alliance between a number of agencies to
obtain the commitment of both the health authority and central government to




AEG Area Executive Group (of the Health Board)
AG Action Group
ATC Adult Training Centre
CAMO Chief Administrative Medical Officer
CANO
. Chief Area Nursing Officer
CCWP Care in the Community Working Party
CDP Community Development Project
CMS Community Medicine Specialist
COSLA Convention of Scottish Local Authorities
CSV Community Service Volunteer
CVS Council of Voluntary Service
DHSS Department of Health and Social Security
Div 3 Division 3
HA Housing Association
HASSASSAB Health and Social Security and Social Services Amendment Bill
HB Health Board
HS Health Services
JCP Job Creation Programme
JHLC Joint Health Liaison Committee
LA Local Authority
MSC Manpower Service Commission
v
NFHA National Federation of Housing Associations
NCVO National Council for Voluntary Organisations
NHS National Health Service
P & R Planning and Resource (committee of Health Board)
RCG Regional Co-ordination Group (for mental handicap projects)
SAMH Scottish Association for Mental Health
SCSH Scottish Council for the Single Homeless
SDD Scottish Development Department
SED Scottish Education Department
SHAPE Scottish Health Priorities for the Eighties
SHARE Scottish Health Authorities Revenue Equalisation Report
SHHD Scottish Home and Health Department
STEP Special Temporary Employment Project
SWD Social Work Department
SWSG Social Work Services Group
URU Urban Renewal Unit (of SDD)
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'no sooner is a preliminary skirmish won [in an intellectual field] -
critics and opponents convinced of the validity of some position,
than before the grass has grown green on the battlefield, one has to
be off a-pace to start a skirmish against those who have accepted the
new idea too thoroughly and too well ... The battle often has to be
fought long before most people have become familiar with the last
victory.'





This thesis seeks to examine some of the issues raised by the espousal of inter¬
agency work in the provision of social welfare, for both voluntary and statutory
agencies. My concerns are not simply academic. They arose from the experience
of attempting to establish mechanisms to facilitate statutory/ voluntary co¬
operation. In that process it emerged that there were problems in doing so which
generally did not seem to be recognised by policy-makers.
The original question posed was 'Why are some voluntary agencies more
successful than others in obtaining funding from statutory agencies?' In order to
explore that question, after investigating the possibility of a comparative study, it
was decided to undertake a case study of one voluntary organisation, which by
repute, had been relatively successful in obtaining funds at a time when there
had been a great deal of competition for funding from statutory agencies.
(Chapter Three gives details of how the agency and the case study as an
appropriate methodology was settled upon.) The study is of the West City Action
Group. This had been established in 1976 as a self-help group for parents of
mentally handicapped people. By 1985 they had successfully obtained funding
from the Plains Health Board and the Scottish Office for a community-based
supported accommodation project which would enable people with a mental
handicap to live in the community rather than in the large mental handicap
hospital which served the area.
Chapters Four to Seven trace the history of that project from the establishment
of the Action Group (Chapter Four) through the development of the idea of
community-based accommodation (Chapter Five). The attempts to secure
funding for the proposal through the Urban Programme unsuccessfully
(Chapter Six) and through Support Funding successfully (Chapter Seven) are
examined to identify the significant features. Over the period of the research, the
initial question was redefined as it became obvious that the process of seeking
funding was inextricably linked with policy formulation. It became clear that
successful application for money lay at the end rather than at the beginning of,
what was in this case, a long and complex set of negotiations which were to have
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ramifications for the entire community care policy in Plains. This process of
redefinition was assisted by the development of an inter-organisational
theoretical framework and this is examined in Chapter Two.
The dominant strand in this thesis, therefore, is that of inter-agency work and
the debates which emerged in the 1970's and 1980's about how to go about that.
But like any policy issue, that debate also has a more specific context. In this case
there are a number of sub-themes which also underpin the debate and need to
be teased out for analytical clarity. The debates about how services should be
provided to address the concerns of the 'community' and how to make services
more responsive to need were important strands. In the field of mental
handicap the major debate was that of normalisation. There was a reaction to
the segregated institutional policies and a growth of demand for community
based provision. This linked into broader debates about the nature of
community care. How it should be provided? By whom? These debates are
underpinned by a deeper concern with the processes of change in large
bureaucracies. How does this come about? Is the significance of the
successful voluntary agencies that they facilitate this process? The remainder of
this chapter provides the background against which the events detailed in the
case study are enacted.
1.1 The Interconnection of Social Problems
Before the major questioning of the role of the state in relationship to welfare
provision, which arose as a result of the economic crises of the 1970's and 1980's,
there had been little contention about the respective roles of statutory and
voluntary organisations. GDH Cole (in Bourdillon ed 1944 p.119) identifies four
possible responses to the problem of which sphere should have the major role
in providing services: "firstly that services should be provided by charitable
agencies; secondly that provision should be made through mutual aid such as
Friendly Societies; thirdly that the main provision should be a state
responsibility and fourthly that there should be a mixture of provision by both
state and charities: what is now termed welfare pluralism. The 1945 consensus
seemed to have settled the question. It was the third option.
Throughout the 1940's and 1950's, these views prevailed. It was taken for granted
that the state had the prime role in the provision of welfare and that the role of
voluntary agencies was essentially complementary. It was assumed that Britain
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had resolved the problem of how to make welfare provision for the population
and the major debate to be resolved was the extent of that provision: should it be
universal or selective? The big debates over welfare seemed to have fallen off
the agenda and the Wolfenden Committee (1978) noted that in this period
voluntary agencies seemed 'to have been marking time' (p.20).
By the mid 1960's it was beginning to be acknowledged that poverty and related
social problems had not been beaten as decisively as had been imagined. There
was a decisive shift in perceptions of the problems. If the approach of the 1945
Labour government is encapsulated thus:
'The state and its apparatus of administration was to be the
instrument of change. Experts would devise and apply a national
programme of reform. The public was cast in the role of spectator
and consumer, not co-partner.'
p.15 Hadley and Hatch (1981)
then the crucial realisation of the 60's was that this alone was not good enough.
It began to be observed that
'the welfare state had not met all the expectations it had generated
for universal high quality and comprehensive provisions. It had not
significantly redistributed resources or made much impact on the
differential life-chances of the poor, the homeless or other marginal
groups.'
p.37 Brenton (1985)
1.2 Bigger is Better
In line with its commitment to managerialism, the Labour government, in the
mid-1960's, set about initiating the reform of the various institutions delivering
services. In the main this meant creating bigger bureaucracies which would be
able to command more resources and marshal them effectively. The income
maintenance system was reformed and a range of Royal Commissions and other
bodies established to formulate proposals for local government, health and
social welfare. In Scotland, the Wheatley Commission was to examine local
ii "
government and a 1966 White Paper, Social Work and the Community, took on
the proposal originally made to the Kilbrandon Committee in 1961 that some
kind of comprehensive welfare and social service agency should be established.
A White Paper in 1969 also proposed the reform of the Scottish health
authorities. These reforms were to create an organisational lobby for the
expansion of voluntary and community groups.
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One of the lessons emerging from the observed failings of state services was that
citizens were not simply passive recipients. It was noted that not all the changes
in housing and welfare in the past, had necessarily been for the better. Whilst
the main aim of the reforms which the government instituted in health, social
security and welfare agencies was to establish more cost effective units which
would both command more resources and use them more efficiently, the ways
in which services were to be reformed was coloured by the analysis made of the
nature of current problems. In particular, the loss of community was lamented
(e.g. Young and Wilmott 1962) and, in reforming social services, this theme
emerged in the official reports which preceded the new acts. Policy makers set
about devising ways of creating services which would foster the re-creation of
community and prevent social disorder arising in future.
The White Paper on Social Work and the Community (1966) was of this kind
and stressed the role of large housing schemes and the de-population of city
centres in creating social problems. It suggested therefore that the concerns of the
new Social Work Departments advocated, should be not simply to react to
problems when they arise, but to play an active role in prevention through co¬
operation across departmental boundaries in the local authority
'to enable communities and individuals more readily to surmount
problems and resolve tensions.'
Para 13
This was echoed more clearly by the Seebohm Report on Local Authority and
Allied Personal Social Services in the context of England and Wales
'conventional resources alone are not enough... The goodwill and
direct assistance of the community are also needed. We still know
comparatively little about how these might be enlisted and
encouraged: of what can or cannot be expected of mutual aid,
'community development', voluntary services or neighbourliness,
particularly in urban areas undergoing rapid change.'
Para 257
The Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 enacted the recommendations of the 1966
White Paper and gave the new Social Work Departments unprecedentedly wide
powers both to 'promote social welfare by making available advice, guidance and
assistance on such a scale as may be appropriate to their area' (Section 12(1)) and
to fund voluntary agencies as well as statutory services to make this provision.
By amalgamating a number of small departments the government hoped to
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achieve a more effective use of resources and provide the consumer with one
door to services and in particular
'simplify the local authorities' communications with the Ministry of
Social Security and with the many voluntary organisations which do
so much of the exploratory work in social service.'
HMSO (1966) Para 12
The switch in emphasis away from an individualistic casework model in social
work to one relating to community needs and emphasising service
development in that context was marked. However as English and Martin (1979)
note whilst there was an emphasis on these issues and on the importance of
inter-agency co-operation, the discussions were 'sensible but superficial' (p.108)
and indeed there seemed to have been little thought given to how these
developments might take place. They observe:
'We find a complete lack of statistical information, an absence of
even the simplest research, and no sign of any analysis either of the
social and economic context or the possible lines of future
development.'
ibid
However, by 1970, the new Social Work Departments were established in
Scotland with a remit to marshal resources more effectively, and these included
those provided by voluntary organisations and focused on:
'the building in Scotland of communities which are primarily self-
reliant, but are well backed by public services and voluntary
organisations.'
Working Party (1969)
It is noteworthy that as the Social Work (Scotland) Act evolved, the emphasis
on the contribution of voluntary agencies increased.
1,3 The New Voluntary Sector
The result of the changed climate of ideas and the organisational reforms was to
create an environment in which fundamental changes could take place in the
nature of voluntary activity. New voluntary organisations arose at both a
national and a local level and in the main they were critical of existing
provision and emphasized the need for change.
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At a national level the new organisations included those with a pressure group
role such as Shelter (1966), Child Poverty Action Group (1965), Disablement
Income Group (1965) and those with a mutual aid or self-help focus such as
Spina Bifida Association (1966), Coeliac Society (1968) Claimant Union (1968).
Although mutual aid had been identified as a voluntary organisation role by
Beveridge (1948), Cole (op.cit) pointed out that pre-war this had been in the
main an economic rather a social concern and that
'They (voluntary bodies) were much keener on urging the poor to
help themselves rather than one another.'
p.118 in Bourdillon (ed) (1944)
The new type of mutual aid had more in common with Kropotkin (1972) who
advocated a co-operative approach than with the individualistic 'pull yourself
up by your bootstraps' style which was more familiar in Britain, since it had been
propounded by Samuel Smiles (1958)
The expansion which took place nationally was mirrored at a local level. Whilst
there is no comprehensive survey of voluntary agencies in Scotland in this
period, the study undertaken by Stephen Hatch as part of the Wolfenden
Committee's study provides some indication of the likely trends. A comparative
study of voluntary activity in three English towns showed that
'Although the history of a few existing voluntary organisations goes
back to the last century, a majority have come into being since I960.'
p.77 Hatch (1980)
Indeed, the expansion became even more marked in the early 1970's, for by the
time of his study (1978) Hatch noted that 40% of the organisations had come into
being in the preceding eight years, evidence of
'substantial and sustained growth in the voluntary sector.'
p.80 op.cit
Nor was this simply an expansion of activity. There was also evidence of
substantial growth in the resources available to such agencies, particularly
from public funds. There was a documented increase in central
government grants to voluntary agencies of 92% between 1970 and 1975
(Falush 1977). He estimated that additionally, as a result of the expansion
of local authority services in this period, it was likely that
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'during the fifteen years since I960, central and local government
funds for voluntary organisations, increased over tenfold, which
greatly outpaces the rate of growth of public services.'
p.37 op.cit
These figures are unreliable, but do indicate that there was a substantial increase
in resources as well as activity.
Nor was this merely an increase in numbers; it was also a qualitative change. As
the concern with the decline of community imbued the social work legislation,
it was mirrored in the growth of voluntary and community groups. Saul
Alinsky, a radical American community worker, had much influence on the
growth of community work m ^Britain and was in particular critical of the
notion of neutral professionalism^had until then formed the basis of both social
and community work in Britain. In Alinsky's view the role of professional^
was to align themselves with the poor and disadvantaged and employ their
skills to 'empower' people.
'Liberals charge radicals with passionate partisanship. To this
accusation, the radical's jaw tightens as he snaps 'Guilty!' - we are
partisan for the people. Furthermore we know that all people are
partisan. The only non-partisan people are those who are dead. You
too are partisan - if not for the people then for whom?'
Alinksy (1969) cited in Jones and Mayo (1974) p.69
The rhetoric espousing the need to re-construct a sense of community
emanating from official sources meshed with this strand of thought and led
many professionals in community and social work to conclude that assisting the
development of locally based community groups would lead to a realisation on
the part of the disadvantaged of their ability to change their circumstances. This
approach is epitomised in the work of Bob Holman.
'Mothers anxious to start more playgroups. Joint action has led to a
more militant, almost political attitude expressed in a readiness to
assert their rights and to stand up to officials. Some have mooted the
need for a tenants' association and hopefully future developments
will concentrate on housing'
Cited in Jones and Mayo (1974) p.69
It is likely that this kind of professional led development was going on all over
Britain, perhaps concentrated in the urban areas, although there is no wide-
ranging survey to back this up. However Hatch (1980) notes in his study of the
three towns that
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'The type of trigger to which the creation of the largest number of
organisations can be attributed are the staff of statutory agencies
acting in an official or semi-official capacity.'
Hatch (1980) p.92
The new voluntary and community groups created tended to be more radical
than the more traditional philanthropic organisations. Instead of being
composed ofgnembers of the local elite concerned to care for the less fortunate,
they tended to^formed from the ranks of the consumers of social services of one
kind or another. As the East London Claimants Union put it, perhaps
representing the most extreme end of the spectrum, they were of the new
generation who
'Unlike their parents who had been brought up in the 'depression',
seen mass unemployment and survived through one or two world
wars, they were not 'grateful' for 'state handouts'. In fact a new
generation had emerged which was only too eager to point out the
contradictions of the welfare state and *S&challenge and criticise its
false illusion of grandeur.'
Cited in Jones and Mayo (1974) p.79
1.4 The Problem of Partnership
It was in these circumstances that the new local authority social work
departments found themselves charged to co-ordinate statutory and voluntary
agencies in order to attain the 'ideal of community self-help.' p.4 Working Party
on SW (Scotland) Act (1969).
The implementation of the Social Work (Scotland) Act is a classic example of
willing the ends, but paying scant attention to the means. Many of the
underlying assumptions about how actually to achieve the desired ends wereyUtswvM»+i*/«S,
just that^as English and Martin noted above. The effect of urging voluntary and
statutory agencies to work together was to blur the boundaries between agencies
and make task definition much more difficult.
Although certain areas of work (eg experimentation and innovation, boundary-
spanning and advocacy) were seen as more appropriately the territory of
voluntary agencies, new initiatives like the Urban Programme and the
Community Development Projects, both announced in 1969, had the effect of
allowing statutory agencies to undertake such projects. Kramer (1981) in his
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study of organisations for the handicapped in England, Netherlands and USA,
suggests that
'while no organisation has a monopoly on innovation, in the future
it is more likely to occur within the governmental sector.
Government organisations have a broader scope, greater complexity
and more resources than voluntary agencies.... There is considerable
evidence of the ability of local authorities in England to initiate new
programs.'
p.188
There were also organisational problems to be addressed. As McKeganey and
Hunter note in their study of inter-agency work with the elderly, calls for service
co-ordination are
'ill-defined and yet ... appealing in (their) ability to exude feelings of
warmth and human kindness'
(1986) p.336.
They identify this call arising from four sets of concerns; firstly the frontier
problem: the need to work across organisational boundaries in order to deliver
services that the clients need; secondly the problem of overlap and duplication;
thirdly the lack of common purpose between agencies ostensibly aimed at
meeting their same needs; fourthly the problem of gaps between agencies in
service provision.
The solution to these problems is usually seen as better co-ordination, in
particular
'improved co-ordination is no substitute for a certain clarity and
agreement over aims.'
ibid.
Thus the exhortation in the Social Work Act for the new departments to work
across departmental boundaries within the local authority was likely to prove
rather difficult unless there was some clear thinking about task definition. As
already noted by English and Martin (1979) above, this did not happen
'there was nothing in the tradition of local government to facilitate
such trans-departmental alliances.'
op.cit p.110
If this was difficult then the exhortation to work with the community raised
even more difficulties for the new Social Work Departments. Who and what
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was the community? How did they identify it? Moreover this problem of
relating to the community is made more difficult by the decline of traditional
forms of association. Taub, et al (1975) identify a change in the formation of
associations which they ascribe to the decline of traditional ties such as kinship
and religion. Thus they argue that external agencies have to intervene to form
community based, voluntary associations because they
'need them as channels of communication, sources of legitimation,
vehicles of social control and a means to organise and direct
resources.'
Moreover
'This need has grown as the ideology emphasising the importance of
local participation and control has become more widespread at
government policy-making levels.'
p.426 Taub et al (1975)
Hatch and Mocroft (1983) identified this commitment to participation as a strand
in the London Borough of Islington's policy towards voluntary organisations in
the 1970's. But as they observe Social Work Departments are large hierarchically
organised systems:
'where rules and policies can only be changed by taking issues to the
top of an organisation and the divisions of responsibility within the
system do not always correspond to the issues and problems that
arise outside.'
p.47 op.cit
This leads to a tension for workers as a community orientation
'requires a wide definition of the role of the social service
department to respond flexibly, unfettered by numbers of
hierarchically imposed constraints; and it requires an emphasis on
social workers knowing and being known in the communities they
serve.'
p.48 op.cit
Small wonder that writing in 1978 Wolfenden found that whilst the rhetoric of
partnership with voluntary agencies was growing at central government level 'it
is different in local government' (p.85). Whilst local government might be
willing to accept and purchase a substantial element of their service provision
from voluntary organisations, allowing them to participate in formulating
policies for these services was low on the agenda.
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There was in other words, an enormous gap between rhetoric and reality.
Whilst fine words were articulated about the important contribution voluntary
organisations make to social welfare provision and an enormous increase in
funding, local authorities remained suspicious of any formalised role for
voluntary organisations.
Murray (1969), in his impressionistic study of the role of voluntary organisations
in Scotland observed that most voluntary statutory relations worked
'well enough together but attitudes vary widely... the attitude of a key
(vol. org) secretary is said to be "we like their money but we hate
their guts"'
p.78
Whereas some local authorities felt that
'statutory services can undertake most of the services undertaken by
voluntary organisations. Organisations of a local character are
somewhat unstable and lack discipline.'
p.79
At the same time as the new departments were asked to adopt new styles of
working with the voluntary sector they had to contend with the difficulties of
melding a professionally disparate group into one coherent department. The
very act of forming these departments 'brought to light areas of need not
previously recognised' as English and Martin (1979) point out (p.109). At the
same time, there was, initially, a severe lack of resources owing to the naivety of
the authors of the legislation who had anticipated that the act could be
implemented with few additional resource requirements. In reality local
authorities and government realised that budgets had to be increased and
departments doubled their staffing between 1971 and 1981 (SWSG Statistical
Bulletin 1982). As if that were insufficiently difficult, the new departments were
to be further amalgamated in 1975, by local government reform reducing the
fifty originally established to twelve. It is not surprising in these circumstances
that the development of relationships with voluntary organisations and
community groups proved problematic.
Whilst the emphasis on the importance of statutory/voluntary co-operation
increased throughout the 1970's these difficulties did not go away. The Barclay
Report (1982) observed that
11
The voluntary sector is potentially an equal partner with the
statutory in the planning and provision of services, but, in our view,
the relationship to date could seldom be described as a genuine
partnership. It sometimes resembles that between statutory master
and voluntary servant.'
p.85
Similarly the joint report between NCVO and the Local Authority Associations
noted
There needs to be machinery for ensuring that services can be looked
at as a whole, whether across the personal social services field, or
client group by client group or both. Through this joint activity the
best use may be made of existing resources and mutual agreement
may be reached about priorities for future activities. Consultation
arrangements which facilitate an effective form of joint planning are
still relatively rare.'
Cited in Barclay (1982) p.87
Experience working in the field indicated that this planning process did not
seem entirely rational. Some voluntary organisations seemed to enjoy favoured
status vis-a-vis statutory agencies, whereas others despite offering very
professional services were supported rather grudgingly and distrusted by local
authority officials.
1.5 New Styles of Service
The debates of this period were not simply about who should provide services
and how, but also about the nature of the service which should be provided. In
the context of this study there are two other important strands: the shift away
from institutional care and the shift towards policies of 'normalisation' for
people with mental handicap.
A major influence on this was the scandal which erupted in 1967 at Ely Hospital
in Cardiff when allegations of gross mistreatment of people with a mental
handicap were made by a Sunday newspaper. The decision in 1969, by Richard
Crossman (then Secretary of State for Social Services) to publish the results of
the enquiry brought the conclusions into public debate. The report concluded
that:
'The present tripartite administrative structure of the NHS has
failed, so far as Ely is concerned, to produce a sufficiently integrated
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service and pattern of care for the mentally subnormal. The concept
of community care is insufficiently developed.'
Cmnd 3957 p.128 cited in Townsend (1973)
The scandal had a number of effects. Firstly it was yet another revelation about
the short-comings of institutional care which as Boswell (1982) noted led to a
loss of faith in such solutions. Secondly, professionals were angry and ashamed
that such events could happen, and there were renewed calls for better
community provision. Books and papers were published (Boswell and
Wingrove 1974) and conferences held including Action for the Retarded called
by the World Federation for Mental Health in 1971, which questioned the policy
of isolating mentally handicapped people in large long-stay hospitals. Kushlick
spoke at this and demonstrated by outlining his Wessex Hospital experiment,
that not only was it arguable that such people should be housed in the
community, it was possible. (National Society for Mentally Handicapped
Children 1972)
The Campaign for the Mentally Handicapped took this debate further, arguing
that, yes, location in the community was more 'normal', but the quality and
nature of such provision was also important. Consideration needed to be given
to individual needs, as many community-based homes being developed
resembled the hospitals they replaced in all but size.
'What is really the difference between sitting in front of a television
in one of these homes and sitting in front of a television in a large
old institution? The chairs may be more comfortable, perhaps the
television may be newer, there may be fewer people to jostle for a
view of the screen. But is this really what all the enthusiasm and talk
of reform boils down to?
p.2 Campaign for the Mentally Handicapped (1975)
Better Services for the Mentally Handicapped (Cmnd 4683) was published in
1971 for England and Wales and a similar paper, known as the 'Blue Book'
followed for Scotland in 1972 (SHHD). Both urged a number of reforms
including more provision in the community by local authorities.
However, Townsend (1973) identified that the policy of developing community-
based care, was riven with contradictions which were not addressed. The
government was following inconsistent policies in, on the one hand advocating
less use of long-stay hospitals, whilst at the same time trying to increase
resources for them. This was further complicated by the fact that, in Scotland at
13
least, responsibility for different aspects of implementation, lay with different
departments within the Scottish Office. The contradictions this leads to, will be
displayed in the story which follows. The structural weaknesses Townsend
identified in 1971 still bedevilled policy in this area in 1985. Firstly, he saw that
weak authority structures in the NHS make new policies difficult to implement.
Secondly, it is very difficult for government to determine how local authorities
implement general policy guide-lines. Thirdly, threats to the status quo tend to
lead to resistance by affected professional groups and finally a powerless client
group finds it difficult to articulate their needs. Thus besides the debates about
partnership, there were other equally heated debates in the early 1970's about the
nature of the provision.
It is in this context that the voluntary agency studied in this thesis arose. The
participants interviewed were seeking to resolve these issues and try to
implement these policies, within all the constraints noted above. What was the
nature of the relationship between statutory organisations and the new-style of
voluntary agencies with an emphasis on rights for the disadvantaged? From the
voluntary organisation's perspective what implications did these policies have?
Is the notion of co-ordination and co-operation which later came to known as





This chapter explores some potential approaches to the study of inter-
organisational networks. It explains why these approaches are deemed more
appropriate to the study of an application for grant aid by a voluntary
organisation than the more usual approach by scholars in this field, who have
tended to concentrate their studies on voluntary organisations themselves. It is
argued that an inter-organisational focus on the network of relationships as
espoused by JK Benson (1975) is more appropriate. This stresses the
inseparability of funding and policy and the importance of focusing on the
perspectives of all participants to understand the workings of networks.
The view of inter-organisational networks as structures of relationships between
organisations can, however, ignore the relationships between individuals and
groups which transcend organisational boundaries. It is also important to
disaggregate organisations; to recognise that a declaration of policy is often an
indication of which faction within the organisation is currently dominant. The
ideas of Crozier (1964, 1976, 1990) and Zeitz (1980a & b) are utilised which see
policy development as arising out of power struggles over areas of uncertainty
and in the latter case as a clearly dialectical process.
This approach implies that conflict and change are involved. Thus it is also
helpful to examine some of the literature relating to the management of change
within organisations. Innovation is clearly another source of uncertainty.
Additionally, change can be legitimated by decisions to allocate money. Thus the
strategies to prevent and facilitate new initiatives, adopted by those negotiating
budgets can also be illuminating. Is the ability to get money simply a result of
how well the game is played? Or is there more to success than that?
This chapter seeks to show that both innovation and the allocation of finance
are 'areas of uncertainty' and that success in controlling these is likely to be
influential in determining whether or not a voluntary agency is successful in
obtaining funding. It is argued that organisational theory can facilitate
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understanding of the processes involved in negotiating for funding by
voluntary agencies and in this context shed light on the nature of the
relationships between voluntary and statutory bodies.
2.2 The Need for a New Paradigm
The preceding chapter has identified the many contradictions and conflicts
present in the milieu within which statutory/voluntary relationships were
supposed to be developed. This study seeks to describe the development of a
supported accommodation project by a voluntary organisation and the
subsequent negotiations to secure funding for the project. In the course of doing
this, issues about the relationship between voluntary and statutory agencies
arise and require to be addressed.
Developing a theoretical framework which would shed light on the nature of
these relationships proved initially a frustrating experience. There seemed to be
very little relevant literature. There was not much written on voluntary
organisations other than at a rather descriptive empirical level. Although
offering a rich insight into the variety and complexity of voluntary organisation
activity, these accounts rested on many untested and unexplored assumptions
made about the nature of relationships, the role of voluntary organisations, the
nature of social welfare interventions and the ways in which both central and
local government worked. At least this merited questioning. Overwhelmingly,
much of the literature lacked a theoretical analysis. The assumptions were
pluralistic and conflict ignored. (Wolfenden 1978, Hatch and Mocroft 1983,
Mellor 1985)
A linked factor which made the relevance of the existing literature less helpful,
was its focus. The direction from which research was approached, usually from
an interest in voluntary organisations per se and often funded or sponsored
from within that area (much work has been done under the auspices of the
National Council for Voluntary Organisations), has meant that the focus of
most research has been on voluntary organisations; their internal workings and
the effects on them of working with, or being funded by statutory bodies.
(Kramer 1981, Wilson and Butler 1985, 1986, Leat et al 1981) There has been little
concern with the issues arising for statutory bodies in this relationship or with
why statutory agencies perceive voluntary bodies as they do.
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Following Kramer, some authors sought to develop typologies of voluntary
organisations or to identify the features which distinguished them from other
types of organisation (Billis 1984, Knoke and Prensky 1984). These attempts ran
into difficulties because the notion of a 'voluntary sector' is another comfortable
fiction which merits much deeper exploration. Unfortunately many of those
who undertake research in this area have a vested interest in maintaining that
fiction. Reality is much less coherent and messier. As Zeitz (1980b) notes it is
important to address
'The tremendous variety, pervasive change and conflict, the
presence of a great number of confounding variables and especially
the propensity of organisations to construct their own environment.'
p.72 op.cit
John Lansley (1976) pointed out that voluntary organisations can choose to
adopt different political styles in different contexts. Kramer's comparative study
of voluntary agencies in England, Israel and the Netherlands (1981) also
embodies a similar observation. The notion that environment affected
organisational style was not a new one (Burns and Stalker 1966) but strangely, in
this particular context, seemed to have been little explored. Wilson and Butler
(op.cit) note that there has been relatively little attempt to apply organisational
theory to voluntary organisations. There has been even less attempt to apply
inter-organisational theory, although there is some American work (e.g. Taub et
al op.cit)
Rationalist assumptions also pervade the literature. These perspectives explain
decision-making as a result of officials reviewing submissions and selecting
those projects which seemed likely to further the development of services in
meeting the needs of the client group. There is a discourse, notably within the
Civil Service which maintains that:
'Procedures and requirements for obtaining money from funding
agencies tend to be impersonally codified, institutionalised and
published. The effect of communication between a funding agency
and a requesting agency is to determine how well the latter meets the
formal requirements and criteria that are necessary to obtain funds.'
Indeed say the authors:
'Inter-personal contacts and informal agreements between
representatives of funding and requesting agencies are less
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important (than those of client referral) ... they are often sanctioned
because a particularistic relationship may impair the objective and
impartial criteria that funding agencies use in resource allocation
decisions and in subsequently monitoring the use of those funds.'
p.601-2 Van der Ven and Walker (1984)
The problem with this approach is that there are always more applications than
funding available, so that selection ultimately has to be made on other criteria
than 'fit'. It also belied my experience which suggested that what was known
about the people promoting voluntary organisation projects could be crucial in
funding decisions. This type of explanation also takes a very passive view of
voluntary organisations, submitting applications and awaiting outcomes, and
ignores the advocacy and lobbying undertaken to forward a project.
Clearly, the process is not rational, but political. This was noted as long ago as
1973, by Newton in his study of local decision-making in Birmingham, where he
concluded that inequalities of power were significant in determining which
organisations were successful in a local government setting and which were not.
Yet because his focus was on pressure groups rather than organisational issues
there are perhaps aspects on which this study will place rather greater emphasis.
Lukes (1974) points out that a focus on decision-making only examines the most
obvious dimension of power. It is, he argues, important to uncover the
structural dimensions which help shape perceptions of what a problem is, for
example and therefore why some decisions rather than others are taken or not
taken.
In posing the question - Why do statutory agencies fund voluntary organisations
for particular pieces of work? it did seem therefore that inter-organisational
theory might prove a useful framework in which to examine these issues. This
meant it was not enough to examine a voluntary organisation and ask what
were the features of it which made it attractive for statutory bodies to fund. The
study required a deeper level of analysis and the question could be posed
another way. What is it about the nature and operation of some statutory bodies
which makes the use of voluntary organisations for some tasks more attractive?
I could find little in the existing literature which shed light on that question at
anything other than a platitudinous level.
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2.3 An Inter-Organisational Focus
Voluntary organisations are creatures of their environment. They are usually
established by a group of people because of some dissatisfaction with an existing
state of affairs. This then implies seeking change either in individuals or in the
current delivery of a service. My focus is on an organisation which is seeking to
improve the service provision for mentally handicapped people. This implies
that, in order to achieve its objectives, the voluntary organisation must interact
with other organisations currently involved in the provision of this service.
Thus the thesis has an inter-organisational focus.
Inter-organisational theory has its roots in organisational sociology and in
particular derives from those theorists such as Burns and Stalker (op. cit.) who
argued that an organisation's structure could only be understood in the context
of its environment. Prior to their work the focus of analysis had tended to be
much narrower, examining intra-organisational structures and processes in
isolation from the wider societal context. Burns and Stalker's great contribution
to the theory was to recognise that organisational management structure and
style varied according to whether the environment was stable or changing.
The centrality of inter-organisational theory to an understanding of modern
society is indicated by Herman Turk who suggests that society is in the main
composed of inter-organisational networks and that in large urban societies
"power positions .... appear to rest heavily upon organisational membership."
p.l Turk (1970)
Every author of a treatise on inter-organisational theory bemoans its inadequacy.
However, it is important to realise that this is a relatively new area of theoretical
endeavour and a major problem is that relatively little empirical research which
adopts this framework has been undertaken. Moreover the foci of those most
interested in the outcomes of such research has not encouraged deep analysis.
Two traditions have shaped inter-organisational theory and to some extent have
limited its development. Firstly a sociological tradition which has its origins
primarily in government agencies funding "research projects trying to discover
how best to achieve 'co-ordination' between a fragmented set of health or social
service agencies." p.41 (G.Zeitz 1980a) Thus there is a tendency to focus on what
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Benson calls the 'superstructure of sentiments and interactions', the factors
which encourage or inhibit co-operation, eg Booth (1981)
This orientation limited both the type of research undertaken and the view of
the interplay between the inter-organisational network and the wider society.
The main aim of research was
'to try to discover various mechanisms which could help induce,
persuade, cajole or trick agencies into some measure of increased
integration.'
p.41 Zeitz (1980a)
Thus problems presented by the environment in which the organisations
operate tend to be ignored.
The second tradition has its roots in management studies and is concerned with
the practical problems confronting managers of business. The concern was to
predict and control for organisational advantage rather than to understand
events. Thus the positivistic concerns of both these traditions lead to the
environment of the inter-organisational network being treated as non-
problematic.
It is not the aim of this chapter to construct a theory of inter-organisational
networks involving voluntary organisations. This is probably not possible.
Rather the aim is to examine the field of inter- organisational theory to ascertain
whether there are any strands which will help shed light on my particular study
and shed some light on the underlying processes. Most of the work examined
stems from non-British culture and there must therefore remain a question
about the extent to which this is transferable to the British context.
2.4 The Inter-Organisational Network as a Political Economy
When establishing any project a voluntary organisation has to negotiate two
things:
i) the AUTHORITY (legitimacy) to undertake the work proposed
and
ii) the RESOURCES (money) to fund this work.
The way these two variables interact in inter-organisational networks is
postulated by J.K. Benson (1975) who argues that these are the key factors in a
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political economy. The political economy approach takes analogy with the
nation and
'focuses on the intersection of the political structure and political life
with the economy'and economic life within organisations.'
■p.221 M. Zald (1970).
This view argues then, for inseparability of policy issues from the capacity to
finance such activities. Each sphere influences and constrains the other.
Voluntary organisations negotiating the establishment of a project are typically
in an inter-organisational network. They have to secure the concurrence of
other competing organisations in the same field that they have the legitimacy to
undertake the proposed task. They have to negotiate with statutory bodies to
ensure that the project fits with their policy goals and that therefore, resources
are likely to be made available. That negotiation is, in itself, complex enough.
The reality today, is for even more complex sets of negotiation with multiple
funding sources. This leads to funding being dependent on either:
a) different funding sources reaching the conclusion that any project
fits with their policy goals in isolation from each other or
b) different funding sources agreeing together that any proposed
project fits with their policy goals.
Either of these scenarios is fraught with difficulty for a voluntary organisation
and requires considerable political and economic sophistication on the part of
the negotiators to have any likelihood of a satisfactory outcome.
Benson provides a framework within which such negotiations may be analysed
in a way which helps to illuminate the processes at work. Firstly, he suggests
that to understand the inter-relationships within a network, the focus must be
on the network and not simply on the perspective of one of the participants in
that network. This sheds light on possible reasons for dissatisfaction with earlier
studies: they are one sided. Secondly, funding negotiations are becoming more
complex and now often involve a number of participants. A common scenario
is that government announces a programme and voluntary agencies bid for a
share of those monies. Benson argues that in this context organisations compete
to acquire control of the two scarce resources, money and authority, which must
be obtained from sources external to the individual organisation. Benson saw
power as the key to obtaining these resources.
21
Organisations need to be powerful in order to obtain a domain (i.e. legitimate
area of operation). A number of different strategies may be adopted to pursue
these ends - for example maintaining an effective programme, a record by which
the organisation may be judged or ensuring an adequate flow of resources. In
other circumstances it may be necessary to seek to change the definition of tasks
in order to gain the right to control them.
Power in the network stems from two sources:
a) a strategic position in the network - in this context, it may be seen
that Social Work Departments have power vis-a-vis voluntary
organisations, insofar as they have power to define what
constitutes a domain in which they are prepared to pay a
voluntary organisation to provide services. However this power
is subject to negotiation as definitions of what constitutes a
legitimate social work task change.
b) the 'linkage of organisations to a larger pattern of social
organisation.' (Benson 1975 p.233) It is for this reason that
voluntary organisations seek eminent persons as patrons or
president, that they assiduously foster links with other
prestigious groups such as the Round Table and with local
politicians and M.P.'s. This enables the organisation to 'mobilise
forces external to the network as a means of controlling resource
flow within it' ibid.
Some networks become blocked with none of the organisations powerful
enough to achieve dominance and this situation is, Benson says, possibly typical
of those networks composed of voluntary organisations. However it is
important to remember that organisations may participate in more than one
network at any one time. A voluntary organisation in a network of other
voluntary organisations, may obtain power through their position in a network
composed of statutory organisations e.g. as the voluntary sector representative.
He also notes that 'power permits one organisation to reach across agency
boundaries and determine policies and practices in weaker organisations.' p.234
op.cit.
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In inter-organisational networks, notions of co-operation and co-ordination are
promoted. There are, however, a number of factors which militate against this
occurring - this Benson sees, as the 'superstructure of ideas and sentiments'
which are underlaid by the pursuit of money and authority. In times when
resources were more freely available, there was little competition between
organisations, but as public spending cut backs have intensified, so has the
struggle for resources. These struggles have taken place on a number of planes
which affect the ability of organisations in a co-ordinated network to reach
agreement on who does what and in what manner. It is argued that ideally there
must be agreement on:
a) the RIGHT of a particular organisation to a particular domain.
b) the IDEOLOGY about the nature of the task and the remedies.
c) the VALUE that the workers in one organisation ascribe to the
work of those in the other.
d) HOW the service may be delivered in a co-ordinated manner.
In practice, such agreement is very unlikely and therefore power struggles take
place over areas of uncertainty in which organisations adopt various strategies
to change the behaviour of recalcitrant members of the network. It is in this
context that the attempts of a voluntary organisation to develop a project and to
obtain funding for it must be viewed.
2.5 The Problem of Power
Michel Crozier argues that the subjective elements of behaviour within
organisational settings must be addressed in addition to formal roles (Crozier
1964). He likens organisations to games where the kind of structure which
emerges, is to some extent dependent on the values held by those with power to
affect those structures. He contends that organisational sociology's focus on
structure needs to be replaced by a focus on process - on the recurring games
played by individuals and groups (Pugh 1990). This analysis treats power not as a
commodity but a bargaining relationship. Power becomes something which may
be negotiated. These negotiations take place within a 'framework of constraints'
which the participants cannot easily change (op.cit). In particular, he addresses
the role of informal structures and relationships, which he sees as, as potentially
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influential on power relationships within and between organisations as the
formal structures more usually addressed.
'If one accepts the concept that human behaviour cannot be directed
by simple financial stimuli alone, that SENTIMENTS have an
impact on ACTIVITIES, one must soon also admit that the allocation
of power and the system of power arrangements have a decisive
influence over the kind of adjustment people are able to make
within an organisation and over the practical results and the
efficiency of that organisation.'
Crozier (1964) p.147
The ways in which individuals and groups of individuals struggle to gain
control of areas of uncertainty and in this way become powerful both within
organisations and inter-organisational networks are examined.
Crozier's analysis of organisations in the Bureaucratic Phenomenon (1964)
views organisations as a series of power struggles between groups and
organisational behaviour as the result of a strategy each individual has adopted
in the one or several games in which he participates. However
'Were it to take place without any check, the power struggle would
bring paralysing conflicts and unbearable situations. It is thus
necessary that a hierarchical order and an institutional structure
impose discipline on the different individuals and groups and
arbitrate between their claims.'
p. 163 op.cit.
Power in this sense must achieve the co-operation of all those able to affect the
power struggle through bargain and compromise. The major means of
achieving this co-operation says Crozier
'can only be the manipulation of information, or at least the strict
regulation of access to information.'
p.163 op.cit
Moreover, Crozier sees 'uncertainty' as the key in these power relationships. By
uncertainty he means occurrences whose outcomes cannot be predicted. In the
example he gives from the tobacco factory, machine breakdowns have
consequences for production workers in terms of lost wages and dispersal
around the factory. In these circumstances the behaviour of the maintenance
man assumes enormous importance - the production workers seek to please
him and he to influence them. Thus a power relationship develops.
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Crozier's contention, then, is that people negotiate around areas of uncertainty.
Moreover
'public administration, being less under pressure for survival, stands
a much better chance of eliminating the overall source of
uncertainty, and thus more difficulties, to maintain the managerial
power. It will give, therefore, undue importance to the remaining
areas of uncertainty, protect the experts who are in charge of them
and allow them to stabilise the power struggle and develop
stationary equilibria that favour them.'
p.272 op.cit.
Areas of uncertainty are rife in public service provision in Britain. Any state
bureaucracy is allotted tasks by statute and statutory instrument. Problems in the
community and as experienced by individuals do not 'fit' easily within
bureaucratic boundaries. Typically, a mentally handicapped person may well be
in receipt of services from education, health, social work and housing services at
any one time. This gives the workers in those services the problem, as outlined
in Benson's article, of defining who does what.
Frequently this task definition leads to inter-organisational tensions as power
struggles develop about the legitimacy of one organisation rather than another
to carry out a particular function (in Benson's terms to have a domain). An
example of this kind of problem is found in the field of supported
accommodation where there is an argument between the housing and social
work departments over the nature of the tasks constituting "support" and
whether these may be adequately fulfilled by a housing visitor or whether they
constitute a social work task. If consensus is not achieved then the client
receives a fragmented service. One of the claims frequently made by voluntary
organisations, is that they can cross boundaries between organisations, that their
territory is this area of uncertainty.
A second source of uncertainty in any organisation is "innovation". This refers
back to Benson's second area of agreement - debates about the ideology
underpining services. If it becomes possible to change the ideology thenA
innovation with all the insecurities and upheaval it involves for workers will
ensue. In a situation of power negotiation some workers will by definition,
stand to gain in a concrete or symbolic way, and others to lose. Thus different
workers, perhaps in the same organisation, may adopt different strategies, and
depending on their viewpoint, may collude with supporters or opponents of
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innovation in other organisations, including voluntary organisations. As
another of the claimed roles of voluntary organisations is innovation, it may be
seen that much of the philosophy under-writing the work of the voluntary
sector may bring it into the power struggles of the inter-organisational networks,
whether they are aware of it or not.
In an intra-organisational setting such as Crozier is describing above, it is
possible for management to create rules and procedures in an attempt to control
the power struggle. In an inter-organisational setting this is not as easily
achieved: relationships are as Van Gels in Drenth (1984) points out
'more organic and determined by the need for interaction of
individual organisations and their position of power7.
p.1076
Crozier has in the light of Benson's work attempted to apply his analysis to an
inter-organisational network in French local government. He attempts to show
through interviews with 500 French local government officials and mayors that
inter-organisational relationships
'are managed by a complex but stable and organised system of
institutions and groups.'
p.548 Crozier (1976)
The French local government system prior to reform was typified by lack of co¬
ordination and communication yet, as Crozier observes, all the organisations
involved are inter-dependent. Thus whilst the system requires co-operation to
operate, the very structure of government in France makes this difficult to
achieve:
'a compromise cannot be negotiated directly by the parties
immediately involved. It is brought about through the intervention
of a third party, an external actor, an individual who does not belong
to any of the groups to which the parties belong. ' ")
It is probably unlikely that this thesis of third-party intervention would hold, as
Crozier maintains it is, as a general rule of negotiation. Nonetheless this
approach does perhaps hold good in some circumstances - where in Benson's
terms networks are 'blocked' - none of the main participants able to obtain
dominance, that voluntary organisations and their projects may assume
significance. Perhaps when statutory organisations negotiate over boundaries,
and are unable to reach agreement, one party may seek to overcome the impasse
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by recruiting a voluntary organisation to press the case. Given Benson's
hypothesis of each organisation seeking legitimacy and money, the voluntary
organisation is not a 'dupe' in this process but a willing partner, pursuing its
own advantage. The game can be played for high stakes.
The particular value that Crozier's ideas bring to this analysis, is the recognition
that within organisational contexts, there is not monolithic agreement by
organisations of their purposes: that individuals and groups may play games to
attain ends which may or may not coincide directly with those of the
organisation of which they are members. Moreover organisational literature has
tended to view informal relationships and subjectivity as pathological. Crozier's
approach suggests the contrary; that this may be the very means of enabling
structures to function, whose formal methods militate against them so doing.
This point is also emphasised in the work of Gerald Zeitz who views the inter-
organisational network as part of a dialectical process. Where Zeitz differs from
Crozier is that the former recognises that it is precisely Crozier's search for stable
structures which has held back the development of the paradigm. Zeitz believes
that it is possible to analyse a political economy theory in this context - the
primary focus df his article is the
'productive action of subjects giving forth external resources which
become exchanged and which lead to systems of unequal control.'
p.75 Zeitz (1980b)
The contradictions and conflicts this produces lead to a dialectical process and
thus this explains why there is a constant negotiation over power and resources
taking place in an inter-organisational network. J. Benson has also developed
his own ideas on similar lines:
'The organisation is seen as a concrete, multi-levelled phenomenon
beset by contradictions which continuously undermine its existing
features. Its directions depend upon the interests and ideas of people
and upon their power to produce and maintain a social formation.'
p.l Benson (1977) pp.1-22
Thus voluntary organisations seeking to negotiate the resources of money and
authority from statutory bodies are confronted not by a rational structure in
which all they have to do is state their case better than anyone else to receive
funding; instead they find themselves caught up in power struggles about
innovation, securing both money for each organisation's work and legitimacy to
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undertake the areas of work, seeking to change the networks environment in
order to facilitate the acquisition of money and authority. Given that voluntary
organisations are concerned with social change per se, it would be likely that
successful organisations in this process are aware, at least intuitively, of its
political nature.
2.6 The Areas of Uncertainty
Innovation implies uncertainty. It involves change with all the organisational
upheaval that generates and laying claim to a new domain in order to allow the
organisation to move into new areas of work. Secondly it is obvious that every
innovatory change implies that there will be winners and losers both within
and outwith the organisation. Changed perceptions of the nature of the care task
for mentally handicapped people have meant that those advocating a
community based supported accommodation stand to gain a 'domain'. However
workers in residential homes and in long-stay hospital setting may have much
to lose by the implementation of change. This means that innovation is likely to
be resisted and may therefore become the focus of a power struggle.
Wilson (1963) argues that there are structural factors which need to be identified
to assess whether an organisation is more likely to favour change. He defines
innovation as 'a "fundamental" change in a "significant" number of tasks',
(p.197 op.cit.) Any organisation considering innovation has to weigh up the
'costs' and 'benefits'. These are not simply economic but include the sentimental
aspects of change; for example 'smoothing ruffled fur'; reducing uncertainty-
induced anxiety; compensating demoted members for loss of prestige and power
on the 'cost' side and gains in personal or organisational prestige on the 'benefit'
side.
Wilson hypothesises the circumstances under which innovation takes place.
There are three stages in the process of innovation:
a) the conception of change
b) the proposing of change
c) the adoption and implementation of change
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The probability of innovation occurring at any of these stages is, in his view,
principally a result of the diversity of the organisation.
Diversity is crucial because of a number of factors. It makes close supervision of
each employee difficult and
'in the absence of clear performance criteria and in the presence of a
variety of conceptions of nominally identical tasks, each member
will try to define his own job for himself.
p.201 op.cit
It will emerge in this study that those who sought to introduce new ideas and
ways of working, indeed, had considerable scope to define their own jobs.
Secondly diversity leads to greater incentives for employees in the shape of
increased opportunities for promotion as well as satisfying other less tangible
needs such as that for prestige and power. These increased opportunities arise
from the creation of sub-units, but this has consequences for the way in which
the organisation is perceived by the employee.
'The creation of sub-units, particularly ones which are geographically
dispersed or organisationally decentralised normally results in the
generation of sub-unit loyalties among members of the organisation.
If the sub-unit is sufficiently autonomous more than simple loyalty
may be at stake: the sub-unit may play as great or greater part than
the organisation as a whole in determining salary promotions and
assignments.'
p.199 op.cit
These factors seem to apply in both the Social Work Department and the Health
Board. The nature of the social work task is very diffuse, as is clearly illustrated
by s.12.1 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 which states that
'It shall be the duty of every local authority to promote social welfare
by making available advice, guidance and assistance on such a scale
as may be appropriate to their area...'
and whilst the establishment of Social Work Departments themselves, does
formulate more clearly the nature of these tasks, there is also little doubt that the
boundaries are blurred.
Both Social Work Departments and Health Boards consist of sub-units; in the
case of social work either residential and day-care units or area teams (although
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the task definition is much more specific in the former); in the case of health,
hospitals which are further sub-divided into wards and other specialised
departments. In the context of this piece of research, sub-units do seem
important; for example: the West City social work team and their role in the
establishment of the Action Group or the Task Force on Supported
Accommodation established for the precise purpose of introducing new
methods of working into the Social Work Department.
There is however a catch in this process, which Wilson identifies, and that is
that the organisational structure most likely to lead to the conception and
proposal of innovatory ideas is the least conducive to their implementation.
Organisations with clearly defined command structures are most likely to
implement change , but this kind of organisation does not give employees space
to formulate new ideas. Thus there is a problem for innovators in large diffuse
organisations in securing the implementations of new methods of working once
devised. Many innovatory proposals are rejected not on their merits but for
essentially political reasons:
'it is too costly to concert the wills of the organisation members
sufficient to implement the proposal'.
p.202 op.cit.
In these circumstances perhaps the determined innovator 'mobilises forces
external to the (organisation) as a means of controlling resource flow within it',
p.233 Benson op.cit. - in this case, activating voluntary organisations as a means
of securing policy change within the bureaucracy, because voluntary
organisations can use means such as political lobbying and the mass media to
apply pressure which local authority officials cannot.
Key to any strategy of implementation is the securing of resources for the
proposed changes. At its most basic, resources means money since, as Benson
observed, this may be used to purchase other resources such as staff and
buildings. Thus, the process by which money is allocated to innovatory projects
becomes crucial. Aaron Wildavsky's 'The Politics of the Budgetary Process' (1964)
is a classic study of this area and whilst it specifically refers to the U.S. Congress,
there seem to be factors common to other budgetary strategies.
The task Wildavsky sets himself is, primarily to challenge the presumption of
rationality in the budgetary process - the kind of mythology spelt out by Van der
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Ven and Walker (above p.17) It is not, says Wildavsky, a question of ranking
objectives, comparing alternatives and choosing the highest. Basically the
budgetary process is one of bargaining, with various strategies to reach
agreement. In this sense Wildavsky's thesis fits with Zeitz's view of the inter-
organisational network as a dialectical process. The budget is in a "constant state
of becoming" with adaptations and variations to accommodate the demands of
differing interest groups.
The shape and size of the budget is a matter of serious contention in political life
and lies at the heart of the political process. The fundamental problem for any
innovatory project in obtaining funds lies, Wildavsky recognises, in that at its
core, budgeting is an incremental process. Thus the largest determining factor in
any budget is 'what did we do last year?' Therefore the hardest task for any new
project is to get on the pay-roll. Once that is achieved then there are strategies for
increasing the monies allocated which may be pursued.
Wildavsky examines the process of expanding the base budget (or innovating)
and identifies a number of arguments consistently put forward to justify this.
The main approach which seems relevant to this research is the 'wedge' or
'camel's nose'. By this strategy a large programme is begun, initially with an
insignificant sum which becomes part of the base budget. Then the proponents
of the scheme seek to expand it by arguing that the original sum allocated will be
wasted unless more money is put into the project.
'An agency may engage in wedging by requesting a small sum for
research and using it to justify the feasibility of a big new project. The
agency may borrow some personnel and equipment, use a few
people part-time in order to develop a programme and then tease
Congress and the Budget Bureau with an established operation that
has generated support for its continuance'.
p.222 Wildavsky (1964)
He puts great emphasis on the role of interest groups in generating support for
budgetary proposals and one may infer that voluntary organisations may be so
classified. However, Wildavsky's work is on a national rather than a local scale
and hence the process is possibly more formal than that at a local level.
Unfortunately, he seems to fall into the trap of superficiality described by Lukes
(op.cit), for whilst Wildavsky recognises the non-rational elements in budgeting,
he seems to imply that the political processes are ultimately rational - that the
system is even-handed because of the processes at work.
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'When an agency shouts more loudly than usual, when an interest
group mounts a campaign, when other Congressmen begin to




'To the extent therefore that all significant interests tend to be
represented in a fragmented political system, decision makers may
reduce their information costs by neglecting many alternatives in the
confidence that they will be picked up by others or by themselves at
another time.'
p.156 op.cit.
The argument then is, that if a significant programme is neglected interest
groups will lobby to ensure that it is covered. Wildavsky says that some
departments will become protectors of the unorganized -
'by joining with private citizens who have some altruistic interest in
this underprivileged group'
Wildavsky op.cit
- a classic description of many voluntary organisations. Although this analysis
ignores the inequalities of power observed by Newton (op. cit) Wildavsky does
note that change is likely to be resisted.
'Yet the required action might carry with it disadvantages for others,
who would fight to protect themselves. The task would then be one
of mobilising the political support required to overcome their
resistance and part of this task would rest on the demonstration that
important values had been neglected.'
p. 158 op.cit.
The power struggle stems from the fact that:
'All participants believe their view of the public interest is correct. It
is their differing institutional positions, professional training and
group values that lead to perspectives producing somewhat different
interpretations of the public interest.'
p.167 op.cit
This bears resemblance to Benson's superstructure of ideas and sentiments
(above p.23) - that inter-organisational co-operation can be effective only when
there is agreement on the boundaries of the domain, the ideology about the task,
the value of the work each set of workers undertakes and how the service may
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be delivered. A voluntary organisation negotiating a grant from several funding
sources has to attempt to resolve these dilemmas. The following chapters seek
to tell the story of one such attempt.
In conclusion some theoretical strands have been identified. It is hypothesised
that, whilst organisations compete to gain control of areas of work which are not
clearly defined as the territory of others and to gain the resources to undertake
these tasks, this competition is rendered more complex by disagreements within
and between large bureaucracies about the nature of the task and the ways of
achieving it. In order to resolve these conflicts individuals and groups pursue a
wide range of strategies with varying degrees of success. This can lead to the
formation of inter-agency alliances in order to achieve change within some of
the members of that network. This will tend to work to the advantage of all
members of that partnership. This must be analysed by a focus on the network
and not simply from the perspective of merely one participant therein.
The emphasis is on a multi-levelled analysis, for it would seem that in adopting
a broad structuralist analysis, it is likely that some of the important effects of
individual and group activity will be overlooked. Clearly no one of the above
theories has the monopoly of the truth, but it anticipated that by examining the
deep processes which constrain the relationships between statutory and
voluntary agencies, as well as the ways groups act to try to reduce those
constraints, the study which follows will get nearer to a realistic account and




This chapter outlines the approaches adopted in this study, by explaining the
methodology -selected and examining the strengths and weaknesses of these
strategies. The reasons for adopting a case study as the research method are
explained. The main research instrument was 51 interviews conducted between
December 1985 and June 1987. These were underpinned as far as possible by the
analysis of documentary evidence. A number of issues specific to this particular
case are also addressed.
3.1 A Case Study
As indicated in Chapter One, this research is based on a case study of the process
by which a voluntary organisation gained funding for a specific project: the
establishment of community based supported accommodation for people with a
mental handicap. The focus of the research is on partnership - the inter¬
relationship in this case between a voluntary organisation and a range of
statutory services spanning local and central government and the health service.
At an early stage in the formulation of the research proposal it was realised that
a study which was likely to be complex could only be approached in a
meaningful way by means of a case study. Much of the material was of a delicate
nature and surveys of local authority/voluntary sector relationships did not
seem to uncover the richness and complexity that experience indicated underlay
them. Hall et al (1975) p.13 and Heclo (1972) both urged that policy studies
should move beyond the most easily examined phenomena and attempt to look
inside the 'black box'. This is what this study seeks to do.
This, then, is the story of one voluntary organisation which attempted to secure
funding for a particular project and seeks to illuminate the processes involved
in securing that funding. However there are criticisms levelled at a case study
approach which must be answered. Hall et al identify two main problem areas.
Firstly, it is argued that case studies fail to advance theory because the approach
is insufficiently scientific. Secondly, that however careful the approach
generalisation is impossible.
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At the heart of these criticisms lies the dispute between positivism and
naturalism. The former arose in the 1930's and sought to establish the credibility
of the new social science by adopting the methodology of the natural sciences;
seeking by experimentation and the adoption of a stance of neutral observation,
to establish universal laws. The latter, in protest against the limitations of
positivism, went to the opposite extreme and urged the study of the social world
in its natural state undisturbed by the researcher, a stance associated with
ethnomethodology.
Essentially the criticisms made of case studies are positivistic ones and it is
important to tease out the assumptions about the nature of the social scientific
task in refuting these. In emulating the natural sciences, positivism seeks to
produce general laws which apply in all circumstances and from which
predictions can be made. These general laws will be formulated according to
procedures which are systematic and incremental. In his critique of this
approach Ryan (1981) argues that to take this objective approach ignores the
special problems of social scientific study: intentionality and reflexivity. The
dilemma for the social scientist is that posed by John Rex (1961) in Key Problems
in Sociological Theory, namely, how to make social scientific observations
which are both meaningful and true. Whilst positivism can sacrifice the former
for the latter, naturalism can risk surrender to the culture under study and
render the researcher incapable of observing anything of significance.
Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) argue that both these approaches are obsessed
with a view of the researcher as separate from that which she researches 'which
is unrealistic'. The issue of reflexivity has to be addressed. They urge the
adoption of an ethnographic approach which recognises that the researcher is
part of the social world and that all research involves selection and
interpretation of phenomena, as does life. This approach generally involves
focusing on understanding the perspectives of the groups under study and
observing their activities rather than relying on accounts. The importance of
understanding the process of partnership, how it began, how it developed
between agencies and why some agencies were promoted rather than others
meant that I could not make initial assumptions about what was happening
other than at the most general level. These hypotheses would have to be
reformulated in the light of accounts and explanations of events given by
participants. Thus the approach in a case study using ethnographic criteria is
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itself a reflexive process involving the formulation and reformulation of
hypotheses rather than the hypothesis testing implied by the positivist critique.
The criteria suggested by Hammersley and Atkinson seemed particularly
appropriate to my study since Benson too urges an approach which focuses on
understanding the perspective of all participants in a network rather than the
more usual approach which examines the relationship from a more one-sided
perspective. However it was more difficult to approach the case study as a
participant observer which is the other facet of the ethnographic methodology
recommended, as the event to be studied had already taken place. Thus it was
not possible to be present at negotiations and observe events. I had to rely on the
accounts of participants.
Two issues seem important here.^Firstly, had an attempt been made to observe
these events, it would not haveAa practicable exercise. The negotiations took
place over a substantial period of time and in^vide variety of locations. Because
of the opportunistic nature of project development work, it would not have
been possible to have arranged to be present at all locations. Secondly, it would
not have been desirable to be present, for a researcher observing what were at
times felt by participants to be illicit actions would probably have had an
inhibiting effect on events, thereby perhaps leading to another outcome. In
order to uncover events therefore, the approach adopted can best be described by
Glennerster et al's (1983) notion of 'administrative anthropology' which they
underpin with Ellmore (1982) making a powerful case for 'backward mapping'.
These principles are those adopted in this study. Ellmore argues that 'street-level
bureaucrats' are much more aware of the difficulties of implementing central
government policy. Thus rather than taking the assumptions of how policy is
implemented which pervade public administration namely that,
'policy makers control the organisational, political and technological
processes that affect implementation'
Cited in Glennerster et al (1983) p.19
my study starts from the perspective of those required to operate and implement
that policy and seeks to understand both the ways in which they perceived
themselves to be constrained by the structures within which they operated, the
extent to which they were able to effect change and the ways in which they were
able
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'to use their knowledge to adapt the intentions into workable forms
through local bargaining.'
p.6 Glennerster et al (1983)
This was explored through unstructured interviews with the major participants
in the decision making process (identified by the participants themselves) plus
the analysis of documentation including official reports and minutes of
meetings. The detail yielded by this approach was enormous and enabled the
study to show the problems of implementing policy in ways which no more
general study of partnership could.
The second criticism which Hall suggests must be addressed is that of
generalisability. Heclo (op.cit) observes that if case studies are to be of any use,
then they must move beyond description to explanation. It is suggested that in
the approach adopted here the issue is not hypothesis testing but hypothesis
generation. One of the major problems encountered in designing this study was
the lack of previous studies of this kind. There were a number of studies of
voluntary organisations and a few of issues of partnership, but almost invariably
these were from the perspective of one of the parties. As noted earlier, the focus
also tended to be on the 'super-structure of ideas and sentiments' rather than on
the battles for resources. Thus this study rather than attempting to offer a
definitive analysis of partnership, is attempting to do no more than suggest lines
of enquiry to be pursued by other researchers.
Mitchell (1983) argues that the logic of case studies is theoretically rather than
statistically defined. Thus the claim in this case is not for typicality but rather
that in its uniqueness one can logically deduce some general principles about the
processes of inter-agency co-operation.
3.2 Selecting the Research Setting
Experience in the voluntary sector led me to the observation that there seemed
to exist a group of voluntary organisations which enjoyed favoured status vis-a-
vis statutory authorities. One or two agencies had been approached in an
attempt to identify the funding relationship with the local authority and the
likelihood of there being suitable material for a study. The agency which was to
be the focus of this had been approached and was on the verge of rejection as
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having too little statutory funding when the material which was to form the
basis of this study literally fell into my lap.
Shortly after my initial conversations at the Action Group, I was party to a
conversation in a pub between a Health Service worker and one of the group's
workers discussing momentous events at the Health Board. It was said that
something really unusual had happened. Never before had a decision of the
Planning and Resources Committee been overturned at the full Board Meeting.
Further investigation indicated that I had indeed found a fruitful research
setting: a case study which illustrated some key aspects of the processes of inter¬
agency co-operation. It must be observed however that much of that realisation
came post hoc. At the time the initial account of events seemed likely to be
interesting and worthy of further investigation. The reader may judge from the
account which follows whether my judgment was valid.
3.3 Research Strategy
The approach adopted in the research seemed in many ways akin to journalism.
Having been given an account of events which outlined the history and context
of the decision from the Co-ordinator of the Action Group, I set about tracing the
history of that decision. The study could be divided into stages. Firstly there was
the establishment of the organisation itself in 1976. How had it become so
quickly recognised by statutory authorities? These issues are addressed in
Chapter Four. Secondly, the development of its interest in housing is outlined
(Chapter Five) and accounts of the unsuccessful application for Urban
Programme funding (Chapter Six) and the successful application for Support
Funding (Chapter Seven) are given.
There is, therefore, a sense in which events structured this thesis. Reality,
however, was more complex. The events in different chapters frequently
overlapped and it was a major analytical task in places to give separate yet
coherent accounts which would enable the reader to appreciate the complexity of
the domain whilst maintaining an understanding of the different stages of
seeking funding for the project.
My strategy was to identify informants who had played a role in these
developments and to hold unstructured interviews with them in roughly
chronological order of their participation. A small group of informants had an
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involvement over most of the period of the study. Some of these people were
interviewed several times. Most informants however had only participated in
one small aspect of the decision.
The informants were identified by asking key participants who else had been
involved. They fell into two categories. There were those formally assigned a
decision-making role by their organisational position. There was also a second,
possibly more significant group, who had rather loosely defined roles and
therefore had a capacity to define their own roles rather^than their activities
decided for them. The latter group existed in both statutory and voluntary
organisations. By triangulating responses from several informants it was
possible to identify the central figures. Altogether I conducted 51 interviews with
43 individuals broken down as follows:
Action Group Social Work Department
Staff 3 Officials 8
Committee Members 5
Planning Dept Housing Department





Scottish Office Health Board
Civil Servants 3 Professionals 5
Voluntary Organisations Officials 6
Employees 4 Board Members 5
It will be noted that these figures total more than the number of individuals
interviewed. This arises because a few individuals had overlapping roles. For
example one of the voluntary organisation employees was also a Health Board
member as were two of the councillors. Their comments are ascribed, according
to which role they seemed to be referring at different points in the interview.
This avoids confusion on the part of the reader and lessens the chance of
identification of respondents.
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The interviews were conducted over a period from January 1986 to June 1987.
The research was interrupted between September 1986 and March 1987 as I
became seriously ill. Most of the local authority interviews were conducted prior
to my illness and those in the Health Service afterwards. Obviously this too may
have affected the quality of the information received and the sense that
informants might make of events, but there is little that can done to rectify this
other than being aware of the disruption.
Although there had been a considerable time-lag since the Action Group was
established, tracing informants proved less difficult than I imagined. Three had
left the area, but in all cases were traced and agreed to be interviewed. The most
fortuitous was the person involved in establishing the group. She had become a
social worker in London. One of my supervisors noticed her name on a letter to
the Guardian about an issue concerning her authority and she was contacted
through them. It transpired that she was coming to Plains the following week
and was available for interview. In only one case was an interview refused
outright and that person was in the category of desirable rather than essential.
Whilst he might have given me a slightly different angle, it is unlikely that he
would have told me anything to substantially alter the story. Another person
was too busy to meet me but agreed to talk on the telephone. Overall the
coverage of participants to the decision making process was thorough. Where
there are shortcomings in the story they stem from failures of memory,
recording or inability to ask the right questions. A major regret in retrospect is
that an interview was not sought with policy makers in the Scottish Home and
Health Department although in part that is compensated for by reference to
Hunter and Wistow (1987).
3.4 Entry to Setting
Gaining access to the field of enquiry was not difficult as I had worked in both
voluntary agencies and local authority settings for 10 years prior to beginning
the research. I had also been active in the Labour Party. Thus I was known by
many respondents as a colleague and, in some cases, a friend. In one or two cases
the relationship was that of a political opponent.
This history caused disquiet prior to commencing the research. Would these
prior relationships be an advantage or a disadvantage? On the one hand,
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obviously personal interest and experience in the field would enable
understanding and at times exploration in some areas of the study where a
researcher new to the area might have been fobbed off with conventional
wisdom. On the other hand participation in the setting prior to commencing the
research meant that respondents may have formulated views and opinions
about the researcher which would structure their responses in ways unhelpful
to the research. The other issue was whether it would be possible to be
sufficiently objective to understand the viewpoint of those with whom I had
personally disagreed over policy matters in the past.
A further issue to be addressed was that most of the people I wished to interview
were highly qualified professionals, many very senior in their organisation.
Would such busy, important people be willing to spend time being interviewed
by a relatively marginal researcher?
What Dexter (1970) calls 'elite interviewing' raises matters which ought to be
addressed in any interview situation, but which in reality can often be avoided
when the respondent is relatively powerless vis-a-vis the researcher. When
dealing with powerful people, it is clear that they are less likely to be inhibited in
refusing co-operation and that they are more likely to raise questions about the
purpose and usefulness of the researcher's project. They are also more likely to
challenge the line of enquiry and to suggest alternatives.
In these circumstances 1 found that being a known researcher of powerful people
was a useful combination and probably facilitated access. The research in the
voluntary sector and local authority setting in the main involved contact with
people I knew quite well. Generally, therefore my approach to them was fairly
informal and consisted of a telephone call in which the nature of the research
was explained briefly and an arrangement to meet was made. In the context of
the Health Board this was not so easy as I was not known by officials or
professionals and the subject matter was potentially more sensitive for them.
Involvement in the voluntary sector in the area again proved an asset, as a
fellow member of a voluntary organisation committee was a senior and well-
respected consultant in the Health Board. She suggested an appropriate person
to start with for background purposes and offered to vouch for me to him. This
enabled me to write to him as the person Dr. X had mentioned to him and was I
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believe, invaluable in smoothing my entry to that setting. Most respondents in
the Health Service were initially approached by letter.
Hammersley and Atkinson (op.cit) cite Barbera-Stein who noted that
'the access negotiation can be construed as involving multiple views
of what is profane and open to investigation versus what is sacred or
taboo and closed to investigation unless the appropriate stance or
distance is assumed. '
p.55
Here the apparent focus of my study was particularly useful. By approaching
statutory bodies to talk about how a voluntary organisation negotiated funding,
the topic of inter-agency co-operation was broached in a way that seemed
relatively safe. It seemed preferable to keep my background briefing relatively
simple as this did not raise unnecessary anxieties nor raise issues which I would
prefer the respondents to raise independently. Thus they were told that the
research was an account of one voluntary organisations attempt to gain funding
for a community care project. The interviewing involved following a trail,
trying to talk to everyone who played a role in the decision. It was necessary to
ask questions about the role of statutory agencies for context and background. All
this was true. If my research involved dishonesty it was by omission. It was
plain in some interviews that the conception of what a piece of research like this
might entail was rather limited and raises interesting questions about the
perception by the respondent of the nature of the relationship between statutory
and voluntary agencies. Some people clearly thought that all the focus lay on
what the voluntary organisation did and saw decision-making within their
agency as a non-problematic process.
Generally there were less problems gaining access to interviewees than I
anticipated. Although these people were doing me a favour I was struck by their
willingness to give me time for interviews. On some occasions, 1 was given very
substantial amounts of time by some very busy people, up to eight hours in one
case. Some went to substantial trouble to be interviewed, in two cases travelling
to Edinburgh to meet me. Dexter (1970) also noted how easy it seemed to obtain
interviews with 'elite' respondents. On the whole people seemed flattered to be
asked and it appeared that one of the rewards which accrued to them was an
opportunity to reflect on their work. The impression was formed that most did
not have much opportunity to discuss their work with someone who was not
concerned to make judgments on them which could affect their career prospects.
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Dexter (op.cit) notes
'A good many people in a specialised position do have some taste for
self-analysis or for discussing the nature of what they do in general
terms or for simply telling people in detail what they have done.
Most strangers simply do not know enough.... so the interviewer
who has bothered to understand, who knows what the interviewee
is talking -about, whose comments are relevant but who will not
make any future claims, who will not regard himself as having
received a commitment no matter what is said, can indeed provide a
pleasurable experience for the interviewee.'
p.38
One respondent commented after an interview that he had really enjoyed it as it
made him realise that he had achieved something in the years he had been
doing his job. So for some the rewards were tangible. Others were simply
curious and in some cases clearly felt that the research addressed issues which
puzzled them too. Some envied my opportunity to stand back and reflect about
these events and observed that they too would like to understand some of the
issues being explored.
Whilst in some cases, it seemed that I might have been perceived as a partisan
interviewer, particularly in the Health Board and by the Conservative politician,
on the whole 1 was impressed by the honesty with which people spoke about the
dilemmas they faced in making decisions and recommendations about policy
changes. For example, although one interview with a politician is peppered with
sniping and asides about 'your lot' (to none of which I responded) it seemed that
a shared understanding of the realities of the political world still resulted in an
interview which gave me insights into the issues which could not have been
gained from other sources.
3.5 The Interviews
A number of practical decisions had to be taken about the interviewing process.
Some of these seemed to be determined for me by the nature of both the
research project and of those to be interviewed. The order of interview was to a
large extent determined by chronology, although initially one or two mistakes
were made because I was unsure of the extent of the involvement of some
people. As I became more familiar with the story that problem disappeared. It
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also taught me to check with the interviewee at the beginning of an interview
exactly how they had been involved.
The place of interview was generally determined by the respondent. This meant
that most were conducted in the interviewee's office but some chose to be
interviewed in my office at the university and some at my home. This was most
obviously the case with those who no longer lived in Plains. Occasionally this
gave problems about when the interview began and ended as some informants
began talking whilst the coffee was being made, not an easy time to make notes.
A decision to tape-record all interviews was made and all respondents ba^rTone
agreed to this. The effects of this were considered before embarking on the
interview process. Whilst there can be disadvantages, it was thought and proved
correct that these were outweighed by the advantages.
It would not have been possible taking notes to record the detail and nuances
that the tape-recorder caught. Often it was possible to check dates and other
details which are easily mistaken in speedy note-taking. On one or two occasions
I emerged from an interview feeling dissatisfied that I had not got out of the
interview what had been hoped for, only to discover that something more
valuable had emerged although I had not thought to look for it. For example, an
interview with the Chairman of the Action Group produced little knowledge
about the actual negotiations for the project, but on listening to the tape it
became apparent that she had given me a very coherent statement about
relationships between staff and parents and of the beliefs which underpinned
and motivated parent involvement. These indeed shed light on the process of
negotiation.
Some respondents however were bothered by the recorder, although it was very
small and I learnt to place it out of line of sight. I explained that the tapes were
for my own use only and not to be played to other people. It transpired early on
that one respondent who was particularly concerned about the machine,
thought that the tapes might be played to an audience and once he was reassured
that this was not the case he relaxed visibly. There were several instances where
respondents insisted the recorder be switched off prior to giving me information
which in many cases had already been given by someone else on tape.
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The major problem was transcription. Suggestions that notes be taken and
counter numbers of relevant sections be noted for reference purposes proved
unhelpful. It was more time-consuming to search back and forwards on the tape
than it was to make the transcription in the first place. Dexter estimates nine
hours are required to transcribe one hour of tape, and that reflects my
experience. It was an immensely time-consuming task. Sometimes the sound
quality was poor. Some conducted in high summer in offices with windows
open onto busy streets produced interviews which resembled Peter Sellers'
recording of 'The Folksinger' where the performer is gradually drowned out by
traffic noise. One or two respondents had speech impediments or spoke very
softly. These factors added to the difficulty of transcription. Some sections of tape
had to be reviewed several times before the respondent's meaning could be
deciphered. However it was possible to omit passages where the respondent had
gone off on a hobby horse or a line of enquiry had been pursued which on
reflection was not useful.
On balance, although the method of recording was time-consuming, the use of
the tape-recorder allowed the interview to be more relaxed and enable me to sit
and listen to what was being said in ways which proved impossible when taking
notes. The maintenance of a research diary in which I recorded my impressions
and concerns about the interview as well as issues which surprised me or
merited further investigation, was a useful adjunct.
There were also problems about honesty. Whilst in gaining access the purpose of
my research was explained relatively simply, there was a sense in which I felt at
times uncomfortable and that I was deceiving people I liked by not being
completely open about what I was doing. The dilemma faced was that if I had
been quite open about some of my areas of interest, th^nrespondents would
have adapted their account to render tfc acceptable in terms of the culture of
their organisation. One issue proved particularly difficult. The processes of
change were perceived to be conflictual and raised issues about power and
control in networks.
As the interviewing progressed, it became apparent that the conception that
some officials might indeed be in disagreement with their political masters and
be 'subverting' the system (in their own interpretation) were likely to produce
strong elements of denial. This was particularly apparent in organisations which
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had a strong adherence to the notion of rational bureaucracy, for example the
Scottish Office and the Health Board.
In these cases the focus on voluntary organisations was particularly useful as the
topic seemed sufficiently removed from respondent's own concerns to appear
safe and unthreatening. By the time more dangerous topics were raised in the
interview, confidence had been gained and it seemed safe to discuss issues of
concern within their own agency.
There are ethical dilemmas in not being completely honest, but it is doubtful
whether complete honesty about the areas of interest would have assisted the
process of discovering the participant's perceptions of reality. A revealed interest
in power struggles to achieve change, would certainly have increased the
reticence of some informants.
Dalton (1959) observes of this issue
'I have watched ... other researchers (who had told top management
what they were doing unlike Dalton) ... the smiles and delighted
manipulation of (them) by guided personnel.... the frequently trivial
areas to which alerted and fearful officers guided the enquiry.'
p.275
The Social Work Department asked me to register with them as a researcher and
the questions I wished to pursue were included in the proposal put to them but
in a way which emphasised the interest (genuine) in the voluntary sector. There
was also a moment when it seemed that perhaps the officials in the Health
Board were colluding over what they told me, as each successive one informed
me with whom I had previously spoken. Eventually however it emerged that
the file on the Action Group was held centrally and the filing clerk bemused at
the sudden rush of requests for this from officers was commenting to borrowers
about this sudden eruption of interest. I tried to be as honest as I could with
respondents but without planting ideas and suspicions about my motives.
The interviews were unstructured and my approach was to go to the interview
with a schedule of issues that it seemed appropriate to explore with that
respondent. The first few interviews were used to identify the main areas of the
case study and subsequent interviews attempted to explore these fairly
systematically.The whole strategy required enormous flexibility on my part and
quick thinking when the line of enquiry seemed about to go off in either an
46
unanticipated or undesired direction. It also required enormous concentration
on what the interviewee was saying in order to ensure that appropriate
questions were asked. Sometimes I emerged from an interview cursing myself
for not following up a point whose significance struck me too late.
Dexter argues that in interviewing 'elite' respondents it is important to let the
interviewee define the situation, to encourage them to structure their own
account and to allow them to define which information is relevant. The good
interviewer needs to be able to hear what the respondent is saying/listening
with the Third Ear', to give concentrated attention and to display empathy.
These were all strategies I sought to adopt. In particular, the emphasis placed on
understanding the respondent's perspective and contribution to the
development of the project usually relaxed them quite quickly. A comment like
'that must have been very difficult for you', often gave the respondent scope to
explain in great detail exactly what those difficulties had been.
Most interviews resembled a fairly relaxed discussion between two people who
understood the area and were seeking to make sense of it. One problem area
against which it was important to guard, was of taking too much understanding
for granted. In particular, those people who knew me very well, tended to
emphasize our shared understandings in interviews and make comments like 'I
don't need to tell you what I think of X'... In reality he did, because my own
extrapolation of his meaning might be awry. It was important therefore to learn
to ask questions prefaced by remarks like, 'I know this seems stupid, but I need to
ask you to explain what you mean by... because of the nature of the research.'
This seemed acceptable to most respondents, as long as I remembered to ask.
One tactic adopted which proved very useful was to outline to respondents the
kind of information given by previous respondents and to indicate areas they
suggested were problematic. The new respondent would then be invited to
confirm or deny the correctness of that impression. This enabled them to agree
or disagree with that impression which was useful for checking veracity, while
at the same time indicating some of my areas of knowledge, which could avoid
repetitious information giving.
A major problem in research of this nature is assessing the extent to which a
respondent tells the truth. Sometimes different interviewees would offer
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varying accounts of events. Which one was I to believe? Dean and Whyte (1958)
stress the importance of starting from a recognition of informants* subjectivity:
'We are merely getting the informant's picture of the world as he
sees it. And... only as he is willing to pass it on to us in this particular
interview.'
in Denzin (1970) p.120
They argue that a number of factors must be considered in assessing the veracity
of informants. In particular, when they are expressing opinions it is important
to consider any ulterior motives, bars to spontaneity, desire to please, and
idiosyncratic factors. One particular factor to be addressed in this study was the
desire by informants to present their contribution in the most positive way
possible. An amusing example was when I asked respondents where the idea
that the Action Group might apply for Urban Programme funding came from.
At least four respondents claimed credit for suggesting that avenue. Experience
of development work perhaps makes this not as far-fetched as it seems, for often
an idea is suggested by several different people before it is acted upon.
However, the more serious problems of veracity arose over the issues where
there was conflict over policy which one side had Tost'. It is one thing to offer an
interviewer an account of successes, but quite another to discuss aspects of past
performance which one might prefer to forget. In these circumstances the
interviewer must be alert to signs of discomfiture.
It is also important to note that there are different types of untruth. Firstly the
respondent may not have paid much attention or simply cannot remember.
Secondly the perception of the situation might be selective. Thirdly the facts may
be shaped to the respondent's perspective because he is uncomfortable with
reality and finally they may simply lie.
Whilst obviously implausible or unreliable accounts can be detected, the most
important check open to me was against other accounts. Because multiple
interviews with key participants were conducted, it was possible to take back
contradictory statements and check them out. Facts could also be checked against
contemporaneous minutes and correspondence. -Being a known researcher also
meant that I had formed some assessment about some people based on previous
knowledge of their performance.
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On the whole the story which has emerged has a consistency about it which I
think indicates that an account of actual events and behaviour was obtained. My
respondents on the whole did tell the truth as they saw it, although sometimes
inadvertently. Three respondents came to the interview with 'minders', which
initially made me quite nervous that I would simply hear the account they
wanted to give. However in all cases this had the opposite effect, for either the
minder volunteered information that the main informant had been trying not
to give or the minder seemed to give the respondent confidence to be more
honest than they might have been in a one-to-one situation.
Most usually the issue which raised its head was the centrality of the issue to the
informant. Whilst the issue of developing supported accommodation was
central to those seeking change, the same cannot always be said of those who
were perceived as unenthusiastic about the issue. Thus sometimes memory
failed. At times one had the suspicion that memory lapses were fortuitous for
example to avoid losing face by admitting to having opposed something which
was now 'flavour of the month'. One or two respondents, I suspect, simply lied
(see eg Ch7 HB Official below p.240). More usually memory failures stemmed
from the events being one small facet of the daily round rather than
representing a significant milestone in achieving a much desired project. There
is little doubt, therefore, that the degree of commitment to the project of the
informants affected the quality of information received.
It did seem that there were greater problems over veracity in the Health Board.
Indeed one forgot such a central feature of the case that it was difficult to believe
it was accidental. Other respondents in the Health Board however said that his
account was untrue and in particular, it was fortunate that one respondent had
shifted jobs into the Health Board after these events and gave me accounts of
similar behaviour which seemed to confirm a standard pattern of going through
the forms of co-operation with the local authority rather than whole-hearted
commitment to the idea of joint planning.
3.6 Documentary Evidence
The second strand of the research strategy was the use of documentary evidence.
Clearly the activities of the Action Group had generated a large amount of
written material over the years. Being well informed was very important in
49
interviewing powerful people. I was fortunate that both the Action Group and a
member of the Health Board gave me free access to their files from which I was
able to extract key documents such as the minutes of meetings and
correspondence. Some officials in the local authority also gave me copies of all
official reports and minutes and copies of the relevant government circulars
were obtained. All these enabled me to check the truth of the accounts I was
offered.
The written record was, as might be expected, incomplete. For example, the
minutes of the first year of operation of the Action Group could not be found.
However, documentary evidence proved invaluable in a number of ways.
Initially, I used documentary evidence to familiarise myself with the Action
Group activities and ethos and to identify key concerns. One interesting
researcher effect was that the Project Co-ordinator reorganised the filing system,
so embarrassed was he by the disorder of the files.
As the interviews progressed, I was able to use contemporaneous minutes,
correspondence and reports to check the veracity of respondents. Sometimes it
was useful to be able to refer to the written record, rather than an alternative
account. Equally having read these documents enhanced the impression I could
give as an informed interviewer.
Finally, in analysing the interview material, the existence of a written record
was useful in structuring the chronology of events as respondents frequently
confused the order in which different decisions were taken. Nonetheless
valuable as these documents were, they only gave half the story, for many of the
negotiations were never written down, for the simple reason that the informal
side of organisations is rarely acknowledged. This is one of the major concerns
of this thesis.
3.7 Confidentiality
Confidentiality has been an issue I have found quite difficult to resolve. At the
time the research was undertaken some people felt quite vulnerable, should it
become common knowledge that they had acted in certain ways. They therefore
gave me information on condition they were not revealed as the source. In
order to try to protect them, pseudonyms for people and places have been
adopted throughout this thesis. However it is clear that anyone involved in this
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area may well speculate as to informants' identities. There is little I can do to
prevent that. The time which has elapsed since the study was made may,
however, have lessened some of these sensitivities.
3.8 Analysis
The analysis of the material was on-going. The method adopted resembled that
described by Burns (1977) of the BBC. As in this study he tested hypotheses in
interviews and
'interjected attempts at articulating half-formed impressions or
interpretations that had already occurred to me.'
Thus the interpretation of data was on-going throughout the interview process
and analysis consisted in his case of reading and re-reading notes
'reconciling and arranging the relevant contents and composing all I
wanted to say in a reasonably coherent and comprehensible way
without losing anything of consequence and without
misrepresenting it.'
The process of analysis in this study was very similar. At first I tried to identify
themes and place them on card indexes with quotes that exemplified them.
However it was quickly realised that the data did not lend itself to that kind of
analysis and any system devised quickly broke down under the complexity of the
material. It was also very time-consuming. The most powerful analytical
framework for this kind of data was chronology. Telling the story and
examining different facets of it in a theoretical context now seems the most
likely format to prove illuminating to a reader. Therefore, highlighter pens
proved to be a most useful tool, marking passages in each interview of relevance
to different parts of the story. Because, as noted above, there were relatively few
overlapping accounts of different facets of the story, the task was not
unmanageable. No informant was involved from the foundation of the Action
Group to the successful negotiation of the project. However two informants
were involved for all of the project negotiations and it was possible therefore to
take their accounts as the organising framework and check other accounts
against these. Despite the differing perspectives, it was remarkable the extent to
which the accounts did corroborate each other. There is always a sense in which,




done seems simple and obvious. However, a true reflection of the process of
analysing of this material would have to acknowledge, at the very least, both the
size of the task and the complexity of the material to be analysed. There were
many days and weeks of frustration as I struggled to give an account which was
both clear and true to the reality. I hope I have succeeded.
3.9 Conclusion
On balance it seemed that being a known researcher did not impede my progress
in this research. Indeed the knowledge of the field I brought to the interviews
was invaluable in enabling me to ask the pertinent questions and in creating
confidence in my informants that this was not a time-wasting project. There is
little doubt in my mind that a different research strategy t.ould have been more
appropriate. The case study approach and the research tools used seem to enable
some interesting questions to be asked. More problematic is the question of
whether the research would be replicable by another researcher. Hammersley
and Atkinson (1983) and Piatt (1981) both point to the different kinds of data
obtained by known researchers. Certainly the material is richer., but is it more
valid? Piatt also observes shared community membership and a continuing
relationship made interviewing one's peers more like participant observation.
So perhaps in the end this does fulfil the second criteri onfor an ethnographic
study.
Ultimately the aspect which proved most difficult to assess was the one which
had started me on the trail, the overthrow of the Planning and Resources
Committee recommendations by the Health Board. There was no record of the




Just a few parents?
4.1 Summary
This chapter offers an account of the establishment of the West City Action
Group in 1976 (originally called the Division 3 Action Group), and its
subsequent struggle to gain acceptance as a legitimate voluntary organisation
with the right to speak on behalf of the parents and families of people with a
mental handicap. The chapter focuses, therefore, on the early life of the group.
Firstly, it explains the context in which the group was established and the
decisions taken about how the group was to operate. These were crucial to its
establishment as an organisation which was to challenge existing thinking about
the provision of services to mentally handicapped people. How did the group
become so quickly established? What were the factors which enabled it to avoid
the pitfalls experienced by so many self-help groups?
Secondly the chapter gives an example of the way the group related to the Social
Work department to highlight the complexities of the relationships which had
to be addressed. This section shows that whatever the present rhetoric the
formal relationship between the organisation and statutory authority has not
always been smooth.
4.2 Introduction
The Division 3 Action Group was established in May 1976 following an
initiative by the local area social work team. By 1991 the group had a staff of over
60 people and a turnover in excess of £700,000. A major concern of this thesis is
how a small locally based group group achieves the legitimacy to secure this
level of funding over a relatively short span of years. Wievel and Hunter (1985),
following Benson's (1975) analysis, suggest in examining the genesis of




iii) legitimacy flowing from nested power
The first criterion implies having the ability to 'deliver the goods'. Obviously the
ability to do this will affect an organisations credibility. The second criterion
indicates the extent to which the organisation's authority stems from the need of
outside agencies
'to deal with local communities, but are often at a loss as to how to
approach them or even symbolically to define them.'
p.490 Wievel and Hunter (1985)
Nested power stems from the ability of the group to 'mobilise resources external
to the network', in Benson's terminology and means that legitimacy is seen
'as a direct function of the degree to which one can call upon the
sources of back-up power to make one's own power effective, in case
of need.'
ibid.
The case which follows will be explored with this analysis in mind and the
factors which gave the group legitimacy to obtain funding will be examined.
The Division 3 Action Group was established as a self-help group for parents
and families of mentally handicapped people. The histories of similar groups
indicate a key role for outside agencies such as statutory bodies in the formation
of voluntary groups. (Hatch 1980). The actions of the local area team were crucial
to the establishment of the group. It is also likely that without support of some
kind the group would have run out of steam ( as many such groups do) and
disbanded within a couple of years. (Richardson and Goodwin 1983) That this
did not happen does not stem from chance, but from a combination of factors
including the context in which the group was formed, the increased resource
flow in the early 1970's and the personnel involved.
4.3 Why establish an Action Group?
In order to identify the factors which led to the establishment of a group for
parents and families of mentally handicapped people, it is important first of all
to examine the context of these events. The 1970's in particular, were a time of
organisational change in statutory services, as outlined in Chapter 1. By 1975 the
major re-organisations of social work, local government and health were
complete. The initial under-funding of social work was beginning to be rectified
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and a result workers were more optimistic about their work. There were debates
about the nature of provision. Was the emphasis on institutional care correct?
Should there be more community based services? What kind of services did
people need? How did these relate to current provision?
The importance of the context in which the group developed needs to be
recognised. Plains is located in the Central Belt of Scotland. The Region covers a
large city and its hinterland, part rural, part mining communities. With the
exception of the period 1982 - 1986, it had been a Labour dominated authority
since regionalisation in 1975. Bigtown Corporation had Labour as the largest
party 1972-1975. Prior to that spending had been very restricted by a ratepayers'
controlled council. At this time the effects of the change of emphasis which
Labour control brought were just beginning to be felt. Additional resources were
available. Within Plains Social Work Department in 1975 a number of policy
changes were in the process of implementation. Area teams were being
decentralised to locally based offices and the number of qualified social workers
increased. The effects of these additional resources varied. In a number of area
teams in areas of extreme social deprivation, this meant simply that they were
able to respond more adequately to existing demand. But in others, including
Division 3 which covered part of the tenemental inner-city, an area of
respectable council housing and a residential seaside resort, things were less
stressed.
'But things were changing and changing quite dramatically -
regionalisation, Labour control, there was a big expansion going on...
at the time of joining (Division 3 in City Hall), my recollection was
of a couple of seniors, two and a half social workers, some admin
and a student. It built up to 50 staff overall - a dramatic increase.'
LA Official 2
The team had established itself in its area by 1973 and because it was in no way a
natural community, the then Area Officer had organised the team to operate in
three geographical areas; what would now be called patch social work. The team
developed a reputation for innovation and the area officer promoted a pro¬
active role.
'There was a growth in resources. "Promoting social welfare"- I
thought we were supposed todo that and I saw community work as a
way of building up (more) resources.'
LA Official 1
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The establishment of the Action Group was not the only new work undertaken
by the team.
'It was a time of change remember and the (local) team had already
done things like taking CSV's, had created four resource work posts
with young people and the elderly - there was a lot of innovation
going on and there was a lot of pushing for different stuff.'
LA Official 2
They seemed to have the space to innovate:
'There was a lot of talk in the area team about it. They felt 'this team
really does have the capacity to tackle this, we're not overstretched' -
there wasn't a high call rate at the office. We felt it was criminal if we
did not consider our area, to look at all its needs and consider what
way to deploy ourselves.'
LA Official 2
However, whatever the motivation for establishing the group, the initial
impetus was not demand from clients. The main pressure on the team was said
to be from the elderly and according to the prime mover in establishing the
Action Group
'mental handicap was a non-issue with all the area teams.'
LA Official 2
There were two problems in instigating work with this client group. Firstly field
social workers simply had no locus in issues relating to mentally handicapped
people. When social work departments were established in 1970 the scanty field
services which had been provided to mentally handicapped people went by the
board:
'It was easy to understand because resources were stretched and had
tended to go to children and families and offenders. There wasn't
much left over in terms of time and energy to get to grips with the
mentally handicapped.'
LA Official 2
At that time the main involvement of the Social Work Department lay in the
provision of Adult Training Centre places. These services had recently been
transferred from being the responsibility of the former local authority public
health department. Field social workers, however, were not involved in the
assessment of potential trainees for placement. That responsibility lay with the
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Residential and Day Care Services division of the Social Work Department and
there was little interchange between the two sections.
'There was no proper assessing done at all at social worker level -
you'd think using a social work resource there'd be a proper
assessment of social background etc like is done with elderly people
or children. You wouldn't just provide a resource without any
investigations into circumstances. This wasn't done at that time.
There was a body known as the School Leavers Panel. It did have
some social work personnel on it, but at divisional manager level.'
LA Official 2
Secondly, the new Social Work Act emphasised that field social work provision
should be generic and provide 'one-door' to clients, in the early days of social
work this was often interpreted as meaning that each social worker had to be
able to provide a generic service. Thus there was often considerable discussion
about whether it was right to specialise. This is clearly reflected in the report
which preceded the establishment of the Action Group.
It seems, then, that the crucial factor in placing the issue of mental handicap on
the policy agenda within the area team, was the ability of individual several key
workers to influence initiatives. The new Area Officer took an innovative
stance:
'he works from principle rather than management - he was
constantly asking questions - What are we trying to do here? What's
the best way of doing it?'
LA Official 21
Moreover he was said to have experience of self-help parents' groups in
England.
'He was interested in a project with the mentally handicapped, to see
if it could result in the development of a specialism that, after initial
full-time groundwork could be assimilated back into the team
without distorting social work's generic approach/
p.l Student Report (1976)
^For a variety of reasons the interviewing strategy in this early part of the thesis was not
as good as it might have been. This means that the significance of exploring this
aspect of the Group's application was underestimated and therefore, this Area
Officer who replaced LA Official 1, was not interviewed.
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The Senior Social worker was also new to the department and had previously
been a registered mental welfare officer in London:
"We'd never got to grips with the problem there either. I carried that
concern forward."
LA Official 2
Thus two of the key workers in the team had ideas about ways of providing
services different to the then orthodoxy in the department. Both were interested
in a more participative approach to clients by the department and because
resources were not greatly under pressure, they set about finding ways of making
this kind of provision.
'(LA Official 2) was interested in consumer groups. He felt that rather
than just social work being a crisis response type of affair, it should
be involved in co-operating with what people conceive as their
social need, it should be much more of a co-operative type of exercise
and .... matching expertise with what people actually want.'
Student
And the Area Officer advocated a similar approach. It was necessary because:
'we knew nothing about mental handicap issues .... so it made sense
to look at it from the consumer's point of view, which meant
bringing them in.'
LA Official 2
Equally, the perception of existing services was negative: they were seen to be
fragmented, being delivered at different stages in the life cycle by health,
education and social work, and moreover inadequate. In particular the
unfavourable views of institutional provision noted in Chapter One prevailed:
'In terms of the way people were thinking about mental handicap at
the professional level, this was the message coming through ....
subnormality hospitals .... there was the beginning of a recognition
that it's not the place to put the mentally handicapped.'
Student
Thus these two workers had good reasons to want to move forward and develop
provision for this client group. They were interested in these people, they saw
existing services as inadequate and they perceived solutions which could be
applied.
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The final ingredient to this mix was of crucial importance: the team was asked to
take on placement for nine months a theological student - a nun studying for a
diploma in pastoral studies. 'She was brilliant - highly intelligent' with a
religious perspective
'a very political lady, extremely astute, who didn't need to be taught
the politics of social work.'
LA Official 2
This was the person who was to do the "leg-work" for the establishment of the
Action Group. Instead of being given the usual kind of tasks allocated to
students and being treated as an extra pair of hands she was given the remit to
explore the situation for mentally handicapped people in the area including the
number, their situation, their degree of contact with social services and the
feasibility of establishing a parents' group:
'that was always envisaged as a possible outcome.'
Student
'We anticipated the possibility of identifying persons who could be
encouraged to initiate activities or form pressure groups around
issues after a while and once this was done, work on a pressure
group or activity group.'
p.l Student Report (1976)
The student was, in addition, to familiarise herself with existing provision, and
make an evaluation of its suitability. Secondly, she was to acquaint herself with
all cases of mental handicap in Division 3 and to try to establish an
information base from which referrals to other agencies could also be made.
This apparently rather straightforward project encountered a number of barriers.
Whilst some cases were identified by searching through the files of the former
Welfare Department which had had responsibility for adult mentally
handicapped people prior to re-organisation, others had to be obtained by asking
other statutory agencies like health for under-fives and education for those of
school-age. Co-operation was not automatically forth-coming.
'There was a reticence on the part of other agencies to tell her
anything about their information on mental handicap... there was a
confidentiality barrier and I think also a query: Why was somebody
asking? ..A feeling that it was their ball and nobody else's.'
LA Official 2
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Indeed so cagey were other agencies about revealing information about these
people, that another social worker who was also seeking to develop services for
this client group was said to have to travel on the Education Department's buses
taking children to special schools and collect names and addresses, as he could
not obtain this information through official channels.
4.3.1 The findings
Despite these difficulties, the survey was completed.2 It uncovered about 260
families with problems as predictable as they were depressing. The re¬
organisation of social work had removed what little service there had been from
the local authority. Some people under guardianship orders had not been
visited for 10 years.
Responsibility for mentally handicapped people was fragmented:
'No-one in authority has overall responsibility and this creates a
likelihood of lags in service delivery due to vagueness about who
should be involved.'
p.l op.cit
Overwhelmingly the condition was conceived of and treated within a medical
and institutional model:
'The handicapped child becomes the focus of specialised attention
and this underlines the pattern of their entire future relationship
with the rest of society.... It is foreseen that they will require a
number of definite facilities and institutions that succeed each other
to cover the years of their future i.e. the special school, the senior
occupation centre, the subnormality hospital.'
p.2 op.cit.
The practice, then general among professionals particularly doctors, was to stress
the abnormal nature of handicap which had the effect of discouraging parents
from expecting much of their mentally handicapped infant. This had the effect,
the report argued, of creating self-fulfilling prophecies.
2It is difficult to date these events exactly, as the report contains no dates whatsoever.
However initial letters were being sent out to parents in January 1976, so it is likely
that these events occurred between October 1975 and April 1976 when the first
meeting of parents was called.
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Parents were often helpless bystanders while the system provided for their
children:
'The experts have much more control over the future of a
handicapped child in ratio to parental control than would be
considered desirable elsewhere. Generally parents must count on a
lifelong dependency on authorities of one sort or another, some
more or less ready to hear their opinions, others not so responsive.'
p.2 op.cit.
The report identified common concerns amongst parents, these being:
a) A desire for a higher quality of specialised educational provision.
b) Anxiety about accommodation problems foreseen in the future.
c) Lack of advice about employment prospects and sheltered work.
d) A feeling for a local clinic and more adequate counselling.
e) A number of practical difficulties that are individual, (from letter
dated 11.4.76 subsequently sent out by SWD inviting parents to an
initial meeting to establish the group).
The case studies appended to the report create a picture of elderly parents locked
into isolated relationships with mainly middle-aged mentally handicapped
people. There were low expectations leading to very low educational attainment
and the most pressing problem confronting all families was:
"what was going to happen after (the parents') death?
p.7 op.cit.
The families lacked any choice in provision
'(One family) was left to their own devices and (the father) feels Jean
suffered from inadequate stimulation. They were not even given
help about financial matters.'
p.8 op.cit.
The stigma attached to this handicap was enormous:
'Mr. S has never mentioned that his son is handicapped at his work
and Mrs. S said that a few years ago she would not have seen me.
She felt completely demoralised and lonely in her burden.... they




Given the scale of the problems the report concluded that there was a need for
continuing social work support across the lifetime of the handicapped person
but the overwhelming need was for a parents' self help group:
'self help is an obvious avenue of real socialising progress because
families can articulate their view and combine to direct their
frustrations into actions. It is for them to challenge the ignorance of
society that it leaves the families of the handicapped to a burden it
consigns as personal to them.'
p. 14 op.cit.
A separate voluntary organisation3 was seen as necessary because^although
opinion was changing towards community provision there were no
resources for this kind of provision:
'One of the problems was that the Social Work Department was
picking up these ideas but they didn't have the wherewithal to
respond. There was interest that there should be something around
on the voluntary side to start building up the resources and pressing
for the resources.'
LA Official 2
And there was a need to create something new because the existing voluntary
provision, the Bigtown branch of the Scottish Society for the Mentally
Handicapped was perceived as hidebound. It was enmeshed in service provision
and probably most importantly had a negative perception of the possibilities of
achieving change:
'It didn't have much imagination, was very pessimistic. They said it
wasn't possible to change things and they certainly weren't into
politicising mental handicap issues.'
LA Official 2
It emerges that besides a value commitment to the issue, the area of mental
handicap was perceived by the social workers, and confirmed by the survey as an
area with potential for development. The assessment was that a voluntary
agency would have the best means of securing resources and a parents' group
would be able to provide mutual support and break down isolation. However
3It would seem that the idea of an organisation with staff was formulated very early on in
the life of the Action Group. It is clearly stated in the report (above p.59) that the
aim was to bring a group together to put pressure on statutory agencies to improve
services.
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the group that was to emerge had a larger vision. Where, then, did this
alternative jaarents' group come from? How was it that they perceived the
possibility of^changing attitudes to mental handicap and achieving
community based provision?
4.3.2 Establishing the group
The next step was to begin the process of forming a group. In fact this had
already begun for as the student had progressed with her project, she also had
laid the groundwork with the parents, preparing them for the establishment of a
group. It would seem that like all good development personnel, she had
identified seven or eight who were most likely to respond to this initiative.
These people seem to have been been identified through conversations in the
course of the study. This group formed a core, who were to go on to form the
basis of the first Executive committee of the Action Group.
It was hoped that the very act of bringing these parents together would stimulate
some action. The initial problem was to achieve that mobilisation. The team
tackled this in two stages. The small group of seven or eight people were invited
to a meeting at the area office on 20 April 1976. It is clear that these people were
enthusiastic and that they wanted to participate in the group.
But it was quickly realised that a wider endorsement by parents than the initial
seven or eight members was needed. The key factor was seen as overcoming the
sense of hopelessness felt by many parents.
'People had battled on, on their own for so long they might feel too
depressed to believe that there might be another way of tackling the
difficulty.'
Student
Parents were persuaded to attend a meeting at St. Fillan's School hall on 19 May
1976 by letter but more importantly the original steering group visited a number
of parents identified by the survey in their own homes, seeking to persuade
them to attend for
'nobody's going to convince a parent of the mentally handicapped
better than a person who knows their position.'
Student
Some 45 parents attended the meeting and:
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'The amazing thing about that meeting was (because we'd no idea
what was going to happen) the level of feeling about the need, about
no services - was like a dam bursting. It was quite dramatic.'
LA Official 2
The rhetoric of the group is that it arose from parental indignation once they
were called together to discuss common problems. However to take that at face
value would be rather naive. Obviously the ground had been well prepared by
the social work staff. Indeed one might observe that, given the participative
model advocated, the approach was, perhaps, rather autocratic, but possibly also
more conducive to success.
It is important at this stage to try to tease out factors which influenced the
formation of the group at this particular period of time in Bigtown. The picture
outlined in the report was common to parents of mentally handicapped people
across Britain in 1976. What was different about this particular part of the town
that engendered the levels of activity to be seen subsequently?
Obviously, the social work personnel were instrumental in the establishment of
the organisation. But there were significant factors about the parents, too. Firstly
the fact that these parents were brought together and secondly the range of skills
and abilities the parents possessed. The idea of bringing the group together for
pressure group activities rather than the more usual mutual aid activities like
running playgroups was also unusual.
Mental handicap isolated both families and the handicapped individual in a
number of distinctive ways: there was a large stigma; special educational
facilities were centralised rather than neighbourhood based; the lack of local
provision of hostels, adult training centres or employment; the large asylum
was outside the town. All these factors meant that opportunities for chance
encounters within the same locality between families with handicapped people
in them were extremely limited.
'At the time before the group started we didn't know any other
parents in this area who had a mentally handicapped child. We
didn't know any of them and probably never would if it hadn't been
for (the student).'
Parent 1
Bringing the parents together broke down their isolation. Moreover, they shared
a deep concern about their children and all wanted to see something belter for
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them. The frustrations which spurred the parents to activity were various: one
family of a young child had been unable to secure him a school place despite the
promise of education for all in the 1974 Education Act. But overwhelmingly it
was concern for the future which motivated the majority.
T think we were hoping to find something for Gordon (her child)....
The prospect of mental handicap hospital for the rest of their lives is
not a very pleasant thought. A lot of the parents involved were older
than us .... They were all getting to an age when they were beginning
to think about - how much longer am I going to be here? What is
going to happen to my child when I'm not?'
Parent 1
One of the striking things about mental handicap is that it is not limited to
economically deprived sections of the community - this raises the second factor
which was important to the Action Group. The fact that mental handicap knows
no class barriers meant that the parents possessed a wide range of skills, abilities
and contacts and included the managing director of a small company and a
journalist.
The area team was quite selective about which parents it involved - those living
alone, those whose children were in open employment, those not visited by the
date of the meeting4, and those with very particular difficulties were not invited
- the group that came together was in the word of one parent
'like a good football team.'
Parent 2
and it was
'clear from the beginning that that particular group of people would
stick with it.'
Student
They were well connected to local networks.
'They all had a finger in a pie somewhere' .... and 'they had a
tremendous amount of drive and energy when it came to the whole
effort and the funding not least of all. Part of that drive... people had
skills and talents that social workers had never possessed.'
LA Official 2
4The word used by the student in a letter to a parent is 'vetted'.
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Thus it seems that there was a vital conjunction of interest between social
workers in the team and parents. The former wanted to establish a group
because they saw that pressure was required to place the issue of mental
handicap on the policy agenda and gain resources for it. It was also significant
that the necessity for more resources was perceived and that it was not simply a
matter of using the parents as resources in the conventional self-help model.
The groundwork was well done: the group of activists identified, provided the
support necessary to the achievement of the social workers' objectives. The
provision of a meeting point between a number of dissatisfied parents of
mentally handicapped people was a key ingredient. However, the positive
attitude of the parents was also an important factor: they believed it was possible
to achieve change. Moreover, they also had the skills to achieve that change and
a freedom of manoeuvre in using pressure group tactics which were not
available generally to those in the employment of local authorities. And the
parents had their own objectives.
4.4 What kind of organisation?
The main aim of the group, as far as the parents were concerned, was to keep
their handicapped people within the local community.
'It was to avoid having to send handicapped children, whose parents
were elderly and possibly had died, out of the community.'
Parent 1
In order to do this the group needed to seek more and better locally based
services.
Social work staff wanted to establish some locus to provide services themselves
and to begin to overcome the fragmentation of service within and between
statutory departments. An article by LA Official 2 in the second issue of the
Action Group's newsletter highlights this concern. In it he expresses concern
that the needs of families of mentally handicapped people have been ignored
despite the claims for a generic social work service; that although there has been
legislation it has not been backed up by resources and urges the social work
department to assume responsibility for families from the birth of a
handicapped child. Moreover the ultimate aim has to be integration of service
provision by the statutory agencies involved:
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'A joint development of the services between Social Work
Departments and Health Authorities is an absolute must in dealing
with this problem, and pressure must be brought to bear to ensure
that this development takes place as quickly as possible.'
LA Official 2 in Div 3 News no.2 (March 1977)
Without doubt this was the long-term aim of the key staff in the area team and a
first step towards it was the establishment of the Action Group.
In their early days (until February 1978) the Action Group was based in the area
office, (indeed such was the team's commitment to the group that the Area
Officer vacated his own office to allow the Action Group to move in!). It was
seen as vitally important that the group have its own separate identity because:
'They were ultimately likely to have more power and influence on
the situation than if there was .... some over-identification and
overdependency on the area team.'
LA Official 2
It was seen that the chances of the group's success would be greater if the
demand was seen to come from the consumers of services - therefore the
community action model was to be the method of working adopted by the staff:
'Independence, perhaps was also to do with our [referring to the
Action Group not the area team!] own integrity, our own developing
sense of worth. They were the ones with the skills and knowledge of
the mental handicap issue. I think it was only reasonable that some
person lacking in knowledge from the social services shouldn't come
along and tell them what to do.'
LA Official 2
If it was to be an independent organisation, decisions then had to be taken about
its name, its tasks and the method of achieving these.
4.4.1 What's in a name?
The name Division 3 Action Group seems a curious choice. Division 3 only had
meaning within the context of the Social Work Department - the number
allotted to the geographical area covered by the three localities in the division.
So why was this name chosen by the parents at the first meeting? The team
member initially saw it as inappropriate and tried to dissuade them:
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'we were saying being associated with our area team, it could be a bad
thing for them, even in the view of our own department and also
externally.'
LA Official 2
But the parents saw the name as a way of making an area identification
contiguous with the area team boundaries.
'This was Division 3 on the Bigtown map (referring to the team
boundary map in the Area Office) and so we thought, how can we
make them realise this is a completely local thing? We were looking
to local people to help.'
Parent 2
The local element was seen by parents as very important. One respondent put
great emphasis on the fact that they were raising money for mentally
handicapped people in their local area not in some other part of the town.
However the team boundaries were arbitrarily set and covered at least three
distinct communities. The team recognised this explicitly in their pattern of
working as they worked in three sub-teams on an area basis. To have included
all three communities in the title would perhaps have forfeited a certain
snappiness in the title - hence the choice of Division 3 Action Group.
In a sense it was quite good - they could have called themselves the
Royal Society for Hearts and Flowers and everyone would have
loved them immediately. Whereas they called themselves Division
3 Action Group. Nobody could understand it ... people got it round
the wrong way, but everybody thought about it ... in some ways it
was the right ingredient.'
LA Official 2
The interesting thing about this name is that rather than identifying the group
with the local community, it identified them with one specific part of the Social
Work Department - the local Area team. This identification makes more sense if
it is viewed as taking up a position within the context of a power struggle within
the Social Work Department than in terms of any specifically local identity.5
5At a later stage in its development, urged by the Director of Social Work, the Group
widened its boundaries and changed its name to West City Action Group. This it was
argued would enable it to encompass an area of deprivation and thus allow it to
qualify for urban aid. However it also reflected the boundaries of the West City
division of the Social Work Department and allowed the department to second to
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4.4.2 How were the tasks of the group conceived?
The overall aims of the group were those outlined above, namely: to seek to
provide locally based services for mentally handicapped people and their
families and to tackle the broader issue of fragmentation of provision between
statutory departments.
In order to achieve its aims the Action Group defined three tasks:
a) Publicity - 'to establish a public identity for the group and to
communicate the work of the group to those in the area who had
a particular interest and to the public in general.'
b) Family contact - 'to continue the assessment of the needs of the
mentally handicapped and their families within the area who
may not be members of the group.
c) Fund-raismg - 'to put the group on a sound financial basis with
the longer term aim of employing full-time staff and providing
premises to act as a multi-purpose centre.'
AG report (undated) c. December 1976 - April 1977
The reason for this startling initial clarity was two-fold. Firstly, the careful
planning and groundwork which had gone into the establishment of the group
by the area team. Secondly, in the very early days, another social worker, a friend
of LA Official 2, was introduced to the group. On a least three occasions, over the
first two years of the life of the organisation, this person ran workshop sessions
for the committee and members to assist in the identification of goals and
priorities.
'He was trying to stir it up he was trying to break through on the
issues and I think he was finding the same problems everyone else
was and that was there was this block in our department.'
LA Official 2
This person ran a two hour session and
the Action Group the divisional co-ordinator of services to mentally handicapped
people. (See Chapter 7, p.182)
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'It set the scene beautifully for the tasks. It actually set the reasons
why they had to get some money together... A lot of other
organisations do it the other way around (first they collect money)
and then they fall apart - they start arguing about how they are going
to spend it.'
LA Official 2
This is in contrast to the Action Group which had a clear focus on what it
wanted to achieve almost from the beginning. The main problems to be tackled
were accommodation, club-type activities and education -
'all the same problems that there are now!'
Parent 3
However, if these problems were to receive additional resources then mental
handicap had to become an issue. The group very quickly realised that there was
very little public knowledge about the nature and extent of mental handicap. It
was not uncommon for there to be confusion between mental handicap and
mental illness. If the group were going to be successful in directing more
resources to this particular client group then those with the power to allocate
those resources had to observe a greater level of public concern than was then
the case.
'In the course of debate, we were saying, "Now look, this is a non-
issue, we're sitting here and you're all concerned, you're the
consumers, but we were all talking about a non-issue. Nobody
knows about mental handicap - no-one in Scotland, beyond the
formal entrenched institutions and services, really knows anything
about it.'
LA Official 2
It became the remit of the Action Group to publicise it in
'a very dramatic sort of way.'
LA Official 2
The second task, that of family contact was very important in Benson's terms to
the establishment of authority to operate within a domain. If publicity was to be
used to create an issue of mental handicap, then those seeking that publicity had
to be seen to have a legitimate grievance. Thus it was that the Action Group
placed its emphasis oninvolving families of handicapped people.
This emphasis - both on identifying families and involving them with the
group had several purposes:
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a) it ensured that the group and also the Area Team had a picture of
the needs of mentally handicapped people.
b) it enabled consumer participation in the debate.
c) it served as a source of new members for the group.
d) by stimulating demand, it legitimated the call for higher levels of
service provision from both the action group and the Area Team.
The constitution, which was drawn up very soon after the group was formed in
1976, specified two things very clearly: that only parents of mentally
handicapped people could be office-bearers of the group and that parents must be
in the majority on the committee. However, the group was open to non-parents
and LA Official 2 seems to have attended meetings right from the start as a full
member. At that point he was the only non-parent member, but there have been
others since then, usually either social workers or politicians.
The level of membership was also important and often cited in reports and
grant applications, presumably because it was thought to lend some force to their
arguments. The membership grew from 17 in December 1976 to 56 by c. April
1978.
The received wisdom in the group was that latterly it had become more difficult
to involve parents, but the chairman in the early period observed that:
'In fact the group has always found it difficult to get a large number
of parents involved - although (the student's) survey showed a large
number of mentally handicapped people in the area, at the first
meeting we had about 7 parents involved and it's never went up
above about a dozen parents involved. There's reasons for it.
Mentally handicapped people are born of older parents, therefore the
parents are older. Because they're older there's a greater percentage of
single parents .... If you've a badly mentally handicapped child or
young adult, you can't leave them if you're a single parent, you can't




'Membership figures were always funny and false because you had
an awful lot of social workers who joined, who were interested in
getting information - the Newsletter.'
Parent 3
So there was a blurring of parent/professional boundaries on the issue of
membership. This respondent estimated that there were possibly c.40 parents
involved with the Action Group in 1986.
The way the tasks were conceived also benefited the Area Team. It legitimised
their involvement in the provision of locally based services. Within two years
of the formation of the Action Group, they had appointed their own part-time
specialist worker for the mentally handicapped and had established a mother
and toddler group for young children.
Secondly, it enabled field social workers to raise concerns about the provision of
Adult Training Centre places by the Residential and Day-care division of the
Social Work Department which was organisationally quite separate from area
teams who formed a sub-division of Field Services. Moreover:
'There tends to be a history in the department of Fieldwork and
R&DC not working very well together - not closely enough on
identifying goals. They tend to be separate goals.
Me: Why?
No idea ... I think they're just bodies with different titles and they
line themselves up and people then - It's power, people worry about
their positions, whether their bit's shrinking or whether its growing
... I haven't a clue. Human nature!'
LA Official 26
In order to further tasks one and two the Action Group gave a high priority to
resource acquisition because:
'If we weren't seen to be making an effort then nobody else was going
to give us any money.'
Parent 1
6Often when respondents were asked about conflictual situations, they answered in this
way, firstly saying that they did not know why matters were like that and
meanwhile offering a perfectly valid explanation.
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In many ways the publicity consciousness of the group was to be an asset here as
the task of publicising the issue of mental handicap led to money being raised
for example from the local Round Table. All the parents on the committee were
keyed into different aspects of local networks and they used this extensively to
raise funds. The committee minutes in the very early days contain very few
items other than various fund-raising activities. Although minutes for the first
eight months are missing, by 10 March 1977 the following items were under
consideration:
County Court Concert
Grant application to Scottish Office





Sponsorship (Ed Stewart & Heinz)
Summer Fete
There are only two other items (re membership and affiliation to Scottish
Society for the Mentally Handicapped) not directly related to fund-raising.
This emphasis on fund-raising was to be important in gaining them legitimacy
from and acceptance by statutory authorities.
'What I think it really was - what impressed a lot of people was the
fact that - still is the fact that they can raise £60,000 a year ... if they
were raising it and doing something God awful I think that would be
noted - but it was in conjunction with the sort of services and their
willingness to grab a hold of the experts and get their knowledge
from them and put it to the benefit of their children.'
LA Official 3
Indeed the group sought funds from any potential source - no stone was left
unturned. It is hard to convey the vibrancy of the group at this point.
It may be inferred then, that in its early days the main purpose of the Action
Group was to change ideas about service provision in order to help the Social
Work Department, and in particular the area team to gain a DOMAIN, as at least
initially in terms of service provision:
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'it wasn't doing a hell of a lot, I don't think. It raised money - that
was our basic function as a committee - was fund-raising.'
Parent 1
This was the first step to legitimacy. Publicity and a modicum of service
provision were also necessary, but mainly, throughout the first two years until




There was a lot of activity going on but not a lot of substance,
whereas if you read the press cuttings at that time you'd have
thought there was a substantive organisation moving forcefully on
government .... It was really a carefully orchestrated piece of noise. It
created the feeling that this was an issue that was about to explode.'
LA Official 2
To get a sense of the extent of these activities, by January 1977, the group had
been regularly featured in the Bigtown evening paper and the local weekly paper
and had been included in a BBC Scotland current affairs programme. Within
another year they were to feature in a BBC2 programme on voluntary action.
The importance of this should not be underestimated. The local paper was one
of the ways politicians in particular gauged local feeling.
The tasks identified for the group and its initial relationship with the Social
Work Department fit closely with Benson's analysis that in any
interorganisational network each organisation is seeking two main resources:
'Two basic types of resources are central to the political economy of
inter-organisational networks. These are money and authority.
....Authority refers to the legitimation of activities and the right and
responsibility to carry out programs of a certain kind.... Legitimated
claims of this kind are termed domains. The possession of a domain
permits the organisation to operate in a certain sphere, claim support
for its activities and define proper practices within its realm. Money
is of obvious importance in the mounting of programs, the
recruitment and retention of personnel and the purchase of
buildings and equipment.... Authority to conduct activities is
generally assumed to imply a claim upon money adequate to
performance in the prescribed sphere.'
p.232 Benson (1975)
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4.4.3 Significant factors in the achievement of legitimacy by the group
Three issues seem to be important to the success of the Action Group in its early
days and I shall discuss them in turn:
a) the symbiotic relationship between the parents and the
professionals - which gave the parents access to information
about available resources and the professionals authority in their
struggle to gain some locus in the provision of services for
mentally handicapped people.
b) the speedy establishment of a separate identity in the form of paid
staff and locally based premises. This established the group as a
separate persona from the area team.
c) the decision to emphasise pressure group activities rather than
club activities for mentally handicapped people. This was the
difference in philosophy which ensured that the Action Group
did not become a part of the Scottish Society for the Mentally
Handicapped.
The most important factor was the combination of the parents' demand for
improved services, with the professional skills and knowledge of bureaucracies
of a community oriented social work team. All respondents stressed the key role
played by LA Official 2 in this process.
'He was the brains behind the whole thing. He ... had the
professional knowledge about how to go about starting these things.'
Parent 2
Without him there was little chance that the parents would have found their
way through the various statutory funding mechanisms to achieve the levels of
funding that the group in fact achieved relatively quickly. He understood the
lines of communication within statutory bodies.
'For a voluntary organisation, it is difficult to know where you land
(in the Social Work Department).'
LA Official 2
For example, the relationship between the Principal Officer ( Vol. Orgs) who
recommended suitability for grant aid and the service giving parts of the
department might be opaque to outsiders. In order to ensure that these
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difficulties did not hold back the Action Group, LA Official 2 saw his role as
feeding
'them information, as much as I could get my hands on and maybe
make suggestions. Not necessarily directive. Rather there could be an
issue coming up about such and such, why don't you consider a
letter to so and so or whoever.'
LA Official 2
Indeed this official found the Action Group more relevant at that time to his
own professional development than his official employer. The group provided
him with support in the growth of his own ideas in ways which were simply not
possible within the Social Work Department because these issues relating to
mental handicap were simply not on the agenda. At times he said he found it
was hard to maintain a professional detachment regarding the group because he
was as committed as they were to achieving their objectives.
'I felt very much part... sometimes 1 felt more part of the Action
Group than I did of the area team. It felt .... I didn't feel any sort of
barrier^or that it was an us and them situation. There were times
when ^talking that I'm almost talking about being part of the team.'
LA Official 2
There was a tremendous level of commitment apparent from both the
professionals and the parents. Throughout 1977 there was a committee meeting
almost every week and the chairman and LA Official 2 would spend another
one or two evenings a week collecting furniture for the charity shop (see below
p.80) in the van belonging to the Chairman's company.
This combination of committed parents and professionals was seen to be
particularly important in arguing with statutory authorities - the professional
gaining authority in argument with potential gaining access to sources of
finance and services that they would not otherwise have done.7
7This combination is one still used by the Action Group, now employing its own professional
staff to argue with statutory authorities for resources and services. Their role was to
put the message across in ways which could be heard by bureaucrats.
Tou tended to look to the professionals for making sure things were put over in
the right presentation - they put things over on our behalf to the Social Work
Department or the Scottish Office or whoever.'
Parent 4
and when they go to meetings
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'It gave him a great deal more power, not by saying anything, but by
the fact that its very difficult for a senior civil servant to say - they
could say to LA Official 2, you don't know what you're talking about,
but to say to the parents of mentally handicapped children that, you
don't know what you're talking about - senior civil servants
wouldn't do that.'
Parent 2
From the beginning a significant contribution to the success of the Action Group
stemmed from the way it powerfully combined parents and professionals in
arguing for an expansion of services to mentally handicapped people and their
families.
The group determined early in its life, that its objectives could only be achieved
by the appointment of paid staff and the establishment of a local base. The
knowledge of funding mechanisms seems to have come from LA Official 2 and
he believes that he may have written the application too. Certainly the speed
with which paid staff were appointed was fortuitous. The Action Group were
lucky to be asking for the right thing at the right time.
The group's decision to seek two professional workers and clerical support
coincided with the inception of the Manpower Services Commission's Job
Creation Programme (JCP). This was the Labour Government's first attempt at
alleviating unemployment and turned out to be ideal for the Action Group's
purposes. It was implemented rapidly and had relatively few restrictions
compared to later schemes.
Firstly, the prime goal was to create jobs rather than services, and thus Action
Group did not have to prove the quality of what it wanted to do. It was in this
way, able to avoid entering protracted discussions about the kind of services
which ought to be provided for mentally handicapped people. In this period
they would certainly have had to prove their case if they had sought funding
AG Worker 1 can give the facts and figures side of things and present that
really well and I can come up with this is how the cuts will affect the
parents.... So we balance it that way, he gives the facts and figures and I give




from the local authority or the Scottish Office. If nothing else the negotiations
would have taken much longer.
Secondly, it is unlikely that either Plains Region or Social Work Services Group
would have funded to this extent, what was at that time primarily a pressure
group. The Regional Council's criteria for grant aid clearly specify that priority
should be given to those providing a service to a vulnerable client group.
Whilst the advent of paid staff enabled the group to organise more effectively, to
acquire premises and then to envisage service provision, it would have been
very difficult for the group to demonstrate that potential in 1976. There were
other factors which initially made service provision undesirable (see below p.95)
However when the group had established themselves both the Social Work
Department and the Scottish Office conceded higher levels of funding.
'Credibility came through providing services rather than just talking
about them - just being a pressure group which criticises but doesn't
actually do anything.'
LA Official 1
The Manpower Services Commission did not have to wrestle with these
difficulties.
Thirdly the JCP was relatively flexible in ways which later schemes ceased to be.
This enabled the Action Group to negotiate a six month extension for its first
employees - so that in all they received 18 months funding from November 1976
for two full-time workers with clerical support. This time span was vital to the
negotiation of alternative funding mechanisms.
Funding from the JCP for two workers as joint co-ordinators, was allocated in
November 1976, barely six months after the Action Group's inception. Two
workers, one male and one female came into post on 6 December 1976, the day
of the group's first Annual General Meeting. Both were recruited from the
unemployment register. The woman was a qualified social worker with
experience of working with mentally handicapped people. The man had a less
conventional background: he was a history graduate with experience in
publication production and media work. This was because
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'we didn't want 'social worky' people necessarily and we felt that one
of the problems with mental handicap was its lack of profile, so it
was a PR job basically."
LA Official 2
The remit of the workers was
'to build up a full information bank of services available, in terms of
national and local facilities; to publicise this information through a
newsheet; 'to compile a register of the mentally handicapped within
the area and to establish local self-help schemes such as activity
groups for the mentally handicapped and generally to keep abreast of
current thinking and new developments in the field of social
provision for the mentally handicapped/
Chairman's Report April 1977
The group placed a heavy emphasis on the dissemination of information
particularly that concerning new approaches to mental handicap. This
underlines the perception that the initial task was to change thinking about
mental handicap and thus increase the value accorded to mentally handicapped
individuals. This was a part of the process of innovation which is described by a
number of writers e.g. Schon (in Lockett and Spear eds 1980).
With the acquisition of workers the group were able to establish a newsletter in
February 1977. This was a fascinating mixture of news about services in other
parts of the country, exhortations about what ought to be happening not just
locally but in Scotland as a whole, and invariably in the first year stories about
money. The main headlines in that year were:
Grant Outlook Improves Issue no 1
Grant Setback Issue no 2
Round Table Give £1700 Issue no 3
Scottish Office grant! Issue no 4
Funding bodies found themselves negotiating in what must have felt like the
full glare of publicity for the Action Group's newsletter was circulated widely,
not just to parents, but to professionals and politicians including MPs. The
group had gained the support of the local MP, a Labour member, as some of the
group were also part of the local political network. They lobbied him regularly
and he wrote letters and spoke to funders on their behalf.
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The establishment of a local base was the other vital ingredient. The initial
funding through the JCP gave the group time to consolidate their position.
Right from the start, the aim was to put the group on a solid footing and secure
permanent staff and premises. By February 1977 they were negotiating with both
the Region and the Scottish Office for finance to rent a church, which the
Church of Scotland had recently closed. The first issue of the Newsletter carries
the following item:
'Hunt for premises
At the last meeting of the Action Group it was decided that members
should begin a serious search for property within Division Three
that could serve as a multi-purpose base for the group. The idea of a
fund-raising nearly-new shop combined with an information centre
was put forward and members of the group have already been
looking at likely property. It is felt that such a base would help in
creating a public identity for the group.'
Div 3 AG News no. 1 (February 1977)
The negotiations were very public and are described in their Newsletter as
follows:
'Parent 1 and Parent 3 met with LA Official 3, the Voluntary
Organisations Officer. (This person) was not in a position to
authorise a grant immediately (sic) but asked for details of the
group's plans. A full application with emphasis on a toy library (my
emphasis) was made....'
Div 3 AG News no. (1 February 1977)
Thus in applying for money, the group stressed the aspect most likely to appeal
to funders. In this case it was the service provision aspects, although it is
debatable whether this was their main purpose at that time. At the same time a
delegation including the Area Officer and the Senior Social Worker, discussed
the need for a multi-purpose centre for mentally handicapped people with the
Scottish Office.
'After an hour and half of discussion, the deputation left without
any firm commitment on spending being given.'
Div 3 AG News no. (2 March 1977)
By 2 May 1977, the Scottish Office offered a capital grant of £1000 to renovate the
church and £1700 to cover running costs on the grounds of the Action Group's
proposals being of a path-finding nature. The Social Work Department gave
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them a mere £250 but in Wildavskian budgetary strategy, the 'wedge' was in
both doors and this was not the kind of group now to go away satisfied. Whilst
the church was to prove a 'disaster area' (AG Worker 2) as a base for service
provision; it was quite unsuitable, it was a good site for a nearly new shop and
with their by now customary zest, the parents set about raising more money by
selling furniture and second-hand clothing.
'Money rapidly built up and money is power - if you've got money, if
you've got a bit of space to use it (you can) really hit the issues.'
LA Official 2
Thus the acquisition of staff and premises were part an overall strategy of
consolidating the power base of the organisation in order that it might promote
issues relating to mental handicap more effectively and develop some provision
of their own, although they always had reservations about the latter.
The Action Grqup did not have limited horizons. This is amply demonstrated
by the internal debate which took place in the early days about the nature of the
organisation. The Action Group billed itself as a self-help group for parents of
mentally handicapped children. If it were truly to be that kind of organisation
that would imply the provision of services by the group. But whilst there were
some club activities provided the main emphasis of the Action Group in its
early days was the campaign to improve the provision of statutory services.
There were good reasons for this. What many parents wanted was not to work
with their own children, but to have respite from them. The charity shop was
seen as useful work experience for mentally handicapped people, but the parents
who ran the shop found this a great strain:
'that was always very difficult .... because (the older parents) found
working with mental handicap a strain. I find it a strain and I have
never really worked with mental handicap within the group. I've
worked in the background in the office but I never got involved with
mentally handicapped people themselves.'
Parent 3
Secondly there was conflict within the group over the issue of service provision.
This seemed to stem from differing views of the potential of the group. The
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division was said to be between older and younger parents with the
professionals allied with the latter, urging pressure group activity.8
'If there was any conflict, it was the conflict of age - we were younger
and prepared to go ahead.'
Parent 2
'They were a bit petty some of them .... the older ones were a bit petty.
I don't think they were quite on our wavelength.'
Parent 1
The main source of this conflict was over the vision about what the group could
become. The older parents were viewed as having very limited objectives
confined to improving the situation of their own children. There were those on
the committee who wanted the Action Group to simply run clubs for
handicapped people (as the Scottish Society for the Mentally Handicapped did)
and
'to provide record-players and Coca-cola.'
LA Official 2
The other group saw that this emphasis would deflect them from a focus on
improving statutory services. There was a measure of altruism in the activity of
the younger group, a recognition that what they were seeking might benefit
others than themselves. There were also jealousies around as the younger group
seems to have constituted a powerful inner circle.
'After the meetings we all (about 4 or 5 committee members) used to
go over to the pub and have a couple of pints with LA Official 2 ....
and the older ones didn't quite approve. I remember at one point
one of them saying that there's more discussion in the pub
afterwards than there is in the committee meetings - which was a
load of hooey really. I think personally they were past it and they
were hanging on. They were treating it as if it were their little baby
and their money.'
Parent 1
The most telling example of this conflict came in the very early days when first
chairman appointed at the initial meeting of the group, was sacked within
weeks of its establishment. It was said that he felt very strongly that if he were
8Because I interviewed office bearers of the Group, I find that I have no interview
material relating to the other side of this conflict.
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involved in something like the Action Group then it should deliver tangible
benefits to him. The immediate issue was over whether his daughter should get
preference for a vacancy at a local employment centre for disabled people.
'It was brutal stuff. They just said - Sorry Jim, you're a nice chap and
we like you, but you're a pain in the neck at the same time. This is
far too important .... everybody's got a stake in this, itS not for you
and your child - and they booted him out.'
LA Official 2
'We were all interested in our own children but not that interested!'
Parent 1
It was success in this battle which was to ensure that the Action Group was to
have a significance which was to extend far beyond the boundaries of Division
Three. If it had kept its vision confined to the immediate demands of those on
the committee, then it would probably have become simply a locally based
service provider which would probably not have been heard of outside the area.
Thus by the end of 1977 the following decisions had been taken
the professional/parent alliance was established
the group had workers albeit temporary ones
the group had a local visibility in the form of premises
the group had a measure of independent finance
campaigning rather than service provision was the main purpose
the campaign was for better co-ordinated statutory services, locally
based.
These directions indicate a desire to change services rather than more of the
same services. The issue was not simply that the services were in short supply
but that they were inappropriate in the view of the Action Group members.
That it had reached this point so quickly seems to have been influenced by a
combination of some fortuitous circumstances and the happy combination of
some relatively middle class parents with a lot of drive and
'The gospel according to (Social Work HQ) is that it was a
triumphant bit of community work because it was actually set up by
staff from social work who recognised that need.'
LA Official 4
The group has retained much of the identity it established in its early days. It
remains committed to an open and democratic approach. It still holds its policy
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consultations with members, but it is now big business and has a much greater
emphasis on providing services itself. The reasons for that stem from the policy
shifts which have been made by government since 1979 and will be addressed in
subsequent chapters.
Over the next two years the Action Group secured its funding. By April 1978, less
than two years since its inception, besides £2700 from the Scottish Office
mentioned above, they also received in January 1978 £7000 from Plains Region
towards the cost of buying the church. This was now to be sold by the Church of
Scotland. This money
'was made available by the Social Work Committee from the
unexpected bonanza in local authority budgets caused by the fall in
interest rates last year.'
Div 3 AG News no 7 (April 1978)
At this point they were also in the process of negotiating a Section 10 (of Social
Work (Scotland) Act 1968) grant to fund their two workers for two years to run
a) an information bank and resource centre
b) a counselling service
c) training in domestic and social skills
d) areas of practical help
e) community care programmes
f) a creative centre
The last item was defined as
'a place where the mixing of ideas and opinions will aid the
establishment of a firm programme to be pressed for from the local
authority and government.'
Div 3 AG News no 10 undated (c. Nov 1978)
It would seem that the Scottish Office were being asked to create a rod to beat
their own back. Nonetheless they were offered funding, but not at a level which
matched their aspirations. They were offered £14,000 towards the purchase of
their present premises and £5000 towards running costs. This however, only
met the cost of one worker. The Action Group were furious. All concerned,
workers and committee members wrote to the local MP, who raised it with
Frank McElhone, the Minister of State for Social Work in the Scottish Office.
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'There was a great deal of bitterness felt by many people involved in
putting forward the application. Though we have been offered a
substantial sum of money, we have not been given the security to go
ahead and run the project.'
ibid.
The Minister replied to the MP in the following terms:
'In assessing its offer of revenue grant to the group for 1978/79,
account was taken of the amount which on the basis of past
performance, it seemed reasonable to expect the group themselves to
raise towards running costs. The group, however appear to consider
that they should be able to set aside proceeds from fund-raising
activities for other purposes. This difference in approach results, of
course, in a different view of the likely net revenue deficit.'
Letter from Scottish Office dated 14.12.78
It was however a minor setback. In two and a half years, they had emerged from
nothing to a point where they had premises and some funding for a worker.
They also had a charity shop which raised some £8300 in 1978. A condition of
the Scottish Office grant was that Plains Region agreed to continue the funding
at the end of the three year grant period. The Action Group were on the 'gravy
train.'
4.5 Not everyone loved them!
Although the speed with which the Action Group obtained resources is
remarkable (even by their own later standards) this should not lead to the
conclusion that their route to success was easy. A group as abrasive as this one
was, at least in its early days, was bound to ruffle some feathers.
In this final section, therefore, I wish to illustrate some of the difficulties that the
Action Group encountered in their relationship with the higher echelons of the
Social Work Department and in particular with their local councillor, who also
happened to chair the Social Work Committee. There were sensitivities about
some of their activities at both senior official and councillor level.
The story, epitomises the way the group challenged existing practice and in
particular throws into sharp relief the contrast between their consumerist
approach and the paternalism they perceived in mainstream provision. They
seemed to irritate their local councillor and this had its origins in a campaign
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they ran to prevent places in Adult Training Centres (ATC's) being reduced
from full-time to part-time, ostensibly to increase provision.
This proposal by the department was raised in the Action Group committee
meeting on 30.6.77 by a parent now deceased. The minutes record the following:
'Eddie has received notification from the SWD that placements at
ATC's are likely to become part-time in future due to "cut-backs".
This scheme has been put forward as a solution to an increasing
waiting list. Apparently 45 school-leavers from last year are still
unplaced and many of this year's school leavers will be obliged to
join the queue.
The proposed scheme would mean that everyone would be placed
but only on a part-time basis, most likely 2 or 3 days a week. This
would undoubtedly cause hardship to many families of those
handicapped presently attending ATC's full time. Many parents
would be obliged to give up jobs on which they are financially
dependent and others would certainly suffer from the strain of
having to spend longer periods caring for their children with little
relief from the situation.
The committee felt strongly that such a scheme was totally
unacceptable. It was decided that they should seek further details and
information and possibly hold a public meeting to sound out parent
reaction to this proposal.'
Committee Minutes - 30.6.77
This might be interpreted as the Social Work Department's attempt to respond
to parental pressure for more places - however doing so by reducing existing
places to part-time, was not what the Action Group had in mind at all.
The following week's minutes (7.7.77) record that the Committee felt, there
seemed to be an attempt to misuse the self help aims of the Action Group to
encourage parents to organise a back-up service for those mentally handicapped
affected by the part-time scheme. This was not what the group envisaged self
help to be. To them this involved parents working together to persuade
statutory services to make better provision.
The Action Group members decided to attend all the consultation meetings
across the city organised by the Residential and Day Care section of the
Department to explain the proposals to parents. They acted as a ginger group
which ensured that all parents in Bigtown were aware of the issues this raised
and encouraged them to resist the proposals.
86
There was a fracas at the first Adult Training Centre meeting.
'The then chairman went to the front, turned his back on the
platform and addressed the meeting - he just cut them straight out
and explained what a nonsense the whole thing was and it was high
time .... it was not half a service that was needed but double the
service.'
LA Official 2
After that the Residential and Daycare Section took the extreme step of banning
known Action Group members from the next meeting. Some of those banned
were employed by the Social Work Department.
'(An official I knew) was put on the door to stop people getting in. I'd
arrived and the (AG) staff met me halfway down the drive saying
we're not getting in!'
LA Official 2
The proposal was dropped, probably as a result of the Action Group's activity,
but it led to them being pushed out in the cold. Those in high places viewed
them with a high degree of suspicion. One senior official told me ^^the
reception the Newsletter received among the social work directorate in the early
days was -
'Look what they've said now and half of them are our own staff!'
LA Official 5
Interestingly however, although there was initial hostility to the group, it was
probably the arguments over the cutback in places that led to the Social Work
Department senior management trying to make an ally of them, or at least using
some funding to try to exert some authority over them.9
9This perception of voluntary organisations as potential allies of the department in the
inter-organisational network was reiterated later in the research in interviews
about the role of voluntary organisations in the joint planning process, when one
voluntary sector worker observed:
Some of the organisations particularly in the landward area have not grasped
what the Regional Strategy (for the Mentally Handicapped) is all about ...
who come, when they come to meetings in order to attack the Social Work
Department.'
Vol. Org. Worker 1
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'It was perceived by, I suppose managers who were around at that
time - Here was this bunch of amateurs who set themselves up
stating the obvious. They knew already and had been trying for years
to do something about it, felt that they were beginning to get some
improvement.... I think that there was a feeling of these folk are
telling us what to do rather than coming alongside us.'
LA Official 1
By the beginning of October 1977 the Chairman of the SW committee and the
Assistant Director (Residential and Daycare) had met with the Action Group to
discuss their differences:
'After the recent disagreement between parents and the Social Work
Department over the future of Adult Training Centres a meeting
was arranged between the Division 3 Action Group committee and
Social Work Department officials in an attempt to ensure that a
dangerous rift did not develop between the two parties.'
Div 3 AG News no (6 December 1977)
Again following their strategy of conducting all their negotiations as publicly as
possible, this was the lead item. The meeting seems to have consisted of the
Chairman of the Social Work10 committee, who was also the local councillor,
explaining the constraints within which the department operated. She felt
obliged to take cognisance of the group, but she did it with a bad grace. Every
respondent, but one told me of this person's hostility towards the group in its
early days.
whereas in his perception their role was to co-operate with the Department in achieving
common objectives.
10It is regretted that an interview with this person was not sought. The main focus of the
research was on a later period, by which point this person was no longer actively
involved in the Council and the significance of her omission was not fully
appreciated. However, at this time, I was working in a voluntary agency and the
Action Group's experience reflects my own. It was clear at this time that there were
tensions in the Labour Group of the Region, between those who took a traditional
Labourist position which was rather paternalistic and those who favoured a more
participative community work approach to service provision.
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'She took it very personally - she saw herself as a champion of the
mentally handicapped and trying to do her best to improve services
for the mentally handicapped. Here's this group .... they had a
newsletter coming out criticising, she found that very difficult to
understand and live with. (She'd say) - I thought we were all
running in the same race!'
LA Official 1
She was perceived to subscribe to the style of Labour politics which was
epitomised as
'voluntary organisations were a pain in the neck. Everything should
be done by the local authority and the state and the state should run
all the services.'
LA Official 2
The real issue was seen as control
'Its a power game basically in the end of the day .... if you're not in
charge it isn't your baby. You don't necessarily encourage it because it
may turn around and bite you.'
LA Official 2
The Chair of the Social Work Committee was to demonstrate to the Action
Group her ability to make things difficult for them over the next few years. She
could control the SW committee agenda and thus stall items being tabled. The
then Chairman of the Action Group, who was a business man, found it
infuriating to take a morning off work and then to find that the committee did
not seem to have the matter on the agenda, despite having been led by officials
to believe that it would be. For a long time she also prevented the expansion of
the Area team's respite care scheme in the same way.
She was perceived to dislike the critical stance of the group, particularly the
suggestion that the services provided by her department were not perfect and
was said to be of the opinion that recipients of services should be grateful. This,
as was demonstrated above (p.84), was not the normal first response of the
Action Group.
Fortunately for the group, others within the Labour Group, who tended to be the
rising stars were more sympathetic to their concerns. The group survived by
lobbying these councillors, some of whom were community work trained, over
particular issues. However whilst the group did receive grant aid from the Social
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Work Department, it remained at a relatively low level until 1985, by which
time their local councillor had resigned from the council.
It would be easy, however, to over-emphasize the significance of the Action
Group in these early days in the minds of both councillors and officials. Because
of the range of demands on the regional council's resources, any voluntary
agency is a relatively small part of their concerns. It is the distinction between
the single issue focus of most voluntary agencies and the multiple concerns and
responsibilities of local authorities. It seems that what money the group did
receive initially, may have had more to do with attempting to placate their
anger and bring them into the ambit of headquarters, thus exerting some control
over them, than whole-hearted endorsement of their aims and objectives. It is
clear that there were divisions within the department at that time over the
direction which policy in this area should take, with some officials more
sympathetic to the Action Group than others. This also assisted their case.
4.6 Conclusion
By the end of 1978, the Action Group had secured a commitment to three-year
funding from the Scottish Office and had a fund-raising capacity to maintain a
degree of independence from statutory funders. It is clear that the Action Group
emerged as a result of a fortuitous conjunction of circumstances and personnel.
It was the right time for such an initiative. The ideological climate was
changing: the primacy of institutional care as a way of dealing with mental
handicap was waning and scandals in England had hastened that. Paternalism
was under challenge and a more participative style of community social work
was coming into fashion. Social Work services had overcome some of the
traumas of re-organisation and local government was also being revamped.
Resources were beginning to flow into field services. Political control had shifted
too and Labour councillors were more inclined to spend money on services.
The Division 3 Area Team which sponsored the project, was relatively
unpressured and had space to innovate. The staff actively sought more work. In
addition, the two most senior workers were particularly interested in mental
handicap. The leaven was the advent of the student, who was able, because of
her grasp of the processes involved, to set the wheels in motion to bring the
ideas of the two social workers to fruition.
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The selection of parents to form the first executive was not very democratic and
did not match the rhetoric of spontaneity with which workers suggested the
group was formed. It does however, point to some useful lessons. It is important
firstly to establish that there is a problem to be addressed and secondly, to
demonstrate that there exist those who are both concerned and able to do so. The
groundwork in this case was well done and the foundations well laid.
The parents were motivated by their anger at the treatment they had received at
the hands of professionals in the past and the paltry services available to their
children. Nor did the services offered match their perceptions of what was
required. Clearly the involvement of a number of middle-class parents was
important here in bringing in people with a sense of personal power.
Contrary to the rhetoric of self-help, the professionals remained involved. The
close inter-relationship with the area team in the early days was quite
remarkable and it is clear that LA Official 2, at least, experienced considerable
difficulty in drawing boundaries between his role as a local authority social
worker and his role within the Action Group. The perception within the group
of working alongside Division 3 in the fight for services was equally strong.
In terms of Wievel and Hunter's (op cit) criteria outlined in the introduction to
this chapter, the Action Group achieved legitimacy on all three dimensions
described. Firstly, they proved themselves effective, if not in the provision of
services, at least in raising money for their objectives. The relationship between
professionals and parents was important here, in that it enabled those with a
cause to go to the most likely sources of funding quickly, rather than waste time
as many organisations do, pursuing monies which are unlikely to materialise.
Their use of the media was also significant, as even with very little substance, at
least initially, they were able to create an illusion of power.
Secondly, the group achieved representative legitimacy as they provided a basis
of validation for area team's claims to the domain of service provision for
mentally handicapped people. Moreover, by their vocal campaigning, the group
assisted the flow of resources, not only to their own coffers, but also to the team.
The team applied the tactics, often adopted in then more conventional
community work with tenants groups, to a community of interest.
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Thirdly, the group achieved legitimacy by using nested power. In seeking
support for their application to the Scottish Office they co-opted the local MP,
who went to great lengths to assist their application. By the time this application
was granted in 1978, the group were beginning to examine how they could could
go about achieving better services for mentally handicapped people. The main
concern was to make some provision for locally based accommodation, so that
mentally handicapped people were not forced to enter a hospital when their
parents could no longer care for them. It was out of this that the funding
application which is the focus of this study grew and the background to that






















Re-organisation of social work in Scotland
Division 3 Area team decentralised
Better Services for the Mentally Handicapped published
Re-organisation of Scottish local government begun
Local government re-organisation effected
Student placed with Division 3 Area team
Student writing to potential management committee
members, seeking to involve them in a parents' group
Core Group (of 7 or 8 people) which formed management
committee meet at Division 3 Office
Meeting of larger group of parents (c. 45) meet in local
school and endorse proposals to form a parents group
Successful application to Job Creation Programme for two
workers plus clerical support
Workers start and first Annual General Meeting of Group
held
Application made to Plains Social Work Department for
capital funding to acquire premises. Similar negotiations
begin with Scottish Office
Newsletter publication commences
Grant of £250 from Social Work Department





















JCP extended for further year
Meeting between Action Group, Councillor and officials
of Social Work Department re Adult Training Centres
moved from Social Work Department offices to own
premises in local redundant church.
£7000 received from Plains Region towards purchase of
property
Negotiating with Scottish Office for three year funding
Nearly New Shop opened in church
Present co-ordinator replaces male worker
Public meeting re proposals to build 10-bedded
community-based accommodation for mentally
handicapped people in conjunction with Refuge Housing
Association
Grant offer from Scottish Office of £14,000 capital and
£5000 revenue. Local MP lobbied by phone and letter sent
to him outlining inadequacies of the grant
MP writes to Minister of State for Social Work
Meeting with Scottish Office to discuss grant offer
Minister replies to MP re-affirming position
MP forwards number of letters supporting Action Group's
case to Minister
Minister intimates to MP that AG have accepted grant
First instalment of grant paid
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CHAPTER FIVE
What will happen to our children when we die?
5.1 Summary
This chapter examines the development of the Action Group's housing project.
It traces the history of the concern with accommodation from the development
of the Shield Housing Association provision in Division 3 area through
involvement with the Doorway Project to the point when the Action Group
began to formulate its own proposals. This history demonstrates the way
experience shaped the Group's perception of the provision required and of the
best means of provision.
This shows that innovation is an interactive process and highlights the
importance of the relationship which developed between Action Group staff
and local authority staff in the Task Force on Supported Accommodation.
Innovation involves conflict between proponents of new methods and
powerful vested interests in social work and health. The importance of sub¬
groups and alliances between individuals seeking change across organisational
boundaries is also central to the analysis.
5.2 Accommodation is a Priority
From it inception, the Action Group had identified the development of local
accommodation for mentally handicapped people as one of its main priorities.
'In any discussion with parents of mentally handicapped people (if)
you say to them what is your one big concern - its "what's going to
my son or daughter when I've gone?'
AG Worker 2
These issues had been raised in the survey prior to the establishment of the
group and were the reasons articulated by Parent 1 for becoming involved with
the organisation. Having secured its financial base, it was able to turn attention
to exploring ways of initiating such development.
This was facilitated by the approach of the staff. By April 1978 the present co¬
ordinator was in post. In line with their view that they did not want 'social
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worky people' (see above p.79), they recruited people with no direct experience of
social work. The co-ordinator of the Action Group came with no preconceived
ideas (at least from a social work perspective) - he had a degree in philosophy
and literature and prior to his job with the Action Group had worked on a farm
on Islay. He 'got the job by brass neck', but he thought his background a good
thing as
'I had to learn the whole thing. I went and talked to people who were
parents .... which gave me some understanding of what the service
must look like to the people who use them, rather than a view as a
service provider.'
AG worker 1
This clearly reflected the consumerist approach emphasised by those establishing
the group. Similarly Action Group Worker 2, who was originally employed
under the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) Special Temporary
Employment Project (STEP) as an information and advice worker in September
1979, shared these views.
'For somebody like myself, who was keen to get on with things, who
had a few ideas (but they weren't preconceived ideas) which were
sparked off by information and requests... led to the building up of a
... structure which was responsive, not a pre-programmed set-up.
AG Worker 2
The co-ordinator now sought to develop some locally based housing. As the
Group held regular policy consultations with parents to decide priorities and
they were able to proceed with a high degree of legitimacy, since it was clear that
what they were seeking was what parents wanted. However, the Action Group's
initial position was that it did not want to provide these services itself, because
that would detract from pressure group activities:
'It assembled expertise in subjects rather than provide direct services,
because if you start providing things like youth clubs, your workers'
time is absorbed in them and it's a bottomless pit. You could have
three workers running youth clubs five nights a week and that's all
you would do....'
AG Worker 2
Although the Action Group at that stage did provide clubs and activities these
were run by parents and/or volunteers. The latter were co-ordinated by a
Community Service Volunteer (CSV). The other two staff members - the Co¬
ordinator and the Welfare Rights Officer were thereby freed to concentrate on
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the promotional aspects of the Group. The decision in 1976, to avoid the 'Coke
and record-players' trap was adhered to.
The Action Group's interest in community based supported accommodation
reflected a growing desire in social work to move away from institutional care,
particularly that provided in large remote hospitals. There were, in 1978/9,
however, a number of constraints on developing such activities. The
bureaucratic structure within which services were provided did not facilitate
this change. There was a political separation of the three bureaucracies whose co¬
operation was essential to enable change to take place: these were Plains Health
Board, Plains Region Social Work Department and Bigtown District Housing
Department. These agencies were not simply separate sections of government,
but operated within different political and organisational contexts. The first was
a government appointed body and the other two were differing tiers of local
government, administratively separate.
There was disagreement about which organisation had the authority to provide
and fund special needs housing. The Wheatley Report on the Reform of Local
Government in Scotland (Cmnd 4150 1969) had proposed that housing and
social work should both become regional level functions, recognising the
common concerns of the two agencies. However the 1970-74 Conservative
government, when implementing the report, had responded to a lobby which
argued that no-one would be willing to become a district councillor, unless that
tier was given some more substantial responsibilities. Thus, housing became a
district level activity, whilst social work remained a regional council service.
This problem was general across Scotland. In Bigtown, however, there were
additional special factors. The major problem that faced the Action Group and
any one else seeking to provide for special housing needs was the unwillingness
of the local authority housing department to act on this issue. The
organisational obstacles noted above could probably have been transcended, had
there not also been political differences between Bigtown District Council and
Plains Region in the period 1974-1982. For the whole of this period, the former
was controlled by the Conservatives and the latter by Labour. The difference
between the Bigtown experience and that in Glasgow is informative here. In
Glasgow the Housing Department had the major role in the provision of special
needs housing. Bigtown District Council decided not to do this. Instead the
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major provision was by voluntary organisations: social welfare bodies in co¬
operation with housing associations.
The major reason for this difference was the attitude of the Conservative group
on the district council and, in particular of the chairman of the Housing
Committee, who refused to recognise special needs housing as a responsibility of
his department. He took the view that if an individual, for any reason, could not
sustain an ordinary local authority tenancy without a measure of support, that
individual was a social work responsibility. The Conservatives were also
inclined to favour lower rates over increased service provision. These attitudes
led to hostility, between the politicians on the district and regional council over
housing for groups with special needs. There was also personal animosity
between the Chairman of the Housing Committee and the Chairman of Social
Work in the Region.
The other major constraint on the development of special needs housing by
local authorities was the oil crisis of 1974 which had provoked by 1977, a major
economic crisis in Britain. This led to a substantial change in local authority
funding, as central government sought to restrain their spending. The optimism
of 1976 had been short-lived. By 1980, there was developing a major political
struggle between Plains Region (Labour controlled) and central Government
(Conservative). The importance of this for my study, was the consequent decline
in resources available to fund new services.
5.3 The Shield House
It was logical, given the emphasis on encouraging other s to provide services,
that the Action Group's first approach was to a housing association to provide
locally based accommodation for mentally handicapped people. Shield Housing
Association (HA) was formed in 1978 under the provisions of the 1974 Housing
(Scotland) Act. It had its origins in Mansionhouse Baptist Church
'who had in their congregation, a mentally handicapped woman.
Through investigating her plight, they realised the enormous lack of
resources in the community for the mentally handicapped.'
AG News no. 10 (undated but c.January 1979)
Their response had been to establish a Housing Association. Shield had
produced and circulated a leaflet which indicated that they were seeking local
groups with whom to work. It was to this that the Action Group responded.
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'Sometimes I think it was the biggest mistake we ever made. At the
time it seemed to be what we wanted.'
AG Worker 1
The project was to be pursued in partnership between the two agencies. Shield
HA had access to funds from the Housing Corporation and could therefore
supply a building, whereas the Action Group had local knowledge. The latter
were to be responsible for local publicity, obtaining the site from the Roman
Catholic Church, discussions about the building, selecting both the residents and
the staff and raising money for furnishings and equipment. Subsequently the
Action Group also became the main support for the staff.
Once a site had been identified, Shield negotiated its development and a ten-
person house was built in the area which was opened on 11 December 1981. It
had six single and two double bedrooms and a communal lounge and dining
room. There was also a warden's flat and office.
To fulfil their side of the agreement the Action Group established a project
committee to handle the running of the scheme chaired by a local GP and
composed of some Action Group members and other important professional
and local people - a lawyer, a representative of St. Fillans Church and a
community representative.
However, it quickly became apparent to those involved that there were serious
disagreements between the two organisations:
'The seeds of dissatisfaction with Shield - disillusion - were sown
early on, as the bricks were put down. There were criticisms of the
plans Shield wanted, criticisms of Shield's model of the
accommodation and so that disillusion set in early on.'
AG Worker 2
The problems lay in two issues - firstly, the lack of a formal management
agreement between the two agencies. Although this was recommended by the
Housing Corporation and by the National Federation of Housing Associations
(NFHA), it proved impossible for the Action Group to negotiate a clear set of
guidelines stating which agency had responsibility for which tasks. Despite the
Action Group's role in their selection, the residents were tenants of Shield HA
and had no formal connection with the Action Group.
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This would not have been an insuperable problem but for the second one - a
fundamental philosophical disagreement between the two organisations.
Whereas the Action Group had a philosophy of listening to parents' wishes and
incorporating them into any plans and proposals, that is the consumerist model
discussed in Chapter 4 -
The Shield model is a dictative benevolence where their idea of
what is benevolent holds sway, rather than listening to consumers.
Me: The "we know what's best for you approach"?
Exactly, and very reluctant .... and compounded with a patronising -
yes, we're quite willing to listen to you - when in fact they're not.'
AG Worker 2
'It was an incredibly closed organisation. It was like dealing with the
Silent Brotherhood.'
AG Worker 1
Moreover the Action Group believed that there was a lack of flexibility 'in
Shield's approach. This was confirmed by the experience of workers in the local
authority:
They (the two organisations) have very different philosophies
really. Whereas the AG.... they would work with us (LA SWD)
There'd be a dialogue between us, ideas or support or whatever.
Shield, .... it was just to discuss what (they were) going to do over the
next ten years - it wasn't negotiable. You couldn't say 'what about
this?' because it was a fixed programme that they had in mind. It
came from a particular point of view and a particular way of
working.'
LA Official 6
So although the Action Group had achieved its initial aim of more locally based
provision, it had also learned the important lesson that working with another
voluntary agency requires agreement on the method of providing the service as
well as the need for it.
This is specified very clearly in Benson (1975) op. cit. when he discusses the
criteria for inter-organisational equilibrium (p.235). Briefly these are
a) Domain consensus
b) Ideological consensus
c) Positive evaluation (of each others' work)
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d) Work Co-ordination
It is clear that in this case, the relationship between the Action Group and Shield
displayed little ideological consensus or positive evaluation and because of the
lack of a management agreement, poor task co-ordination and a lack of
agreement over who had the right to operate in this domain.
As a result of their disillusionment, the project committee (the Housing Sub¬
committee) became highly critical of Shield HA and began to explore alternative
ways of providing community based housing.
'In the subcommittee that was involved with the Shield House,
they'd begun to learn more about housing associations and what
might be possible outside of Shield... We began to get NFHA guides
and started reading up about management agreements and working
together with voluntary organisations and housing associations in
partnership. There was something around there as well, maybe we
can get involved in that in ways other than Shield.'
AG Worker 1
5.4 The task force on supported accommodation
Whilst the Action Group was involved in negotiation with Shield HA over the
housing project, an important development, with implications for special needs
housing had taken place within the Regional Council's Social Work Department
(SWD) - the establishment of a special development unit - a task force on
supported accommodation.
The task force had its roots in an Urban Aid project, established by the SWD in
the early 1970's to develop new ways of working with the population of single
homeless people in a run-down central area of Bigtown. Like the Action Group,
the project workers were obliged to revise their objectives and methods of
working constantly in the light of new knowledge. As work developed in this
area they moyed from a relatively simple model of the causation of single
homelessness (ie that the single homeless were alcoholics) to a recognition of
the more complex nature of the problem.
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'When I came to Bigtown, to that job in the Urban Aid Project, I
came as the social worker to the hostel (for recovering alcoholics)
and I was going to sort out all the housing problems of single
homeless people in Bigtown They would come out reformed
people who would have houses in Mansionhouse.
'I discovered in a fairly short time that many of the people staying in
hostels and night shelters, they possibly had a drink problem or were
getting a drink problem but the main problem was a housing
problem.'
VO Worker 2
This project was very prolific in the generation of new ideas and strategies.
Direct spin offs from its work were
• the Bigtown Council for the Single Homeless
• Scottish Council for the Single Homeless
• the Central Area CDP and the development of a Housing
Association
• and the Task Force on Supported Accommodation
When the project ended in 1978, all the workers bar one, had moved on to other
jobs. The remaining member had no obvious task. He was made Social Work
Consultant within the Headquarters of the SWD responsible for a number of
areas of development.
'It was slightly a misnomer, it was just a convenient title that was
lying around empty as a vacant post within the department.'.
LA Official 7
He had a permanent post within the department but had no clear task when the
project ended. Yet this person was an innovator who had a strong value
commitment to improving services for the homeless. He seized the opportunity
therefore to create a job in which he could further the development of services
for this client group. He was involved over and above the requirements of his
work, and besides being a LA Official, was also a committee member of the
Scottish Council for the Single Homeless - the Director of that being a former
colleague in the project.
102
His situation reflects that described by Wilson (op.cit); namely that diversity is a
crucial factor for innovation in bureaucracies and that
'in the absence of clear performance criteria and in the presence of a
variety of conceptions of nominally identical tasks, each member
will try to define his own job for himself.'
p.201 op.cit.
Social work is in its nature a diffuse task, but this individual's role was
exceptionally so and he was to use it to advantage. He both initiated and was
subsequently responsible for the development of the task force.
Even in the early days of the Urban Aid Project there had been a recognition of
the need for an inter-relationship between housing, social work and health to
tackle homelessness. There were those whose experience of hospitalisation
rendered them homeless and therefore more likely to require SW services such
as ex-psychiatric patients; and those like the mentally handicapped who were in
hospital taute de mieux. Yet another common factor contributing to
homelessness was experience of residential care in childhood - young people
who lacked the resources of family support. Moreover these problems were
exacerbated by the limited availability of council housing to single people.
In the inter-organisational nexus, however, there was a failure of leadership or
in Benson's terms the network was blocked, with no organisation powerful
enough to obtain resources. The obvious candidate to do the unblocking - the
Bigtown District Housing Department was unwilling to do so because of the
political and financial factors discussed earlier. The establishment of the task
force was an attempt by those in the Social Work Department to try to make
some progress.
When Task Force was established its objectives were
'to promote co-operation and liaison between statutory agencies
(Social Work, Health, Housing and Social Security) voluntary
agencies and housing associations.'
It hoped to
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'rationalise, co-ordinate and encourage new and existing
developments by providing a focus within the Social Work
Department for exploration, discussion and practical action'
Introductory pamphlet, Task Force on Supported Accommodation,
April 1980
The job of Task Force was not to establish its own supported accommodation
provision but rather to act as a facilitator:
'Task Force was not seen as a direct service provider, more a
stimulator. We had expected it to stimulate inside the department as
well as the voluntary sector. In the event the voluntary sector took
off most at that stage.'
LA Official 5
There were two quite unusual features of the team which merit comment
• the character of the staff recruited
• their control of a small budget (this is dealt with on p.lll as its
significance emerges later)
All three professional staff recruited had worked in voluntary organisations -
although one had substantial local authority experience as well. Both managers
responsible for the team - the SW consultant and the Assistant Director of Social
Work (ADSW) - were clear that it was not so much voluntary sector experience
which was sought as a particular type of personality:
'people with an attitude to work who could be lateral thinkers, but
adventurous; not too constrained by bureaucracy, who would be able
to look at the situation. They were going into a completely new area
so we wanted no preconceived ideas. We were looking for people
who were fairly independent with a lot of ideas - imaginative.'
LA Official 5
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'In some ways it was co-incidental, but clearly the view we'd got of
supported accommodation being an all-embracing concept and the
promotion of it requiring promotion within the department and
within the voluntary sector and tied in with the Housing
Association movement.... I mean, we'd certainly got a broad view of
the work that was needed and therefore people with a broad
background did stand a better chance to be honest.'
LA Official 7*
Whatever the reason for their selection, this team of people with voluntary
organisation experience, operated in ways which were not usual within the
bureaucratic model.
'We saw ourselves in that role as a development team, as part of the
Social Work Department, but actually separate to it as well.'
LA Official 6
Whilst there was a physical separation, in that the Task Force office was not part
of any other social work facility
'we cultivated a separate image as well.'
LA Official 6
The emphasis was on expanding supported accommodation services by
whatever means possible, rather than seeing it as necessarily a social work
department task.
'We were loyal to the department, we saw a very important role for
the Social Work Department, but we weren't departmental people in
that sense. We didn't see that everything had to be done by the
department - we weren't absolutely blinkered in that way as some
people are. Some politicians see, for political reasons, everything's
got to be done by the local authority or everthing's got to be
privatised because its profitable and there's a polarisation.... We
deliberately recruited staff who .... were happy with a mixed
economy. We set about sowing seeds on a fifty fifty basis, I think.
LA Official 7
Wilson (op.cit) stresses the importance of sub-units, like Task Force, in the
process of innovation. He identifies three stages in the process:
Whis aspect of "outsiders" being recruited to innovate reflects the experience of the Action
Group who 'didn't want social worky people' see p.79 above.
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A The conception of change
B The proposing of change
C The adoption and implementation of change
Sub-units, particularly geographically dispersed ones, such as Task Force (and
Area Teams) lead to the 'generation of sub-unit loyalties' (op.cit p.199) which
may transcend any wider loyalty to the parent organisation. This facilitates the
conception and proposition of innovation because the sub-unit members come
to see costs and benefits from their perspective rather than that of the wider
organisation.
In this context of a large bureaucracy with a diversity of sub-units - Wilson
argues that stages A and B are more likely to occur - because of increased
opportunities to define work situations. Paradoxically, it will be harder to adopt
change
'essentially for political reasons, it is too costly to concert the wills of
organisation members, sufficient to implement the proposals'
op. cit p.202
In other words, success or lack thereof in innovation depends on the power
structure of the organisation. Whilst a tightly knit, hierarchical bureaucracy is
less likely to generate new ideas, implementation is easier than in a diverse
organisation with many sub-units and hence multiple centres of power. Thus,
any agency like, the Social Work Department, has serious problem - how to
generate new ideas and secure their implementation.
Task force was no exception to Wilsons' hypothesis. They were to have
considerable difficulties with the wider department, and not just because of the
threat that innovation posed to some other parts of the department. Plains
Region SWD was a typical local authority bureaucracy - hierarchically organised
with (in 1980) four distinct divisions - Fieldwork, Residential and Day-Care,
Development and Administration - each headed by an Assistant Director of
Social Work. The focus in each division was not on client groups but on method
of service delivery. This meant that the department lacked expertise about the
needs of specific client groups. The focus was on 'how?' rather than 'for whom?'
This meant that in-house expertise tended to have a strong interest in
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maintaining the status quo, as staff's expertise lay in the provision and
maintenance of residential care establishments.
The first concern of the Task Force team was to try to define 'Supported
Accommodation'. Secondly they surveyed existing provision across client
groups. Their conclusions were presented to the Region in August 1980.
Supported Accommodation proved difficult to define. It proved easier to say
what it was not.
'Any form of accommodation for a special needs group, which is
intermediate between conventional residential or institutional care
and fully independent living." This definition accepts that there is a
grey area at either end of this intermediate range of accommodation
provision.'
p.l Task Force Report (1980)
Thus special needs housing was in Crozier's (1964) terms an area of uncertainty;
the domain was not clearly defined. There was also little clarity about who
should provide the service or how.
'There is little evidence of a regional perspective on the
development of supported accommodation. Provision has tended to
established in an ad hoc, patchy, manner that may at times bear little
relationship to the needs of the region as a whole.'
p.25 op.cit
There was also a contrast between the approach of the SWD and the voluntary
sector.
'The Social Work Department has had an increasing involvement in
the development of supported accommodation over the past several
years. However, there is an overall lack of variety in this provision,
and a tendency to stay with what is familiar. The keyword is caution,
with a resulting emphasis on hostels or small group homes
supported by visiting professionals.'
p.15 op.cit
This may be explained in Wilson's terms as a compromise, in order to avoid a
serious challenge to the existing power structure of the department, innovation
involved no more than incremental change. Voluntary organisations, lacking
these constraints, had
'played a significant role in extending the range of provision by
setting up new schemes for different groups. Some of the most
creative projects have resulted from co-operation between specialist
voluntary organisations and housing associations. There is a
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growing body of expertise among these organisations which clearly
represents an important resource for the future.'
p.15 op. cit
In Crozier's discussion in the Bureaucratic Phenomenon - power stems from
control over areas of uncertainty. If 'authority' is substituted for 'power', then it
is possible to interpret the establishment of Task Force in 1979, as a bid by Plains
Region SWD, or at least by those seeking to innovate, for this particular area of
operation (domain), thereby enabling the Region to demand resources for the
service too.
Task Force set about surveying the ground. They did this in two ways. Firstly
they looked at what was being provided within Plains for a range of client
groups: people with mental handicap, people with physical disability, people
with mental illness, offenders, people with addictions, young people, elderly,
single parents, battered women, single homeless people. It was this exercise that
established contact between the team and the Action Group. The latter were at
this point well into their own development of locally based housing with
Shield.
Secondly, the task force team spent a week visiting projects in other parts of
Britain. This had two important effects: it created the possibility of the 'diffusion
of innovation' (Schon op. cit) and it generated group cohesion between the three
workers as they toured the country together.
Having completed their survey, the team set about clarifying their role for the
next three years (which was the life-span of the project). With only three project
workers it would not be possible to stimulate development for all client groups.
It was decided to concentrate on mental handicap, physical handicap and young
people. This seems to have been because of the interests of the workers and
because there were already others active in some of the other areas. In the end
'we focused on the three things to start with, simply because we had
to start somewhere.'
LA Official 7
The team had considerable freedom to define their task. Team members were
able to follow their preferences, not just on the area of work but also the style of
working. The one team member who had substantial local authority experience
chose to work within the department in the child-care field as well as with
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voluntary organisations whereas the other two concentrated more on work with
voluntary organisations.
'I suppose, we had less of a kind of interest in the way the
department was structured and the whole re-organisation issue
which was going on when we were there. We all used to get
frustrated with the bureaucratic decision-making. The team leader
and I tended to find ways of by-passing it rather than challenging it.'
LA Official 6
This attitude was also reinforced by the staff's subsequent experiences. The
choice of the voluntary sector as the prime area of development of supported
accommodation services for mentally handicapped people stemmed from
difficulties, particularly in negotiating with the residential and day-care
section of the department. Whilst the staff member who worked within the
department was perceived as 'bi-linguaT (LA Official 1) by those working in
mainstream service provision, there was generally a view of Task Force taking
away the exciting bits of other people's jobs.
'Instead of their job getting enlarged and becoming more exciting,
that exciting bit was chopped off and (they were) told "you just keep
on doing the mundane, day to day, bread and butter things" and
somebody over there who .... the staff feel, knows nothing about it,
will suddenly.... go round all the voluntaries or who they can talk to,
who've never practised in this field, are coming up with ideas that
need tested out in practice.'
LA Official 1
Task Force were conscious of this negative appraisal of their role.
'They didn't see us as useful at first. They didn't understand what we
were doing. They also thought we were arrogant and you know, saw
ourselves as something apart and not doing "real work".'
LA Official 6
Indeed it was this negative perception of innovation as not "real work" which
had led to Task Force being established, rather than extra posts being put into
either Area teams or Residential and Day Care division, to undertake this work.
It was also a way of maximising the potential of a small resource. Task Force,
which was in total five people, would have had a minimal impact spread
around 17 area teams. Even its successor, a supported accommodation team,
with 35 staff remained a separate centralised unit.
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It is paradoxical that there was resentment amongst mainstream workers at
losing the 'interesting bits of their jobs', but as the Director of Social Work
observed, if such posts had been in an area team, they would have been seen as
'luxuries the department could ill afford' especially once financial stringency
became the order of the day after 1981.
'But as long as we're reducing the area offices, when selecting which
posts to freeze, they'd have picked that post every time, because of
their need to keep a duty rota going, and because of their need for
clients coming through the door to be received. We found that with
the mental handicap specialists - we put one into each area team and
the moment we freeze recruitment (and we wanted local autonomy)
the first post they froze was the mental handicap worker and the
second was the community worker.'
LA Official 4
Thus centralised teams are a way of protecting a small resource, but they are also
a way of securing a more public position. This is particularly important, when,
as in this instance, there is a need to change both professional ideologies and the
power structures, because there is resistance to change.
Task Force was faced with the difficult task of changing the perception of the
kind of service it was possible for the department to deliver. Team members
perceived the hostility of some sections of the SWD to their ideas and yet their
task was to persuade the Regional Council and other bodies that the innovation
of supported accommodation should be adopted. For example, bureaucratic
criteria were applied to any new development, so that there were arguments
that supported flats should have two staff sleeping-in.
'At times it was hellish, very, very hard. The level of aggro was quite
high at times. Different sections were trying to protect themselves,
trying to fight a rearguard action. At that time, in 1980, there'd not
even been any question of this "Time of Change"2 exercise - but
Residential section were fighting a rearguard action to protect itself
from new ideas - you can hardly believe it now - talking about
training flats!'
LA Official 7
2A review undertaken by Plains Region in 1982 of services for children, particularly
residential. The recommendations included the closure of several children's homes
and the wholesale transfer of staff into community based ventures including the
Supported Accommodation team.
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The major battles were fought in financial terms. In Wildavsky's (op.cit) terms
policy issues were disguised as financial ones:
'Some of the biggest issues were really terribly bureaucratic issues
about finance - about whether the department would take on houses
There was all kinds of things to do with the internal auditors
about the use of money and the promotion of independent living
which was what Task Force was primarily about - caused all kinds of
difficulties with auditors, finance officials and administrators within
the department - control over this, that and the other. The setting up
of some of the places was incredibly difficult to start with. We had to
start with the finance people, setting up budgets from nowhere -
"Where was the money to come from?"
LA Official 3
Initially the arguments were over sums as small as £500. Wildavsky (op.cit)
would describe this as a case of 'wedging'. Where budgets are incremental, the
hardest thing is to innovate, to secure a new budget heading. Once the wedge is
inserted, however, it can be built on and in Plains Supported Accommodation
had acquired a budget of £35,000 by 1986.
Task force found itself in a situation where it was going to be very difficult to
bring about change. They had to prove their case and they looked to voluntary
organisations to demonstrate that these new ideas were viable. Voluntary
organisation involvement came relatively easily because the team were already
in contact with them through their survey. Their use of information is
interesting in that the team acted as brokers: having collected examples of new
ways of working from all over Britain, they presented these examples to
interested parties - 'sowing seeds all over the place' (LA Official 7) and carefully
tended those which showed signs of taking root. The fact that they had managed
to obtain a small sum of money to underwrite the start-up costs and vacancy
levels in projects, gave them a way of attracting voluntary organisations, too.
Because of their high publicity profile Task Force managed to generate a 'buzz'
about Supported Accommodation
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'You only need a few articles in the Bulletin3 and Link Up4and other
places and everybody begins to talk about Supported
Accommodation as the new generic term.'
LA Official 7
But initially, it was voluntary organisations which were more receptive to these
new ideas perhaps because of their ability to be more flexible. They did not have
to overcome some of the bureaucratic and institutional obstacles to change,
which confronted the social work department officials. They also often had
resources available to them (eg buildings and alternative sources of funding),
which were not available to statutory bodies:
'I'm afraid we were developing a new area and trying to sell it to
people on the one hand and trying to think it through on the
other...'
Me: 'Who did you have to sell it to?'
'Well to everybody really .... Some of these more imaginative
projects .... we sold to the voluntary sector and housing associations
because they were providing the buildings, the ideas and quite often
they were going to run them at the end of the day. We certainly had
to sell things inside the department as well!'
LA Official 7
In the case of mental handicap the team member responsible, impatient with
bureaucratic methods, and anxious to prove her case, turned to voluntary
organisations to help bring about the change in perception of what was possible.
5.5 The Doorway Project
Task Force had proposed four models of care in their initial document 'Choice
and Challenge'(1980):
3SWD Newsletter
4Bigtown Council of Voluntary Service Newsletter
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'chosen because they offer an opportunity to complement
imaginative schemes already in operation and to meet needs which
are not being met within existing facilities. They have been chosen
for their symbolic value. By illustrating what is possible, the attitudes
and expectations of public professionals and residents alike may be
radically altered.'
p.20 op. cit.
The model proposed for mentally handicapped people was that of a project the
team had visited in Cardiff and had its roots in what was known as the Welsh
Strategy.5
This model involved three mentally handicapped people sharing a house with
four or five non-handicapped flatmates who would provide support. The latter
would be committed for one year. In Cardiff this support was provided by
university students and Community Service Volunteers, with backup services
from social services. A similar project was proposed for Bigtown.
'to do that kind of work, we reckoned we ... had to work with the
voluntary sector, because it would be difficult to establish that kind
of project through the Social Work Department ... because:
a) they just wouldn't take it, it was too risky, too different, too under-
controlled, - the control they could have over the type of people
coming into it, in terms of supporters ....
b) partly my own preference to work with the voluntary sector, if I'm
honest - I felt I would get much more support .... I felt they would
understand what I was trying to do .... a lot of it around changing the
way of thinking about providing services for mentally handicapped
people.'
LA Official 6
It was through this project that the Action Group came to have a close
involvement with Task Force. In January 1981 the Action Group co-ordinator
was invited to join a planning group to establish the Doorway Project. The
prime movers were the Task Force worker and a staff member of the University
Settlement. Other members of the management committee included staff from
the mental handicap hospital, both medical and social work, SWD staff and a
university lecturer in social policy.
5This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7 below.
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'It was a long running disaster .... There was a question of whether
the Action Group should host a development like that .... I felt
uneasy about that and thinking that it was an awful lot of work and
it wasn't something we were willing to take on at that stage.... (Probe)
By a lot of work I meant, it was going to be difficult,.... (some people
thought it was going to be easier than I reckoned it would be) so I
went along with the idea of there being another organisation set up
to this. This became Doorway.'
AG Worker 1
This project provided an object lesson for all concerned about the problems
which can arise, if development work like this is not done in a planned and
careful way. The fundamental problem stemmed from trying to move too
quickly. Whilst LA Official 6 was clear that the project would not have got off
the ground without a certain 'naive enthusiasm'
'We didn't define and work out enough in advance how the whole
thing was going to work - what the responsibilities were going to be -
how we were going to handle the finances; all the nitty-gritty that
keeps the project going ... We worked that out as we went along.'
LA Official 6
The major source of pressure was that a suitable house for the project was found
with surprising ease. However, once the lease was settled, there was a financial
pressure to occupy it. It was this factor which denied the group time to sort out
the important management details.
There were other pressures and problems, too. The selection of tenants was
poor, in one case, particularly so.
'We weren't big enough as an organisation to accept that until it was
too late. It's a whole big issue, taking people out of hospital into a
new environment and if it goes wrong, just moving them back.
You're dealing with people's lives and it's terribly hard.'
LA Official 6
There was also some perceived hostility to the project on the part of staff in the
hospital. The Action Group and Task Force staff felt that whilst those Health
Service people on the management committee were sympathetic to supported
accommodation, there was




One Health Service professional interpreted the 'naive enthusiasm' of the
Doorway management committee as more akin to missionary zeal - coming into
the hospital to 'save' patients.
'There was nothing wrong with that. I think patients should be
saved - it was 'them' and 'us' and what health said - the people
coming in, they said they believed the opposite. (For example) "This
patient's only got one leg," a nurse would say. (I'm being facetious)
The people coming in would say "Oh, no, no, no - he's got two.'"
HS Professional I6
It was clear to all involved that
'it threw up so many other prejudices, difficulties about different
professionals working together. All the things about the different
perspectives people in a hospital have about an individual compared
to how they are seen by people outside.'
AG Worker 1
In Benson's terms co-operation would fail because there was no ideological
consensus and no positive evaluation of each other's work (Benson p.235 op. cit)
The other major significant factor was the failure of support. There were two
problems. The first was the failure of the Social Work Department to provide
Adult Training Centre places despite promises to do so. This put increased
pressure on the student residents, as it left tenants with little to do during the
day.
The second problem was
'that the support (in terms of visiting) that should have been there
wasn't .... I don't think we'd worked out what was going to be
needed. It was a real lesson to me about how much harder you have
to work out what you mean by support in terms of hours, tasks, and
who does it, and how the sort of assessments are done that used to be
done by the hospital, about what people can and cannot do. It just
gives you a useless picture.'
AG Worker 1
6The relationship between the Health Service and other agencies will be
discussed more fully in Ch. 7.
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In part as a result of these pressures, the students who had volunteered to live
in the house left and the management committee had to find new support
people
'who didn't have anything like the same commitment and didn't
feel that they'd chosen these people.'
AG Worker 1
Things lurched from one crisis to another. The chairman resigned and the Co¬
ordinator of the Action Group took over. He determined that the project had to
end
'It lingered for more than a year. The people went back to (the
hospital). Some people on the committee wanted to keep it going.
Other people - I was one - argued that we should fold the whole




This experience did not however lessen the Action Group's enthusiasm for
developing this kind of housing provision. Their approach was to seek ways of
doing so successfully, rather than giving up at the first failures. Clearly they
learnt a number of lessons from their involvement in these two ventures. From
their involvement with Shield they discovered the difficulty of two agencies
pursuing ostensibly the same ends, working co-operatively. The four criteria
specified by Benson (1975) prove useful in analysing what was wrong in that
relationship. The two organisations, although working with the same client
group, had quite different value systems. The consumerist approach of the
Action Group clashed with the more paternalist approach of Shield. The failure
to agree about how the domain was to be shared between them was
fundamental and led to negative evaluations of the work of Shield by the
Action Group as well as lack of clarity about the tasks. Perhaps there was a case,
the Action Group began to realise for becoming more directly involved in
service provision.
From the Doorway experience they began to realise the kinds of issues which
had to be clarified and agreed in order to make a project work and in particular,
the problems of working across different professional groups and agency
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boundaries. What was particularly significant was the relationship of trust and
mutual respect which built up between the Task Force worker and the Action
Group Co-ordinator. The Action Group began to move to a more co-operative
way of working with the higher echelons of the SWD.
'the contact I'd had with LA Official 6-1 used to see her at a lot of
meetings. There was quite a buzz around about Supported
Accommodation and different ways of doing things, I got the
feeling there was something here we could maybe get into.'
AG Worker 1
'I felt it was a mutual relationship - supportive and productive.'
LA Official 6
'There was a reciprocal build up of interest in the need to provide
accommodation. The Social Work Department learnt from Division
Three Action Group. There was a lot of to-ing and fro-ing.'
LA Official 3
This kind of relationship also highlights the point which both Benson (1977)
and Zeitz (1980b) namely that it is process rather than structure which is the
vital focus of inter-organisational study. There are continual adjustments to be
made in the light of new possibilities or constraints:
'The social world is in a continuous state of becoming.'
p.3 Benson op.cit
Between Task Force and a number of voluntary organisations, there was created
a group of people whose commitment to the principle of community care,
transcended organisational boundaries. Zeitz makes the important point that
organisations are open rather than closed systems and therefore they need to
take account of external factors. They are also not coherent wholes but a mass of
contradictions which necessitate constant change and adaptation. More
importantly, this community of interest between the Action Group and Task
Force led to co-ordinated action to achieve mutually desired ends. Van der Ven
and Walker (1984) focus on this 'ad hoc' form of inter-organisational relations.
They argue that organisational agents act as entrepreneurs when an organisation
has a particular objective which it can only attain by gaining co-operation,
support and resources from other organisations. This entrepreneur
'gathers together the resources and forges the ad hoc relationships
needed to enable his or her organisation to pursue its own objective.'
p 598 Van der Ven and Walker op.cit.
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The authors fail to give a credible account of this process because they focus on
the individual agency, ignoring Benson's strictures to focus on the network. The
Action Group/Task Force relationship emphasises the importance of this - it
was not an exploitative relationship but a symbiotic one. Voluntary agencies
alone lacked the power to implement changes, but they offered to Task Force,
the expertise lacking in the SWD to propose and implement change. This study
encompasses therefore, not one organisational entrepreneur, but a group of
them, each crossing organisational boundaries and each having their specific
objectives, but with sufficient common purpose to be able to take co-ordinated
action.
Thus,by 1983, when the Doorway Project had come to an end, the Action Group
was ready to make its own proposals. By now it had achieved legitimacy as an
organisation and had learnt a great deal about the pitfalls of running
accommodation projects. Its relationship with the headquarters of the Social
Work Department was moving onto a more co-operative level as innovators
within the department perceived their potential in helping to achieve change.
They now had friends who would be able to assist with their proposals. They
had already learnt a little about negotiating for funding. In obtaining support for
























Local meeting to discuss the development of a site for
community-based housing by Shield HA
Information and Advice Worker employed through STEP
Plains SWD establish Task Force on Supported
Accommodation
Planning Group to develop Doorway Project convened
Doorway volunteers begin weekly visits to local mental
handicap hospital to identify suitable residents
Task Force survey of provision
Task Force report published
House offered to Doorway project
Shield HA complete community housing project
Support Workers move into Doorway House
2 people with a mental handicap move into Doorway
Closure of Doorway Project (unable to date this exactly)
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CHAPTER SIX
Urban aid is funny money anyway!
6.1 Summary
This chapter outlines the proposal for a supported accommodation project
developed by the Action Group and relates the history of the application to fund
this through Urban Programme funding the Urban Renewal Unit (URU) of the
Scottish Development Department (SDD). This history illustrates the difficulties
faced by any agency in fitting its policy objectives to the requirements and
objectives of the funding mechanism and highlights the problems caused by an
attenuated negotiating structure. It illustrates the factors which can render a
funding application unsuccessful.
The chapter focuses on three strands:
a) the proposed project
b) The interpretation of the Urban Programme guidelines
c) Efforts to make the Action Group's application 'fit' whatever
these guidelines were thought to be.
It also highlights the role of 'insider advocates'; officials who promote the
interests of other agencies within their bureaucracy because of inter-agency
alliances discussed above (p.l 17). These alliances demonstrate the complexity
and inter-meshing of the different motives of participants in various
organisations agreeing to pursue 'common ends'. In pursuing this analysis, the
chapter also argues, following Wildavsky, that, within a framework of rules, (in
this case a specific programme rather than a budget) negotiations and decisions
have a political rather than a rational basis. Rationality was the justification
rather than the reason for decisions.
It was also notable that there were differences between officials in different
bureaucracies in the perception of their role. This has consequences for
voluntary agencies. This perception seems to be directly related both to the




By 1983 the Action Group had moved a long way from its position in 1979, both
in its own tenns and in the eyes of the local authority:
• from wishing to stimulate other organisations to provide
housing, it was now seeking to make its own provision
• from being seen as a 'bit irritating,'(LA Official 2) to a valued
service provider.
'The history of (the Action Group) is very interesting - it moved
from being a thorn in the flesh to an organisation that was very
much supported and thought well of by the department as a whole.'
LA Official 5
The decision to move more firmly into the service provision arena was purely
pragmatic. Prior to 1979, there was an expectation that service provision came
from statutory sources. The election of a Conservative government that year,
brought a gradual realisation that that expectation had to be revised - perhaps
permanently. Opportunities for new initiatives laid much greater emphasis on
voluntary and private sector provision.
The attempt to work with Shield HA had taught the Action Group a lesson -
that the choice of partner was fundamental to the success of the venture. One of
the major issues between the two agencies was the lack of control the Action
Group had over the management and direction of the project. Therefore, if the
resources could be obtained to fund extra staff, it made more sense for the Action
Group to run its own project.1
From the Doorway project, the Group had learnt the importance of doing the
ground-work thoroughly and of developing clarity about how,the service was to
1The Action Group had also been down the avenue of setting up an independent ( but
linked) voluntary organisation: the Sitting Service, an organisation which provided
sitters to allow adults carers to have some relief. Whilst this organisation was
nominally separate from the Action Group, there was considerable overlap on the
management committee. The co-ordinator was of the opinion that this arrangement
wasted time and that its affairs would have been more conveniently managed
within the Action Group structure.
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be delivered. The difficulty in managing a project with input from a range of
different professional and organisational backgrounds was also noted.
The other factor influencing the decision to give more emphasis to service
provision was credibility. The stated priority of the SWD in funding voluntary
organisations, was to maximise service provision (above p.78). Thus if the
Action Group was to be regarded as a key organisation in the field of mental
handicap then it needed a greater emphasis on services. If those services were to
be funded from statutory sources then there had to be some degree of
congruence between what the Group wanted and the aims of the funding body.
There was a body of opinion within the management committee that the Action
Group would be more effective if it sought to maintain its independence of
statutory funding by giving more emphasis to the charity shop. The co-ordinator
felt this position to be unrealistic and was unwilling to pursue this. The major
problem he foresaw was the unreliability of shop income. There were
'too many imponderables and too may ups and downs about when
you'll have money in.'
AG Worker 1
Although Social Work Department officials were aware of the uses of pressure
group activities, generally the emphasis in talking about their relationship with
the Group and about decisions to fund it, emphasized its service giving, 'self
help', community based aspects.
'It provides a service as well as being a pressure group. It's an
oversimplification, but almost the greatest voluntary organisation
there's ever been is CPAG (Child Poverty Action Group), in terms of
what its achieved through pressure without providing a service at
all. But I suppose we would err on the side of those that provide a
service.'
LA Official 4
At the same time as the Action Group was moving in the direction of greater
levels of service provision, the SWD was reviewing its criteria for grant aid,
culminating in a report to the SW Committee 'Criteria for Grant-Aiding
Voluntary Organisations' in 1984. This stated as one of the fundamental criteria
that
'the organisation provides a service which is consistent with the
agreed priorities of the SWD.'
p.2 op.cit.
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The discussions which culminated in this report would have been beginning
when the Action Group formulated its proposal and the Group would have
been aware of these views because they were closely linked into local networks.
There were costs as well as benefits attached to this decision to develop its own
housing services - some of which were alluded to by Action Group Worker 2
(above p.96). Running services was much more time consuming than pressure
group activities. It entailed some sacrifice of freedom of manoeuvre too. This
particular application, if successful would mean that for the first time the
majority of the Action Group's funding would come from statutory rather than
non-statutory sources.
Funding a voluntary organisation is not simply a beneficent gesture on the part
of statutory agencies. There are elements of control too: over the kind of
services, the client group, the area of operation, management and financial
probity. The Action Group in seeking a large amount of statutory funding would
be expected to accept these constraints on its operation or risk having its funding
withdrawn.
In these circumstances pressure group activities might be expected to become
more muted, at least as far as funding bodies were concerned. However, as noted
earlier alliances sometimes form between groups of officials in statutory and
voluntary agencies which transcend organisational boundaries. These alliances
seem important for innovation, in bringing about policy changes within
statutory bodies. The relative freedom which a voluntary organisation has to
campaign as well as provide services is a key factor in bringing about this
change, particularly if that campaigning is well informed by 'inside'
information. Thus the increased participation of the Action Group in local
authority discussions to develop its service provision, also enabled the Group to
influence local authority policy in ways which would not be possible simply by
outside pressure. Through their contacts with sympathetic officials, they had a
conduit through which their ideas might flow into the SWD.
6.3 The Action Group's Supported Accommodation Project
By 1983, the Action Group had obtained a good deal of experience of special
needs housing; they had worked with Shield and Task Force and through the
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latter with Doorway. They had also begun to provide a small resource
themselves.
This had come about in a fortuitous way. Plains Region had been in contention
with central Government over finance for some two years and as a result had
been heavily penalised. In 1982, a minority Conservative administration had
taken control with Alliance support. There had begun to be substantial cut-backs
in services and new provisions suffered most heavily. This had serious
consequences for an innovatory project like Task Force. LA Official 6 had been in
negotiation with a social worker in the Division 4 Area team, who was
interested in establishing an experimental resource for mentally handicapped
people. Task Force had approached housing associations and had been offered
some accommodation by Hands HA. The SWD had planned to provide some
'core and cluster' flats themselves, with a resource worker supporting residents
living relatively independently.
'That report basically got lost because of the cuts. It was the whole
problem of timing - we couldn't raise the money to take it on within
the time limits.'
LA Official 6
Rather than lose the houses, LA Official 6 asked the Action Group Co-ordinator
if his organisation was interested in using these flats. They were. They decided
in December 1982 to see if lessons could be learnt from their experience of
Doorway and to use one of these flats to house two mentally handicapped
people supported by volunteers. Task Force now had resources to cover voids
and to pay expenses to the volunteers. The Action Group's Volunteer Organiser
recruited support. In comparison with their previous experience with Shield
'The whole thing was so smooth.'
AG Worker I
with a properly negotiated lease and management agreement.
In line with their now long-held belief in consulting parents, the Group
renewed its commitment to obtaining more community-based housing through
a policy-making workshop. This was held on 12 May 1983 and conducted by the
same person who ran the initial workshop in 1976, which established the
parameters of the group. The aim of this workshop was to evaluate the
directions taken by the group and to make recommendations for future action.
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As part of this some of the opportunities presented by recent policy changes were
discussed.
The advent of housing benefit and changes in DHSS board and lodging
regulations meant that for the first time there was some prospect of reliable
sources of income to fund supported accommodation projects. 'Extra Care Costs'
could be recouped for those on Supplementary Benefit from central
government. This route was, however, only available to voluntary
organisations and other non-statutorily provided accommodation. This was in
line with government antipathy to statutory provision of services and a
preference for voluntary sector and private market provision. This emphasis
had also recently been inserted into Urban Aid regulations, (see below p. 148)
However these factors encouraged Action Group staff to consider an attempt to
provide a larger scale provision.
'There were lots of things around .... in 1983. Everybody who'd been
involved with Doorway was talking about a new potential ... for
things that would be staffed.'
AG Worker 1
The Group had also become aware of Urban Aid as a potential funding
mechanism, as Action Group Worker 2 was a councillor in a deprived area
where this funding had been used extensively by the Regional Council. They
knew that in other parts of Scotland Urban Aid had been used to fund services
for mentally handicapped people.
'It was a really hot summer. It was really warm and we'd been talking
about this ... It looks as though we can really design something, a
proposal and put it in ... We packed up the office and went down to a
pub (by the sea) and sat on the promenade with big sheets of paper
and started working it out in a very rough form, what the
application would look like.'
AG Worker 1
The proposal was written with a specific type of funding in mind - Urban Aid. It
sought workers to develop and support community- based housing for mentally
handicapped people. The Action Group workers calculated that once facilities for
community care were established, they could become self-financing. The major
problem was the money to develop services - it was this that they were to seek
through Urban Aid.
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The staff did not simply sit down and write a proposal which was then
submitted for funding. It was an inter-active process. There was a good deal of
informal comment obtained from staff in both the Regional Council and the
District Council.
'By that time I'd had quite a lot of contact with (AG Worker 1)
through Task Force and he showed me the draft document - .... - how
it should be couched and what additional information was needed. It
was the same with a number of people, particularly in the voluntary
sector, who sounded me out at that point. I tried to make sure they
sounded out one or two other people as well.'
LA Official 7
Before proceeding with detailed work on the project the Action Group staff
needed to know whether or not it was a feasible proposition. It was this feedback
they sought from the LA officials, because as Action Group Worker 2 observed,
whilst there might be
'gold in them thar grant applications ... one of the problems with an
organisation like ours is that good ideas abound but time to act on
them doesn't ....'
The statutory advice was helpful
'in advising you how to maximise your application. We were very
lucky in getting advice about what not to waste our time on!'
AG Worker 2
The proposal sought £130,000 from Urban Aid, the costs split 75%/12V2%/12V2%
between the Urban Renewal Unit (Scottish Development Department), Plains
and Bigtown District Council, to fund three workers:
a) a development worker
b) a support worker
c) a voluntary services officer
It was envisaged that the project would be time limited over approximately four
years and that it would take place in two phases. The tasks for the team would be
1 Assessment of the degree of support needed and how to provide
this.
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2 The negotiation of public and private sector housing, the
development of a management system within the group and the
negotiation of long-term funding.
3 The development of community support systems to facilitate
integration.
The proposal emphasised the consumer oriented approach of the Action Group:
'We firmly believe that the needs of mentally handicapped people
should be answered from a knowledge of individuals rather than the
imposition of a system.'
p.6 Project Proposal Div 3 AG (September 1983)
In the short term the team would seek to develop lightly supported
accommodation through the use of local authority and housing association
properties. This should enable some throughput in the one existing staffed
resource - the Shield house. In the longer term medium and intensively
supported accommodation with staff was to be developed in co-operation with
housing associations. Long-term funding would be sought from Health and
Social Work through Support Finance, (see below Ch.7)
It was this application which was submitted to the District and Regional
Councils for Urban Aid funding in September 1983.
6.4 The Urban Programme
The Urban Programme was a child of its time. It arose in 1969 from the
rediscovery of poverty earlier in the decade and attempts in the USA to
construct an anti-poverty programme - the War on Poverty. The immediate
stimulus however, was Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech in 1968. This
provoked fears of urban conflict among politicians (already evident in the USA)
and a perception that it was necessary to offer some additional resources in order
to prevent this. There seems to have been little thought given to what the
programme would actually do. Indeed Richard Crossman noted (1977 p.129) that
the difficulty had been 'to make any practical sense of this idea'. What emerged
subsequently was the attempt of a civil service committee to do so.
The programme focused primarily on 'areas of multiple deprivation' stemming
from the idea that poverty results from clusters of problems which mutually
reinforce each other, creating a culture of poverty. It aimed to break this cycle of
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deprivation. It is particularly important to note that the programme focused on
fairly tightly defined geographical areas. In Scotland, these were the worst 10%
Census enumeration districts, measured on indices such as unemployment, lack
of basic amenities, infant mortality. Within these, priority was given to the
worst 5%.
The amount of money available for the programme was relatively small in
public expenditure terms and was circa £8 million for Scotland in 1986. This
leads to a small-scale and highly selective approach, definitely out of the 'we're
doing something' school of policy-making; infinitely cheaper and politically
more acceptable than the major structural changes that some analysts (eg Brown
and Madge 1982) suggest would be more likely to achieve results.
However, despite its small scale, the funding mechanism had some attractive
features for local authorities, in particular, the large proportion of the funding
contributed by Central Government. Once a project was agreed by the URU, the
government agreed to pay 75% grants for 4 years and this could be extended for
voluntary sector projects up to 7 years. 2
In 1984 the ceiling for an individual project was £500,000 on capital costs and
£300,000 recurrent costs. So it can be seen that this kind of funding can represent
a very good 'buy' for a local authority, particularly as they were permitted to
share their 25% contribution with another authority (eg District/Region).
This funding was particularly attractive to financially straitened authorities like
Plains because expenditure was 'ex guidelines.' This meant that spending on this
programme was not included in the calculations by central government of a
local authority's guidelines on spending. It was these guidelines, which when
measured against proposed expenditure, determined whether the Secretary of
State would impose a 'claw-back' on the Rate Support Grant. So, although it was
but a tiny fraction of an authority's total budget, Urban Aid represented potential
for growth, when all other avenues were blocked.
2This was easily the longest time scale of any of the then available funding arrangements.
The usual maximum for special projects funded through Social Work Services Group
(see above p.84) was three years. Both MSC monies and the Unemployed Voluntary
Action Fund (UVAF) lasted usually for only one year.
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In 1981, the first government circular since 1970 on 'The Urban Programme in
Scotland' (SDD circular 7/1981) was issued. This re-affirmed the area based
principle stressing
'The programme is not intended simply for experimenting with new
ways of providing services irrespective of location.'
p.l SDD 7/1981
The circular adjusted the time-scales over which funding was available and
made a shift in emphasis away from local authority projects to those sponsored
by voluntary and community groups. This was underpinned by an assertion that
'involvement ... in devising, sponsoring and running a project is in
itself a valuable element of community development additional to
the benefits of a particular project.'
p.l op.cit.
The 1981 circular also emphasised the potential to involve the private sector and
gave priority to wealth-creating rather that wealth-consuming projects.
It defined a set of eligibility criteria and a set of priorities. Projects had to
• be for (and normally in) areas of multiple deprivation
• be a new project offering 'practical tangible results'
• not increase the overall numbers of local authority staff
• be within cost limits
In Scotland the Urban Programme is administered by a small Urban Renewal
Unit (URU), located in one of three Housing Divisions in the Scottish
Development Department of the Scottish Office. However that location is
'Purely a matter of happenstance .... you could make an argument for
it being practically anywhere except the Agriculture Department.'
Civil Servant 1
The unit appraised applications, evaluated projects and formulated policy. The
staff received submissions from Regional Councils for approval.
At Regional Council level, in Plains, before 1984, the Planning Department,
whose main task was management co-ordination, had an information role in
respect of the Urban Programme and dealt with the assessment of the eligibility
of projects and their formal submission to the URU, but the bulk of the pre-
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submission negotiation with the Scottish Office was undertaken within the
service department.
There was little consistent practice. I found it impossible to obtain a clear account
of how projects were dealt with within the Social Work Department. However
the responsibility for the formulation and submission of the overall 'Urban Aid'
package rested with the Planning Department. Each service department
compiled a list of applications which were evaluated for professional content
and ranked according to compatibility with that department's priorities. The
Planning Department then checked the applications for eligibility according to
the priorities spelt out by the URU. Officers from social work, education and
planning then met to agree a package which was presented to the politicians for
approval and this would then be submitted to the Scottish Office.
6.5 Why choose Urban Aid?
In September 1983, the Action Group submitted their application for Urban Aid
to fund a Supported Accommodation project costing £33,337 p.a. over three
years to start on 1 April 1984. The main components of the project were outlined
(above p.126). Why did they choose Urban Aid rather than some other avenue
of funding? Was this the appropriate mechanism?
A number of factors seem to have suggested this avenue to the Action Group
which I will deal with below, but it is first important to recognise the context of
the application. By 1983 growth in social service provision (as in almost all other
aspects of the Regional Council's work) was at a standstill. The main reasons for
this were the penalties imposed on the Region under new government powers
in 1981/2 and the subsequent election of a Tory/Alliance Council intent on
saving money. Although it was still possible to establish new areas of work (viz.
the discussion in Chapter 5 of the development of Supported Accommodation)
most of the major advances could only take place if something else went. Thus
the Supported Accommodation team was established using savings from the
decline in both demand for and popularity of residential child care. At a later
stage this kind of money was quite simply 'saved'.
At the same time as local authority sources of voluntary sector funding dried up,
agencies seeking money to develop new services embarked on a search for
alternative funding sources - what Kramer (1981) describes as 'Grantsmanship'.
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More and more agencies were competing for increasingly limited but more
diverse sources of finances - all with different kinds of strings attached. This led
agencies in many cases to pursue several funding avenues at the same time in
the hope that one 'came good'. Quite simply money was becoming scarce and
organisations would try anything.
'I think people were keen to get money and applying everywhere.'
LA Official 8
'I wouldn't necessarily describe it as a gravy train - but we actually see
money passing before our eyes and there's a knee jerk reaction that
one has to reach out and get it.'
VO Worker 1
'It was a feature then that a number of organisations at that time
were very keen to get funding and began to go for whatever there
was.'
LA Official 5
It was in this context that the Action Group decided to try for Urban Aid.
There is not any one clear precipitating factor in the Group's decision. In
interviews, the question 'Whojrcidea was it and why?' provoked as many
answers as there were respondents. It seems reasonable to infer then that the
decision to go for Urban Aid was the result of a combination of what seemed to
be favourable auguries which reinforced each other. The factors seem to be
a) they were aware of its potential through Action Group Worker 2's
experience
b) they knew it had been used to fund projects for mentally
handicapped people in other parts of Scotland
c) they were encouraged to apply by LA Official 7.
A key factor here is overlapping roles. The official in charge of Task Force was
also responsible for Urban Aid evaluation within the SWD. This person
vouched for the project. He allowed it into the system of evaluation and
suggested ways of forwarding it. The knowledge that he had acquired of the
Action Group and its work in the preceding years was an important factor. This
highlights the political nature of decision-making:
'The work that we've done in supported accommodation over the
preceding years meant that perhaps I was a bit biassed, I don't know. I
wasn't the final arbiter in Urban Aid. I was faced with 10 or a dozen
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Urban Aid projects. I was certainly pretty confident that the
background work had been done on this particular one, but other
people had to be convinced and think about it and it had to get into
the lists and get argued about...'
LA Official 7
So he pointed the Action Group towards a number of key people as well as the
Region's Planning Department who dealt with the technical criteria of Urban
Aid. One of these key people was the District Council's Depute Director of
Housing.
'I was one of the people who pushed that. I suggested the joint
project to him, partly because by that time the Regional Council was
more and more strapped for money and it might reduce the amount
we'd have to pay even although we'd only have to pay 12 1/2%.
Secondly it did seem there was scope for getting up the priority lists
in the URU in the SDD because they were beginning to talk more
and more about comprehensive packages for projects and things that
were jointly agreed with the District and region .... It did seem that if
we could actually get joint agreement from the Region and the
District - it would give it added weight.'
LA Official 7
This official was keen to promote the Action Group's project because:
Firstly the feasibility of Task Force's ideas had to be proved in order to establish
supported accommodation as a legitimate operation (or domain) for the SWD.
Whilst Task Force staff were committed to these ideas, there was, as was noted
in Ch.5, considerable opposition from other SWD staff, including those with
power to block development. The more projects of this nature that were put
forward, the greater the likelihood that this kind of care would become a
mainstream task.3
Secondly the Region had severe financial difficulties. There was a preference
among some Labour councillors for the Region to run projects itself. This view
was probably shared by some key departmental staff. But whenever the Region
sought funding from government sources the answer was no. In 1983 Plains
could not have satisfied the criterion emphasized in the Urban Aid guidelines
'not to increase the overall numbers of local authority staff.' (7/1981) So the
3It has to be emphasized that this was by no means the only project of this kind that was
being promoted at that time. There were others for physically disabled people and
homeless young women.
132
region had to promote voluntary sector projects if it was to stand any chance of
Urban Aid money. The prospect of a joint project with the District Council
would make it a very cheap option indeed for both councils (£3000 each for the
first year). That Urban Aid was 'ex guidelines', offered decided financial
advantages from officials' viewpoints in pursuing this funding mechanism.
The third issue is more complex. Regional councillors were reluctant to assume
new functions (because of the financial situation) and especially those which
might be the responsibility of another agency. The District Council was
perceived as attempting to shirk its responsibilities in relation to housing for
special needs and some councillors therefore strongly objected to assuming
functions such as supported accommodation. The problem was where to draw
boundaries between social work counselling and support and the duties of
housing visitors. Although the idea of supported accommodation was gradually
gaining acceptance, the arguments were enormously time-consuming for
officials and it was simply easier to promote voluntary sector projects where
these boundary disputes had less significance.
The deciding factor for this official was the growth within the department of a
Working Group on Services to Mentally Handicapped People promoting a
Mental Handicap Strategy. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter,
but it should be noted that this was an idea which was being promoted by Task
Force staff. Although it was still early days in this group's thinking and the
major developments were to take place in 1984
'(LA Official 7)'s got the vision to see 10 years ahead - in order to get
the kind of thing happening like they're doing in Wales.' (reference
to the Welsh Mental Handicap Strategy)'
and he was
'good at understanding that development work takes a long time
and he's got the staying capacity to set up processes and establish
structures which I got very intolerant about because I want to see
things happen quickly.'
LA Official 6
This official took the long view. Although the Action Group project was a
relatively small part of the structure which needed to be established if
community care was to become a significant part of the provision for mentally
handicapped people - it was clearly a step in that direction and for this reason it
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was supported. The Group was now an agency whose track record was known
and trusted by local authority officials, and this increased their chances of
support.
LA Official 7, like a number of others in this study was a 'product champion'.
This
'must be a man (sic!) willing to put himself on the line for an idea of
doubtful success. He is willing to fail but he is capable of using any
and every means of informal sales and pressure to succeed. No
ordinary involvement provides the energy required to cope with the
indifference and resistance that major technical change provides. It is
characteristic of champions of new developments that they identify
with the idea as their own and its promotion as a cause to a degree
that goes far beyond the requirements of their job.'
Schon (1973) quoted in Martin (1984) p.170
LA Official 7 demonstrated this kind of commitment. He would work late into
the night to produce important reports on time and was involved in the Care in
the Community Working Party4 in a voluntary capacity. The importance of
these ideas meant he wanted to see the Action Group project funded. He
therefore encouraged them to apply for Urban Aid and although he suspected
that it might be difficult for the Action Group to satisfy the criteria, he thought
they could make a case.
'(AG Worker 1) was desperate for money and it did seem quite
legitimate as far as I was concerned.'
LA Official 7
The Action Group gained the support of the District Council in a rather similar
manner. The Depute Director of Housing also had reasons for supporting this
project which went beyond the merits of the proposals. He wanted to widen the
scope of his department's activities and he saw the potential of supported
accommodation for development. However these ambitions had been frustrated
over the years by the antipathy of the Tory-controlled council and a 'very old-
fashioned Housing Director.'
4 An inter-agency pressure group to promote community care serviced by the Scottish
Council for the Single Homeless. LA Official 7 chaired this. The Working Party is
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.
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'In the early days, I have a very vivid recollection of a meeting ...
with the Central Urban Aid Project (between 1973-79) with VO
Worker 1 arguing very forcibly in relation to supported
accommodation - "Why not use housing visitors to support people
in supported accommodation?" and I thought wistfully at the time -
"Wouldn't it be nice if we could do that?" But obviously there was
no question of the Tories ever getting involved in anything that
smacked of social work.'
LA Official 9
As far as this official was concerned, supporting voluntary sector projects like
this, was making the best of a bad job. His preference was to make provision 'in
house', but in 1983 when the Action Group approached him that was politically
not possible.
'As a matter of principle, I think its a "cop-out" that the voluntary
sector should do all the supported accommodation .... If we can do
sheltered housing then I don't see why we can't do supported
accommodation.'
LA Official 9
In Benson's terms he was anxious to establish a claim to this 'domain' of
supported accommodation, to establish the legitimacy of the Housing
Department to act in this area, although he recognised that the terms for
acquiring resources set by the Government favoured voluntary organisations.
It was easier for housing associations to obtain capital for projects through the
Housing Corporation than it was for local authorities to do so.
The Tory Councillors who controlled the Housing Committee thought it was
the job of the voluntary sector to provide specialist accommodation:
'Basically because they didn't want to know - if it wasn't mainstream
housing, it wasn't anything to do with them.'
LA Official 9
The other aspect which favoured voluntary sector projects was the difficulty
which local authorities had in promoting projects jointly. Whereas it is
relatively easy for two or more authorities to put resources into a voluntary
organisation, the scope for competition to claim the domain is enormous when
the project is local authority run. The process of drawing boundaries of
responsibility has to be much clearer in the latter case.
'I still don't think we've sorted out boundaries between housing and
social work. Vol. Org. Worker 2's paper on hostel funding made a
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bold statement: housing should pay for the accommodation element
and social work for support. But it fudges the issue about where the
hell you draw the boundaries. If you run a hostel of single people,
you have to provide 24-hour cover. At what stage do staff become
care staff?'
LA Official 9
Ultimately the decision becomes arbitrary. In the case of Urban Aid projects, the
District Council paid 50% of the 25% contribution - otherwise past experience
had demonstrated (over another project) that
'You can argue endlessly about the right proportions.'
LA Official 9
This issue clearly demonstrated Benson's thesis that in the inter-organisational
network organisations compete for two scarce resources: money and authority.
'I can't see a situation where a social work authority is going to fund
a housing authority, whereas they obviously do fund housing
associations.'
LA Official 9
'The Social Work Department agreed. 'Yes - we might not give them
(the Housing Department) money.'
LA Official 5
The reluctance to pass money to another statutory body seemed to stem from the
implication that the local authority was also conceding control of a domain. If a
voluntary organisation was the recipient then it seemed only a temporary
concession of control. The area could be retrieved by the statutory body in better
times financially. Boundaries were blurred and no concession of authority
seemed to have been made.
The development of the Housing Department's interest in supported
accommodation was very much this official's 'baby'.
Me: 'Was there a decision in the Housing Department that it wanted
supported accommodation developed?'
'No .... until the last nine months, I'm probably the only person in




Me: 'You had a remit?'
'I gave myself a remit.'
LA Official 9
Other staff in the department, particularly those in housing welfare (who made
up a large part of LA Official 9's area of responsibility) did want to see supported
accommodation developed, but unlike the Depute Director, they lacked the
power to put items on the political agenda. The Chief Welfare Services Officer,
when asked why there was so much voluntary sector activity in Bigtown in this
field said:
'That is historical and also political.'
Me: 'You think the political will wasn't there?'
'Yes, that's right .... it's certainly something we'd been wanting to get
involved in and hadn't had the resources ... There was no-one to
push forward and look at what areas we should be getting involved
in - there was no comprehensive policy.'
LA Official 10
In promoting^the Action Group's application, LA Official 9 was engaged in
'wedging' one^the budgetary strategies observed by Wildavsky (op.cit).
'If it had been Urban Aid, then we'd have been involved on the
management committee.'
LA Official 9
This participation would have given the department a 'toe in the door7 of the
domain.
The Action Group formally submitted their project to the Housing Department
on 15 November 1983 and by 29 November the Housing Committee had
approved participation in funding this project 'in principle.'
The political climate was becoming somewhat more amenable: there had been a
change of Housing Committee Chairman and one Tory Councillor in particular
was perceived as much more likely to advocate the idea of special needs housing
to her colleagues. It was also less than six months to the District Council
elections and therefore time to appear to be a little more magnanimous.
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The depute director employed another strategy observed by Wildavsky - 'Spend
to save.'
'I argued that by giving support services we could prevent failures in
tenancies - which very selfishly has an impact on housing
management - if you prevent rent arrears.'
Me: 'You appealed to their financial motives?'
'That's right.'
LA Official 9
What is remarkable about the decision of the Housing Department to support
the Action Group's application, is how little negotiation there was. Unlike the
Social Work Department where there had been vested interests to whom
supported accommodation presented a threat, the opposition here was likely to
come from politicians and with the right strategy they could be managed. Also
an agreement in principle did not cost them anything -
'Cash took longer. The agreement in principle wasn't worth much
because there was no money for it in the budget.'
LA Official 95
But this agreement did allow the project to enter the next phase of negotiation.
Once the Council had given their agreement in principle then all negotiations
for Urban Aid would be undertaken on their behalf by the Region's Planning
Department.
At this stage the Action Group was very encouraged by their progress; so far it
had all seemed so easy. The Social Work Department had welcomed the project.
Agreement in principle had come quickly from the Housing Department. This
seemed like money they could get.
'We stuck with Urban Aid and didn't think of any other ways of
trying to pursue it (the project) then.'
AG 'Worker I
LA Official 7 wanted the Social Work Department to support the project and
allowed it over the first hurdle into the Region's selection process, because he
•^Agreement in principle put the Action Group project into the District Council's estimates.
The final budget would then be compiled by councillors at a later stage.
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thought it a good project which meshed with two areas of work (supported
accommodation and the Mental Handicap Strategy) to which he was whole¬
heartedly committed. Moreover it was easier to get political support for
voluntary sector projects and it had financial advantages when the Region had
resource problems.
LA Official 9 supported the project because he and the Welfare Section of the
Housing Department were seeking a locus in this area of work.6
From officials' points of view it was the first step towards being able to do that
kind of work themselves. By the time this research was conducted, a change of
political control had taken place and a Homeless Persons' Team had been
established within the Department.
The important point to note is that none of those initially promoting the
project, including the Action Group itself, chose Urban Programme Funding
because of a focus on urban deprivation. Other motives and policy objectives
were more important.
6.6 Did it fit the Guidelines?
Once projects entered the Region's or the URU's appraisal system, they were in a
competitive environment. Firstly the Region had a limited budget to fund their
contribution. It had been their practice to over-bid slightly to allow for projects
rejected by the URU, but even so not all eligible projects could go forward.
Secondly the Scottish Office also had a limited budget for Urban Aid and this
had been under increasing pressure.
'Competition for the available resources has got vastly more intense.
When the Urban Programme was running in the Seventies - it was
almost a case of going out onto the streets scouring around for
projects.'
Civil Servant 1
6At the same time as agreement in principle was given to the AG project, the District
Council also gave the same commitment to a hostel for homeless young people and
the Bigtown Council for the Single Homeless' Homemaker Scheme.
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By 1985 the URU were turning down four out of every five applications. The
Scottish Office encouraged intense competition because
'if we're not getting all the possible applications then we can't
conceivably be funding the best possible selection of them.'
Civil Servant 1
In this atmosphere the potential to negotiate on behalf of projects, like the
Action Group's, which did not 'fit' the criteria became more limited.
'It's not just a question of being eligible. It's a matter of being eligible
and being high on the priorities.'
LA Official 8
Because the promoters of this project had their own policy objectives, the
assessment of the project had not been done on the basis of Urban Aid
guidelines. Rather the approach had been: "This is a desirable project. What do
we need to do to fit it to Urban Aid? " And some dressing would be added which
would give it the right sort of aura, sufficient they hoped to satisfy the URU.
Before the project was submitted, it was apparent that there were two difficult
issues for the Action Group's project:
a) the fact that the geographical area of Division 3 was not classed as
deprived.
b) the extent to which it was legitimate to focus on a client group
within an area of deprivation rather than the area itself.
In order to counter the first and most fundamental problem (because if the area
did not meet this criterion, then the project was not eligible, never mind a
priority) LA Official 7 had suggested
'it didn't need much suggesting, that (AG Worker 1) make sure it
covered Division 4 as well, which was an Urban Aid area and already
the Action Group had begun to extend into that area as well. So we
made sure that was stressed in the application.'
LA Official 7
The other aspect was less clear-cut. This centred on the extent to which a client-
group could be served under an area-based programme.
'The Urban Programme is an area-based programme and that's on
page one of everything they (URU) send out. But you and I know
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that everything isn't area-based, so there's quite a lot of negotiation
has got to be done on that. So for something to be eligible that is
really client- based, you've got to do a bit of tucking it in.'
LA Official 8
The issue was the interpretation of the first eligibility criterion
'1. Projects should be for and normally in, multiply deprived areas or
areas at risk; their effect should be focused on such areas rather than
diffused more widely.'
Annex to Circular SDD 7/1981
Although there were two distinct arguments, the way the 1981 circular was
written implied that there was only one. There was an an argument about
whether projects for deprived areas had to be in such areas and there was
another about the extent to which a project could be client-oriented and
therefore serve those from non-priority areas. In interviews with officials I
found that this kind of blurring took place too. For example the quotation from
LA Official 6 above, continues:
'and extra encouragement to write pieces to explain that a larger
percentage of the people you are dealing with probably come from
deprived areas than from other areas.'
LA Official 8
thus confusing the geographical argument with the client focused argument.
In the Action Group's initial proposal put to the SWD, these issues are dealt
with rather superficially. The only positive mention of Urban Aid is in para 1.3
of the summary:
'The Urban Aid proposal will build on the Group's knowledge of
mentally handicapped people in West Bigtown ... '
p.l Action Group Proposal (Sept. 1983)
and above this was a map of Division 3 with boundaries drawn around it which
excluded Division 4, the area of deprivation. However this was not the final
version of the application.
There were no arguments in the original proposal which attempted to
demonstrate that mental handicap was linked with urban deprivation. The
broad social class spread which had been advantageous in forming the group
was not so useful in seeking this funding.
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6.7 The Social Work Department Appraisal
Once the project was submitted, from the Action Group's point of view it
disappeared. They did not know what happened to it or understand the
processes it had to go through.
'I don't think at any point LA Official 7 had actually explained to us
the process - it went to them (the SWD) and then it went to
planning. I don't think it had sunk in with us that there was this
next stage. We thought it was the Social Work Department who
were pushing this. It seemed to take a very long time.'
AG Worker 1
When the project was submitted to the SWD in September 1983 - it embarked on
an obstacle race. At this point however it is important to make a change of focus.
The perspective of any official in a large bureaucracy is quite different from that
of a voluntary organisation focused on a single issue.
'Their application as far as they are concerned is very important, key,
top priority. If it comes in here to us (SWD), you're looking at the
allocation of grants to voluntary organisations. It's one of an endless
stream of stuff that's being processed. Its priority changes instantly,
the minute it gets into somebody's workload here... It's immediately
subject to an analysis which isn't about it in its own right.'
LA Official 5
This analysis involves something other than simply checking eligibility and
funding those that fit the criteria as has often been implied by some writers in
the field (eg Van der Ven and Walker 1983 above p.18).
'You might do that, but you still won't have enough money to fund
them ... It's nice to be able to say we'll fund all the good, well thought
-out projects that come to us. To do that we need to have a fairly
elastic budget and we don't have that.'
LA Official 5
Ultimately criteria tend to be based on subjective judgments, on previous
experience of the organisation and their relationships with the authority. The
project the Action Group put forward was a good one and by this stage in its
career they were known and trusted by a number of key people within the
department. (Indeed it may be that this was more important than fitting the
URU criteria.) A major contribution to this improved standing was the
relationship which had built up through Task Force.
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'What began to happen, I think was that we realised that there were
ideas to to be got from them, not just criticism and I think the Action
Group probably realised that they had something to offer that was
positive and that they could influence the shape of services by other
than noisy campaigning.'
LA Official 5
A major factor which opened the department to a number of voluntary
organisations, not just the Action Group, was the existence of policy gaps. As
was noted (above p.106) - the SWD was structured to provide services rather
than for client groups. Although there was considerable expertise within the
department in a number of fields it tended to be fragmented and uncoordinated.
Moreover loyalty tended to be to the division which provided services, rather
than to the client-group. Thus it was very difficult for the department itself to
deal with policies in a way that focussed on the needs of a particular group of
clients like the mentally handicapped. In Wilson's (1963) terms 'it is too costly to
concert the wills of the organisation members' (p.202) or as Benson (1975)
suggested the network was blocked and no-one within the department was
powerful enough to obtain movement. Invitations by innovators to involve
voluntary organisations in departmental and inter-departmental policy-making
haitto be understood in this context and will be discussed more fully in the next
chapter.
Because the department provided relatively few services for mentally
handicapped people- mainly Adult Training Centres and some fieldwork
support (the latter rather precarious in a climate of cuts) - what expertise there
was in assessing the Action Group project consisted of Task Force staff who
already whole-heartedly supported it. The assessment of urban aid applications
lay within the same ambit.
The SWD applied two criteria to projects in their assessment:
a) projects should satisfy the URU guidelines
b) projects should complement the department's own services.
In the fonner case the Dept. needed to be satisfied
'that the project was going to make a significant contribution to a
designated multiply deprived area or to a particular group who were
seen to come from one of those areas. It's a bit difficult in mental
handicap - you have to struggle a bit in the Action Group's case. You
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couldn't say that mental handicap is a particular feature of (deprived)
area(s).'
LA Official 5
Whilst with the benefit of hindsight, it seems obvious that the project might
founder at URU level, the the local authority perception then was that it could
be negotiable because
'We had had urban aid applications approved in the past with a
similar sort of problem and we'd got round it by demonstrating that
the client group were people who'd come from deprived areas/
LA Official 57
Moreover the criteria the URU applied were perceived to shift both in terms of
how to tackle urban deprivation and political expediency.
'The criteria varied from one year to the next in my opinion - it
wouldn't always be accepted in the URU but in actual practice it
seemed to me it varied a bit.'
LA Official 5
The form these negotiations would take tended to be attempts on the part of
officials to pick up the right 'vibes' in response to questions rather than anything
overt. I have heard the process compared to the Roman custom of 'reading the
entrails.'
'They were very reluctant to say directly but you'd usually get some
kind of indication of what was not going to make it ... (They'd say) if
you could say it was doing a, b, and c it might stand a chance. We
tended to do that quite a lot.'
LA Official 5
This process was interpreted as both subjective and political, whatever claims to
rationality the URU might make.
7However in the particular case cited as a precedent - a hostel for female offenders - the
client group were more clearly in the URU categories - and in that case the argument
was about whether this facility should be located in a deprived area rather than
about whether it would serve a deprived area. But the way the criteria were
written in 1981 assisted this kind of confusion, as noted above (p.141).
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'Urban Aid is funny money anyway, isn't it? We've got a lot of
Urban Aid money this year (1987). I don't know if it's got anything to
do with the General Election or whether there were underspends the
year before. Its a bit like the Rate Support Grant - its all dressed up to
look frightfully scientific: it's not really like that.'
LA Official 4
'We will probably have £6 - 700,000 worth of projects through this
year (1987). Now I know we are in election year and three of the
projects happen to be in the Secretary of State's constituency -
nonetheless, we're going to claim some credit for that.'
Councillor 1
This perception led to a consensus amongst those making recommendations to
the Directorate that it was worth trying to get money for this project under
Urban Aid funding. Once that assessment had been made, it was unlikely to be
questioned at the directorate meeting because this would be but a very small part
of an enormously pressured workload. This would be reinforced by the clear way
in which the project satisfied the second of the criteria used by the SWD in
assessing such projects - that it complemented the department's own services.
Not only did the Directorate meeting support the project, but they agreed that it
should be ranked the department's top priority project in negotiations with the
Planning Department because:
'Mental handicap at that time was very high on Social Work's
priorities. They had a working party on Mental Handicap. They had a
whole series of things they'd been working about 'Care in the
Community' ... and as their policy priority, that was a client group
that they felt was reasonably well organised, they felt they could get
to grips with it and they were pushing it very hard through all sorts
of other places in social work arrangements.'
LA Official 8
At this time there was also no other obvious source of funding for these
services. (Support Finance, which emerged later, will be discussed in the next
chapter). It was for these reasons, I believe, that the project surmounted the next
hurdle and was passed to the Planning Department for assessment.
6.8 The Project Disappears
At this stage the project disappeared from view: the Action Group heard
nothing. In December 1983 the Co-ordinator sought a deputation to the Social
Work Committee which was refused because the item was not on the agenda.
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The amount of money the Region could spend on seed money was under
review, although no-one told the Action Group. Originally the Planning
Department had anticipated a budget of £100,000 for Urban Aid seed money (the
contribution of 25% by local authorities). However, the Regional Council was
now controlled by Conservatives with Liberal support and a hard scrutiny of all
spending was underway. On 12.12.83 the Director of Social Work noted in a
memorandum to the Director of Planning:
The Chief executive recently told me that I was acting outwith the
approved regional council procedures if I submitted requests for new
Urban Aid projects to the Social Work Committee.'
Instead all new spending proposals were scrutinised by the Conservative Centre
Group, a political policy forum through which reports to the Policy and
Resources committee (which made recommendations on Urban Aid) had to be
routed. Papers on all the priorities for Urban Aid, including the Action Group's
project, were submitted to this group. On 21 February 1984, the Regional Council
cut the Urban Aid seed monies to £50,000 and officials reviewed their priorities.
The Action group survived this process. They were among the three projects
given top priority by social work on 16.3.84.
However, at the same time central government was also tightening the belt. On
19 March 1984, Mr Michael Ancrum, Scottish Home Affairs Minister announced
a freeze on all new spending on Urban Aid, except those to which local
authorities were already committed. Spending was cut from £30.6 million in
1983-84 to £26.5 million in 1984-85.
The Action Group did not know what was happening. In July 1984, Action
Group Worker 1 wrote to the Conservative chair of the SW Committee
enquiring what had happened to the project. This provoked the following reply
from the Director of Social Work:
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'You wrote to the Chairman of the Social Work Committee in July
about Urban Aid.
I have sat on the letter for a while in order to give me the
opportunity to cool down. I cannot tell you how greatly I resent the
implication that my department has allowed an Urban Aid
application to remain ignored.
All Urban Aid applications have been handled expeditiously in my
department and lie with the Director of Planning.'
Letter from SWD. 3 Sept. 1984
In fact the problem by this time did not lie with the Planning Department but
with the URU. Until the embargo imposed by the minister funding had been
relatively freely available and in the past the programme had been
undersubscribed. By 1983 it was becoming clear that one of the Government's
priorities for the Civil Service was to increase its efficiency and this tended to be
seen in terms of saving money. A Financial Management Initiative (FMI) was
introduced which attempted to make civil service thinking more business-like.
In the URU its outcome was a review of Urban policy generally and the Urban
Programme in particular. This took place between March and August 1984. It is
possible that the Scottish Office simply decided to hold this review as part of a
more general programme, but there was a suspicion that the URU had been
chosen because of questions about how their money had been spent in the past.
It seems that the URU felt a need to defend its budget. However what ever the
reasons for the embargo - it had serious consequences for the Action Group's
project.
Besides the delay, the review of policy meant that a new circular was issued. The
Minister announced the lifting of the embargo on 24 August 1984 and that
'while there was no scope for the approval of any more new projects
to start during 1984 -85, resources would be provided to enable new
projects to start in 1985 - 86.'
The new circular was issued on 9 November 1984 (SDD 35/1984) and there was a
shift of emphasis which bore all the hallmarks of FMI:
'it certainly relies much more than before on buzz words like 'viable




and the two criteria emphasized in the circular were:
'that the Secretary of State will increasingly be looking to authorities
to submit urban programme applications for projects which are part
of a co-ordinated local strategy for tackling deprivation/
and
'that there will also be greater emphasis on the identification of
quantifiable objectives.'
p.l SDD 35/1984
The circular set as eligibility criteria that a project should:
• be of direct benefit to a deprived urban area whether for all
residents or particular groups within them;
• create a new asset which a local authority would otherwise be
unlikely to provide;
• be within the cost limits
• not be part of the authority's mainstream provision
and amongst those projects which met the criteria, priority would be given to
those which were:
• in the most deprived areas
• part of comprehensive strategies
• not directly run by local authorities
• most effective in mobilising other resources (volunteers, private
sector money, local community development)
• innovative
• likely to reduce long-term demands on local authority budgets
• short-term and unlikely to increase local authority staffing
• assist crime prevention
These changes were perceived in the local authority as placing a greater
emphasis on geography. Compared with the 1981 criteria (above p 129) there is
an insertion of emphasis on area in the first priority. However, given the
observation that Urban Aid decision making had political overtones, the SWD
was not certain whether this meant that the Action Group's project was
therefore not eligible or whether it would still be possible to argue a case.
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At the same time another political shift towards economic regeneration was
perceived.
'On the basis of statistics, it's obvious that more of the areas (of
deprivation) are areas of high unemployment and the indicators
relating to unemployment have been given more weight in the
analysis.'
LA Official ll8
This shift in emphasis reduced substantially the area of Division 4 which
qualified for Urban Aid(on which the Action Group's application relied). An
increased emphasis on the worst 5% of deprived areas (which did not include
Division 4) would be likely to reduce the priority of the Action Group's
proposal.
6.9 And Re-appears
On 13 November 1984, four days after the new circular was issued, the Planning
Department intimated to the Action Group their intention to 'recommence its
consideration of potential new Urban Aid projects'. The Action Group was
advised to contact either LA Official 7 or LA Official 11 for information or
clarification.
Firstly, the Housing Department's interest in sharing the cost of the project was
re-activated. By this time there had been substantial changes in the District
Council. To everyone's surprise (including theirs) the Labour Party had gained
control of the Council at the May 1984 elections. There had been radical changes
in policy and housing was at the forefront.
In August 1984 a major report on housing for single homeless people had been
approved in principle. This contained policy proposals on hostels, supported
accommodation and allocations policy. The projects which the previous Tory
administration had approved were included. As a consequence the District
council had also agreed in principle to fund the total cost of the Action Group's
project up to 50%
8Referring to 'Areas of Special Need in Scotland' (1984) an analysis to identify the main
areas of deprivation in Scotland undertaken for the URU by the Central Research
Unit of the Scottish Office.
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'since Urban Aid is now unavailable at a cost to the District Council
of approximately £19,000 in 1985 - 86.'
It would however have been extremely difficult to secure the agreement of the
SWD to match that sum:
'It was easy to get the commitment from the District. The Region on
the other hand with every social work pressure group knocking on
their door and a budget being cut absolutely drastically, were actually
not looking to fund voluntary organisations because they were
running out of money and being cut back on their own statutory
responsibilities.'
AG Worker 2
On 20 November 1984 the Management Sub-Committee of the Housing
Committee agreed that the project be funded with or without Urban Aid. This
was ratified by the full Housing Committee on 27 November 1984.
The welfare rights officer (AG Worker 2) in 1984 was a Labour Councillor and
Chair of the Housing Management Sub-Committee. Accordingly he declared an
interest in terms of ss.38 - 42 and 60 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act
1973. Whilst he did not canvass support for the group's project he recognised
clearly the problems he faced:
'the big problem is integrity.'
and
'It was difficult not to be part of saying to people - this is a wonderful
idea.'
AG Worker 2
However he recognised that advantages did accrue to the Action Group because
he was a councillor because:
a) It gave knowledge of the system and procedures which he was
able to share with the group. (He had also been assistant to an MP
for a year when he gained a similar knowledge of Parliamentary
procedure).9
9This resembles the way LA Official 2 used knowledge to assist the AG discussed (above
Ch.4).
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b) Recognition of his status improved the group's access to senior
officials.
As Westergaard and Resler (1975) note, he did not have to do anything because:
'individuals and groups may have the effective benefits of power,
without needing to exercise it in positive action.'
p.142
Lukes (1974 p.ll) observes that the analysis of of power in our society has tended
to use a simplistic 'one-dimensional' model. This is reflected in the legislation
which prohibits positive action to forward their interests by Councillors.
Whereas Lukes posits a much more complex analysis, which would include the
role of structural factors in addition to the simple focus on action. In this case
the recognition of the networks to which this councillor was connected would
constrain officials' choices. This is not to imply that this councillor did anything
wrong or that this was a unique event. A similar approach was used by regional
officials in assessing which projects to include in the Region's package, (see
below p.152)
Having secured the agreement of the District Council to share the costs of the
project, the Planning Department could begin its assessment of the project
within the Region's package of proposals to submit to the URU.
When the Planning Department assessed the eligibility of the Action Group's
project is unclear. No one can remember. However it seems likely that officials
would re-examine all projects in the light of changed circumstances. My
informants are clear that this assessment would be done prior to entering the co¬
ordinated inter-departmental prioritising mechanism. So the question must be
asked: why did the Planning Department not rule the Action Group project out
as ineligible?
Whilst I am not sure that there is a clear answer to this, significant factors seem
to have been the complex political pressures with which the Planning
Department had to deal and their consequent style of operation. The department
was piggy-in-the-middle, subject to pressures from all sides
• from service departments
• from voluntary agencies
• from politicians
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• from the URU
On the one hand they had to satisfy the URU criteria and on the other produce a
package which was acceptable to the other three groupings:
'We weren't in control of it. It was like driving something that was
about 100 yards down the road with two strings really. They weren't
our applications; they were voluntary organisations applications. We
weren't going to be able to make the final decision on who got what.
So you were acting one removed all the time.'
LA Official 8
In these circumstances the strategy was to minimise damage, to compromise
rather than confront:
'I would say that the Planning Department - it never took a strong
lead and still doesn't and it is more on the basis of accommodation,
although I don't remember any desperate differences of opinion.'
LA Official 11
If the SWD officials and the Action Group were strongly in support of this
project and thought there was a chance it could be argued through with the
URU (as LA Official 7 did ) then the Planning Department officials were unlikely
to challenge this. They thought that whether the mentally handicapped
constituted a deprived social group could be argued, given the previous
inconsistencies in URU decision making. The fit with the Region's priorities
seems to have taken precedence with them too, as with the SWD. It may be that
the significance of the increased emphasis on geography only became apparent
with hindsight,as the Scottish Office had presented the circular as a clarification
rather than an amendment. The only alteration in the proposal submitted to the
URU by the Action Group was to remove the Division 3 boundaries from the
map of Bigtown in the proposal and show the location of the one existing
supported accommodation project in Division 4.
However agreeing that the Action Group project seemed to be eligible, the
Planning Department set in motion the procedures to assemble what was
generally known as the Region's Urban Aid package. There were three stages in
this final process
1. Assessment by the Principal Officers' Group consisting of officials
from Planning, SWD and Education.
2 Assessment by the Assistant Directors' Group with the same
range of officials represented.
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3 Agreement by the councillors on the Urban Aid Sub-Committee
of the Policy and Resources Committee.
The formulation of the package was undertaken by the Principal Officers' Group.
Projects were evaluated on a number of criteria which included:
• its aims
• the fit between objectives and proposed staffing
• the budgets
• co-operation with other agencies
'We look at our respective priorities and the priorities of the areas
and the amount of seed money available that year and what we have
picked up from the Scottish Office about their particular inclinations
and we come up with a list of top priority projects.'
LA Official 11
But this was a bargaining procedure between the three main departments
involved. It was a political process:
'There was also a bit of give and take: education would say "Now
come on - you got two the last time - we want two this time.'"
LA Official 8
There was also a recognition in the Region that whatever the Scottish Office
might argue about objectivity, rationality or measurability that
'Some of them are subjective judgments. I mean whether
something's innovative or not is a bit subjective. "Minimises local
government expenditure" How do we ever know that!'
LA Official 8
The 'package' of Urban Aid proposals having been agreed by the Principal
Officers' Group, was then passed to the second stage, the Assistant Directors'
Group, whose job was
'more into strategic arrangements that the council had than the
(PO's) group.'
LA Official 8
The group examined the way projects fitted into long-term plans that the
council had and other funding opportunities to which they could be linked e.g.
EEC money.
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'Just to make sure that we weren't wasting our opportunities and to
prioritise and to do a little bit of the political piece.'
LA Official 8
The political piece essentially involved two things: an appraisal of what would
'go' with the local politicians and with the URU. In the case of their committee
they tried
'to make sure that all the projects weren't in the area of one
particular colour. They were usually in Labour areas because that just
happened to be the kind of areas we were in, but not always.
Sometimes there was a bit of discussion about the acceptability to the
committee.'
LA Official 8
The officials tried to take cognisance of political sensitivities to avoid any major
upsets at the committee stage. Politicians recognised too, that it was more
difficult to change priorities at committee and lobbying for an application tended
to take place when the project was first submitted. The proposals presented to
the committee for agreement were the result of negotiations and compromises
from the moment projects were submitted through until the successful few
reached the stage of being included in the 'package'.
With the URU, the officials felt there was a greater difficulty in assessing what
was likely to be supported. All officials interviewed commented on the secrecy
of the civil service in respect of decision-making. There was much speculation
and perplexity about this process and a great deal of effort went into discovering
the URU's actual criteria and fostering good relations. The process of negotiation
was perceived to have changed over the preceding seven or eight years
however. In the late 1970's
'I and somebody else would go down to the Scottish Office and say
that looks like what we would like to do next year and it comes to
about that much. How do you think that's going to be?... That was in
the days when they'd look at it and say "Oh, I wouldn't bother doing
one of these - we've done one already in Greenock and it didn't work
very well. Or, we're only going to do two in the country and we've
done them already...." They would also give you indications that the
Minister would like X,Y, or Z (not necessarily from us but
somewhere in the country.)'
LA Official 8
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This willingness to give indications of acceptability was perceived to have
declined over the years and by 1985 (when the Action Group's project was
submitted), when the Assistant Director (Planning) asked
'Is there anything on that, that you think is absolutely not going to
get any support, because we'll take it down the line a bit and put in
something that would be better ... Recently they very seldom gave
you any indication of that ... They were likely to say just send it in
and we'll see what we can make of it.'
LA Official 8
Social Work Department officials had also observed this change in the
willingness of the URU to 'tip the wink'. However they blamed changes in the
Region's mechanisms for dealing with Urban Aid, which were to be
implemented finally in February 1985. This was the outcome of a report by the
Performance Review Committee the main effect of which was to centralise
negotiations in the Planning Department. This the SWD saw as reducing their
scope for informal checking on projects before they were finally submitted.
'We had contacts, not just at senior level, but with case officers. We
could ring up and say "How's it going? Do you think we should
amend it or you'd get some kind of indication That doesn't
happen any more. It's now in the hands of the Planning Department.
It's become more formalised and dealt with by higher level persons.'
LA Official 5
Like the SWD, the Planning Department placed great emphasis on friendly
relationships with civil servants
'We've taken advantage of being in Bigtown to have them visit the
projects and they've often popped out for an hour to have a look at
something, which has been helpful to them. Also we've been
helpful to them in that when they've had people up from London to
look at the Urban Programme in Scotland and they are only here
from one Shuttle to the next, you can put them into a Bigtown
project whereas you can't go to Strathclyde or Tayside.'
LA Official 8'
Officials would try to build up relationships of trust too, create confidence that if
given the money, the Region would be able to deliver the project quickly, and
not cause underspending which was perceived as a problem for the URU.
However, although
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'We thought we'd built up quite a good rapport, .. then they started
moving all the people. Then they get in someone new, who was just
another voice on the telephone. You'd have to rush down and make
contact with them.'
LA Official 8
The most plausible explanation for this change of attitude does seem to me to be
a change of personnel in the Scottish Office. Certainly the civil servant in charge
of the URU when the Action Group's application was considered did not
subscribe to the idea of hinting what might be acceptable.
'I can't envisage anybody here doing that. It just isn't part of the
culture, if you like. Its not a question of whether its said formally or
informally - it wouldn't be said informally either. What we might
say would be, if a local authority was bringing forward a lot of
projects relating to local authority sponsored projects, that they'd
have a better chance if they brought forward more sponsored by the
local community.'
Civil Servant I
Having done their best with all the compromises they had to make and tried to
achieve a "package" which satisfied all parties
'We were juggling all of these things and part of my job was the chief
juggler.'
LA Official 8
a report on the package was compiled and submitted to the Urban Aid Sub-
Committee. This included the Action Group's proposal which was submitted to
this committee on 26 February 1985. The committee report contained the
priorities recommended by the three departments involved and if the Planning
Department had assessed the situation correctly then
'actually at committee, they very, very rarely messed things about.'
LA Official 8
The list of projects agreed along with the Action Group's included a project for
the unemployed in a mining area, a tenants project, an adventure playground, a
day centre for elderly people, bedsits for homeless young people, two
community development projects and a flexible fund. These had been selected
from 36 submissions on the waiting list in 1984. By the time the Action Group's
proposal reached this stage, all pretence at any area base seems to have been
abandoned; the committee report states:
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'The project focuses on a client-group - the mentally handicapped
rather than a geographical area.'
UA Sub- Committee Report 26 Feb. 1985
However the Council were to discover that this was not the correct
interpretation of the new circular. The package was now submitted to the URU
for their adjudication. The Action Group's proposal had reached the final
hurdle.
6.10 Inside the Black Box
Once submitted to the URU, the project would again have to go through a
competitive process, but this time competing against projects from all other
eligible regions of Scotland. Projects were appraised by case officers against Urban
Aid criteria under three main headings:
a) Basic Eligibility (see above p.148)
b) Project Presentation (including quantifiable objectives)
c) Priority (ibid)
The appraisal form is designed to function as a flow chart and the guidelines to
case officers under eligibility say
'i) resolve any doubts with local authority
ii) if the answer to any of the items at 'A' is NO reject application
iii) if the answers are all YES continue appraisal.'
Extract from Scottish Office form UP10
The question mark over the Action Group's project was on the first criterion -
eligible area. The URU interpretation of the possible relationship between a
client group and a deprived area was crucial. Plains Region had also submitted
another application, which was similar to the Action Group's, from a housing
association, seeking to develop a facility for young single homeless people. The
main differences were seen to be the client group and that the latter was able to
be more flexible about its geographic base. When the housing association's
proposal was accepted and the Action Group's rejected, LA Official 7 interpreted
this as being because:
'The main difference was that the (housing association) one was
peripatetic. They were prepared to locate in an Urban Aid designated
area. The Action Group was more fixed geographically.'
LA Official 7
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However a civil servant in SWSG, who had worked in the URU explained the
distinction rather differently. The Urban Programme was area based and projects
would have to be seen to benefit a deprived area rather simply deprived people.
The question he would see the URU asking would be - 'How does helping
mentally handicapped people assist the area?:
'It would be benefiting families not the area, and therefore a low
priority. However if a project was for teenagers; they are equated
with glue-sniffing, vandalism, petty theft. Thus a project to benefit
teenagers will have a spin-off for the area. Less graffiti, less glue-
sniffing, that's the rationale.'
Civil Servant 2
An SWSG advisor agreed. He saw a hierarchy of client groups in relationship to
Urban Aid criteria.
'With teenagers, its easy; with the unemployed its fairly easy; but
with the elderly and the handicapped its not so easy/
Civil Servant 3
When the URU raised the question of the area base of the Action Group
proposal with the Region, the Action Group was asked to respond. On 29 March
1985, a letter was sent from the Action Group to the URU making the following
points:
a) That the Action Group's current work extended beyond the
Division 3 boundary.
b) 'In the past year we have become increasingly involved in the
Plainj Strategy for Mentally Handicapped People. This is being
progressed through six sectors (of the SWD) - Division 3 falls into
Bigtown West along with Division 4 and Division 5. It is within
this context that our accommodation proposals will develop ...'
c) Therefore the Action Group's AGM was to consider a proposal to
change its name to become West City Action Group.
Letter to URU (29 March 1985)
It must be observed that whatever other purposes the name change might serve,
in the context of Urban Aid, at this late stage, it looked opportunistic. Certainly
the reply seemed not to satisfy the URU and on 22 May 1985, the Action Group
were notified by letter from the Region's Planning Department, that the SDD
had rejected their application.
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'The main reason despite the recent extension of the project to
Bigtown West, was insufficient targeting on areas of deprivation.'
Letter from Planning Dept 22 May 1985
However as far as the Action Group was concerned all was not lost - hand¬
written on the bottom of the letter in the co-ordinator's hand was
'No further meetings. LA Official 7 proposes we concentrate on
Support Finance.'
Other means of funding were now available with the issue of SHHD's circular
"Community Care: Joint Planning and Support Finance." There was even some
money available from SWSG too and it was to these areas that the Action Group
now turned their attention.
6.11 Why did the Application fail?
Superficially, the answer to this question is simple: the project failed because it
was not eligible under the basic guidelines of the Urban Programme. But then a
further question emerges how did something that was not eligible come to
progress through a competitive process and survive until the last hurdle?
As was observed at the beginning of this chapter, one of the things which
encouraged the Action Group to apply had been precedent: a project for the
mentally handicapped had been funded in another part of Scotland. Plains
Region suspected that they had favoured status. What seems more likely
however, is that the other region were good at writing applications which
appeared eligible and then amending them once they had the money. Also, this
particular application had qualified under the 1981 rather than the 1984 circular.
This shift of emphasis in the URU is probably more apparent with hindsight
rather than at the time; now that decisions have been taken in new
circumstances, it is possible to see a change of direction more clearly than would
be possible in 1984. The URU became more precise in the application of Urban
Aid guidelines because
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i) they had an increased number of applications. This increase
stemmed from two sources: the decrease in local authority funding
and its knock-on effects on voluntary organisations; and the URU's
own encouragement to organisations to apply.
Whereas in the past projects which were marginal could squeeze in because the
URU had few applications -
'Talking to the URU, the more they got a lot of bids ... they got into
this situation with lots of bids for a limited amount of money - the
more they were going to go for ones that were 100% rock solid on
every one of the criteria and the fewer of these marginally argued
ones that they were going to be willing to take.'
LA Official 8
ii) At the same time, if as suspected the URU had suffered a budget cut
in 1983, then they would have less money to disburse and would
also have an incentive to ensure that they did not make the mistake
of being undersubscribed again.
In Crozier's terms the URU could be seen as creating a climate of uncertainty in
order to gain power in negotiations, as surely as Crozier's example of the
mechanic cited in Chapter 3 who can decide at his leisure when he will mend
the machine and how. As long as they commit themselves to nothing no blame
can attach to decisions thus reducing political repercussions, whilst at the same
time conferring the advantage that there will always be plenty of applications
because people are unsure of what exactly would qualify.
The SWD saw some of the blame attaching to the new centralised co-ordination
process. Certainly there were greater communication difficulties and as one
official put it:
'All I can say is, if you are negotiating projects that relate to your own
area (of work), it's much easier to argue a case you are familiar with.
I would be able to ring up the URU and say this fits in with what
we're doing much more directly. Now any project we're negotiating
has to be put in the context of the Region's other applications. I think
it's slower, more complicated and more difficult.'
LA Official 5
A further factor however may simply have been the length of time the Action
Group's project had been around. That officials at this stage simply found it
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difficult to say "no, we are not going to put this forward." They knew well the
amount of time and energy that voluntary agencies put into preparing and
formulating proposals and were highly critical of the kind of advice that they
saw civil servants in the URU giving to organisations which approached them
about a project.
'They (vol. orgs.) would say things like "Do you think we'll be able to
get the money?" and get answers like ... you know, trying not to
discourage them, but a typical civil servant sort of answer - "Oh, it's
an extremely worthwhile case or area. We know you've been
working very hard and we're very pleased with the application
you've put in and you know there are £Xmillion to be distributed
and we do hope you manage to get it." And people would take that
as being "Yes" because they didn't understand that that was just a
nothingsy answer.'
LA Official 8
The Action Group were by now very useful to the SWD and by 1985 coirtributing
to a number of areas of departmental work mainly involving the Mental
Handicap Strategy. The SWD would have been very reluctant to offend them.
Similarly, the Planning Department, acutely aware of the political nature of
their work, would be equally careful to avoid repercussions if at all possible. The
Action Group did have a reputation for noisy campaigning. In cases where
blatant political pressure had been applied, the Planning Department
acknowledged that
'When there is great political pressure - you have to go to the URU
to get them to tell them.' (no)
LA Official 11
[In the particular case cited the RC Archbishop had sought a meeting with the
Secretary of State for Scotland to press for the project for the elderly.]
The URU recognised that they were sometimes used in this way
'I think it is certainly a factor, not just for political reasons with a big
'P', that a council will not wish its staff to tell a group that its
application is ineligible or unlikely to be successful - they prefer us to
be the bad guys.'
Civil Servant 1
Whilst no one indicated to me that this applied in the Action Group's case, it
must be considered as a possibility.
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But the reason the Action Group was encouraged to apply for Urban Aid in the
first place must be considered as the basic reason for failure: that the Region in
1985 had the wrong focus on this funding area. Instead of seeing Urban Aid as
something to assist urban deprivation and taking this as the starting point - it
was seen as a pot of money into which any project could be squeezed, if correctly
tailored. Their approach could be likened to that of the ugly sisters to
Cinderella's glass slipper and for some of the same reasons. The dire financial
situation was producing desperate measures. The lack of a clear system for
dealing with projects submitted to the functional departments exacerbated this
approach. Projects could be well advanced and therefore more costly to stop in
political terms before anyone realised that basic eligibility criteria were not met.
It also seems likely that the Region did not in 1985 understand how the URU
were likely to interpret the new criteria. Fundamentally their approach was 'ad
hoc'.
'One of the reasons why (Plains) are less successful (is) because if they
just pick up ad hoc projects that happen to be around, they're less
likely to come up with a whole programme of projects that are likely
to be approved.'
and
'It would be my judgment that within Plains there is this gap
between what they think they want to achieve at the centre and the
functional departments, what they want to achieve, which is
basically very ad hoc and I don't think the two have yet married up
properly.'
Civil Servant 1
The Chairman of the SW Committee agreed with this analysis:
'I think there was a pathetic, lamentable failure on the part of the
council to put forward serious projects. There were clearly projects
which went forward for Urban Aid that weren't in the definition.'
And, having discussed the Action Group's name change ....
'You see, these sort of tricks dinnae fool the Scottish Office and what
they consistently were telling us was that you put forward Urban Aid
projects for geographical areas that don't qualify, put forward other
projects that have already been been rejected and dressed up, they
put forward projects that used to be run by the MSC and now that's
come to an end, they changed their name and rejigged them and
shoved them in as something else and you cannae really do that. Its
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not surprising you get a poor performance when you put in all these
projects that aren't going to qualify.'
Councillor 1
He could be so frank because these criticisms applied to the previous
Tory/Alliance administration. The Council had changed hands again in 1986.
There is little doubt that the proposals the Action Group put forward were good
and the problem was that attempts to force them into an Urban Aid mould, that
might have succeeded in better times, were overtaken by events. It is easy to be
wise with hindsight:
'Although you now know they got money from elsewhere and
we've moved on in the Care in the Community a bit - at the time all
this started, that was just pieces of paper. So I think Social Work did
the right thing in saying this was a high priority area .... It was it s day
for something - maybe Urban Aid wasn't the right thing for it - the
right way to put it forward.'
LA Official 6
6.12 Conclusion
From its inception, one of the major policy objectives of the Action Group had
been to establish more locally-based accommodation for mentally handicapped
people. The project proposed in 1983 arose from that objective. What was new
for the Action Group was the decision to become major service providers
themselves. Originally they had wanted to see such provision made by the local
authority, but national political changes rendered that objective increasingly
unrealistic. Their experience in trying to make such provision through or with
other voluntary agencies had been unsatisfying. The realisation had gradually
dawned that if they wanted greater housing provision which satisfied their
criteria, then they would have to make it themselves.
Although there were now monies available from the Department of Health and
Social Security to cover the running costs of supported accommodation projects,
initial development funds were also required. It was for this purpose that the
Action Group sought funding. Unfortunately, in 1983/84, there was no clear
mechanism for funding projects such as this. The attempts to secure Urban Aid
funding have to be seen in this light. The Action Group and their friends in
statutory organisations were trying to fit the proposal to a funding mechanism
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which sought to achieve objectives which were not central to those of the
project.
It is clear that the project was supported because it was central to other purposes
which the SWD in particular wanted to see achieved: the development of a
major initiative in supported accommodation for mentally handicapped people
(see Chapter 7). Because officials had overlapping roles, they were at times able
to help projects into the system, which served the policy ends that they wanted
to see achieved. Officials in both Social Work and Housing were also trying to
establish the legitimacy to operate in this new area of work which had been
identified and which was not yet clearly 'owned' by either department.
There are a number of interesting features of this process. Firstly, it is clear, that
once the project was submitted the Action Group played very little part in
forwarding it. They seem to have relied on officials to look after their interests.
Secondly, the way in which local authority officials adopt strategies to manage
the political environment is marked and it is clear that officials put much
energy into editing conflict out of the system by attempting to assess what will
'go'-
The negotiations with the Scottish Office highlight the difficulties of an
attenuated system. By the time the project was submitted to the URU, those
advocating it were possibly four steps removed from the Action Group.
Unfortunately, the change of rules and the harsher financial climate meant that
the URU had to defend their budget. This led to much closer scrutiny being
applied to the project that some earlier ones had received.
With hindsight, it is obvious that the chance of gaining Urban Funding for this
project was slight. What is remarkable is how far that project progressed before
that became obvious. The main reason for this seems to have been that in the
local authorities the assessment was on political rather that rational grounds.
The question asked was whether the project was desirable, rather than whether
it fitted the Urban Aid guidelines. This arises from the motives of those
scrutinising the applications.
The focus in this chapter has been on the interpretation of rules. However, in
the subsequent application for Support Finance, the focus lay on trying to create
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in the Health Board the will to work co-operatively with other agencies in this
field and to shape the rules.
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SDD Circular 7/1981 - The Urban Programme in Scotland
issued, emphasising an enhanced role for 'voluntary
effort' in the Urban Programme and priority to projects
undertaken by volunteers or by voluntary bodies using
grant aid from the Local Authority.
Action Group formally submit their Supported
Accommodation Project to the SWD for consideration for
the Urban Programme
Project submitted to Bigtown District Housing
Department on the same basis
Bigtown District Housing Committee approve the project
in principle
Director of Social Work instructed to have all new
projects scrutinised by the Conservative Centre Group.
Region cuts seed money for Urban Aid Projects from
£100,000 to £50,000.
Action Group proposals remain a priority for inclusion in
the submission to the URU
Minister for Home Affairs announces the suspension of
all new approvals for Urban Aid
District Council Elections: Labour gain control in Bigtown
Action Group writes to Chairman of SW Committee














Minister lifts suspension of Urban Aid approvals and
announces that a new circular is to be issued
District Housing Committee approve report on housing
for single homeless people in principle, including a
recommendation that the AG project be funded up to 50%
Action Group receive letter from Director of Social Work,
blaming the Region's Planning Department for delays.
SDD Circular 35/1984 - The Urban Programme in Scotland
issued, shifting the emphasis more clearly to co-ordinated
development and comprehensive strategies.
Action Group receive letter from Planning Department
indicating that projects have to be submitted to the URU
by mid-January 1985.
District Housing Committee approve funding for the
Action Group project either out of revenue up to 50% or
under Urban Aid 12.5% 1985
New structure for co-ordinating Urban Aid submissions
implemented
Region's Urban Aid Sub-Committee approve the package
of Urban Aid proposals including the Action Group's as a
priority
Package submitted to URU for consideration
Letter from AG to URU stressing wider geographical area
SHHD Circular NHS (GEN 18) - Community Care: Joint
Planning and Support Finance issued
AG receive letter from Planning Department advising
them that the URU has rejected their proposal on the
basis of 'insufficient targeting on areas of deprivation.'
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The Health Board is giving Money to a Foreign Power
7.1 Summary
This chapter gives an account of the Action Group's application for Support
Finance and shows the role of voluntary organisations in the power struggles
focussed on policy innovation, suggesting that not only do statutory bodies lack
the power to resolve successfully some intra-organisational conflicts without
their intervention, but also voluntary organisations can be crucial to policy
change in the wider inter-organisational network.
Whilst the Urban Aid application had focused on the interpretation of rules, in
this chapter the struggle sought to induce the Health Board to participate in the
new mechanism of Support Finance. This assumed great importance because
the Health Board were reluctant to co-operate with other agencies in providing
community care and unwilling to concede domains through the Joint Planning
process.
This highlights Benson's (1975) concern with strategies of change in networks
and seeks to show that relatively minor partners in the network (voluntary
organisations) can play key roles in helping to bring about such changes. In
particular this chapter examines Benson's contention that:
'Despite the frequency of (the adoption of) co-operative strategies, the
conditions for their success are restrictive. Such strategies are limited
to situations in which each party must hold something of value for
the other party to be capable of resisting the other's demands. Only
then can co-operative strategies be effective. If a party cannot
withhold something of value from another, there is no basis for the
latter to make concessions.'
p.241 op.cit.
Thus this chapter initially examines three issues:
• Community care for mentally handicapped people
• The role of joint planning in achieving policy change
• support financing as a mechanism to fund projects.
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It highlights the way in which the different political structures of local authority
departments and of Health Boards led to different patterns of decision-making
and different roles for officials, politicians and health board members, thus
posing problems for voluntary organisations trying to influence the system. The
unwillingness of central government to accede to demands to change the rules
and to display leadership underlines the ambivalence of the Scottish Office
about this issue.
Although the Action Group's application was not the central focus of this
debate, its role along with other voluntary agencies, in pushing for the
implementation of the support funding package which was developed, was
important. Seeking funding of this kind cannot be a simple one to one activity.
Rather, it is a complex political process which requires the creation of alliances
between personnel in both statutory and voluntary agencies, often pursing the
same end for different motives.
7.2 Introduction
The Action Group had always favoured community based provision for
mentally handicapped people. As previous chapters show, this, above all, had
been the motivation for parental involvement - a desire to achieve something
better for their children than the hospital places then almost the only option on
offer at the parents' death. The Action Group's policies had been oriented to this
end, with the provision of local housing and support services given a high
priority. It was to achieve this end that they had become involved with the Task
Force on Supported Accommodation and by 1984 community care seemed to be
arriving firmly on the policy agenda. Certainly there were a number of
initiatives south of the Border, which gave cause for optimism that Scotland
would soon have similar policy priorities.
The Group had a project which they wished to pursue, and having failed to
secure Urban Programme funding, felt they had a realistic chance of obtaining
Support Funding, under the terms of the circular issued in May 1985. However
in order to understand the complex issues, of which this application was part, it
is necessary to go back in time a little and set both an historical and a policy
context. It is also necessary at times to maintain conceptual distinctions which
were not always apparent in reality. It is important that the reader understand
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that the events described separately below, were contemporaneous. However
without making these distinctions there is a danger of being overwhelmed by
the complexity of the situation.
It is proposed therefore to examine:
i) the development of community care policies in Plains, and in
particular what became known as the Mental Handicap Strategy.
ii) the pressure which grew, partly as a result of i), for joint planning
between the Regional Council and the Health Board.
iii) the demand to develop support finance as a mechanism to fund
these developments
The Action Group had decided to concentrate on support finance as the best
means of funding their project but their chances of success depended more on
the willingness of Plains Health Board to implement the new support finance
scheme introduced in 1985, than on the merits of their application. There were
bigger issues at stake than one small community care project.
When the Action Group applied for Urban Aid (discussed in Ch 6), they had
acquired credibility in the eyes of the Social Work Department. They had also
been engaged in a similar exercise with staff at Riversdale Hospital, the local
mental handicap hospital. Thus the chapter that follows attempts to recognise
that
'most of the groundwork was done in advance of the period before
the applications went in.'
AG Worker 1
Moreover, because the Action Group's application became part of a much more
ambitious and wide-ranging strategy, it is very difficult to tell the story simply
from their perspective. Indeed it would not do justice to the story. Therefore this
chapter seeks to do what Benson (1975) urges: to focus on inter-organisational
relationships per se, rather than on 'focal organisations and their environment.'
(p.230). Thus, it seeks to understand the perspectives that each organisational
participant brings to the inter-organisational network.
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7.3 A Mental Handicap Strategy for Plains
7.3.1 The Germ of an Idea
The development of a mental handicap strategy for Plains was a logical
consequence of the previous work undertaken by Task Force. They had begun to
develop supported accommodation for mentally handicapped people, but were
experiencing frustrations. As a result of the Doorway experience (see CH 5), they
realised that problems arose because of the lack of a co-ordinated strategy. Day
care places had not been readily available, and there had been a lack of
preparation for independence before residents left the hospital for the
community.
As a special project they had the scope to be innovative. When at a loose end in
1982
'We drafted some proposals for closing Riversdale down one
afternoon in the office... What would happen if..? If we had infinite
resources what would we like to see? That's really how it all started
because LA Official 7 took away this silly piece of paper we'd devised.
It wasn't silly, but what we'd like to see happening.'
LA Official 6
Shephard (1976) noted that in innovation resisting organisations
'The most effective general formula for effective innovation is "an
idea, initiative and a few friends'"
p.520 op. cit.
LA Official 7 now had the idea. The problem was how to turn this from a piece
of paper into something that would result in the closure of Riversdale, or at
least substantially reduce the number of patients. The initial reaction in the
department was not favourable. On approaching his superior with these ideas
'What are we going to do with this? How are we going to get this
implemented? (He) sort of said, "Go away. I don't want to know.'
LA Official 6
Because LA Official 7 was a product champion, however he was not so easily
discouraged. He never missed an opportunity to further his causes and there
were more ways of tackling a brick wall than driving straight through it.
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Colleagues observed his willingness to work beyond the call of duty and the
result was that he found favour with the Director of Social Work.
'Because of... being (who he was), he somehow got himself in with
the Director and although they've had lots of ups and downs, the
Director began to see (him) as a right-hand man.'1
LA Official 6
Shephard (op.cit) noted that in order to achieve change it was preferable (and
certainly desirable) to have the support of top-level executives. In this case it was
probably not difficult to achieve, at least for the principle of community care.
The Director saw the possibility of acquiring a new area of operation (domain)
and potentially some resources. Prior to his post in Plains, he had worked in an
English authority, where he had gained some experience of joint working with
Health Authorities. This he had already used to good effect in the Support
Finance field. In the straitened circumstances of Plains Region, following the
government cuts imposed in 1981/82, an avenue to develop services funded by
sources other than the Rate Support Grant was attractive. Some observers were
certainly cynical, with hindsight, about the extent to which this initiative was
xnotivated solely by a desire to improve services for the mentally handicapped.
'I've an anxious feeling about the way the SWD plays it. Its all right
to criticise health services, but they're not prepared to turn quite the
same scrutiny on their own department. They've got vested
interests. You are talking about principles, which I think inevitably
mean, for instance, that you (also) get rid of Adult Training Centres.'
AG Worker I
But it was not the approach of the SWD in this instance, to set its own house in
order first. Rather the focus was on how to obtain legitimacy to operate in the
broader field of community care and thus obtain resources to fund this activity.
Because they actively sought out models of good practice for supported
accommodation projects, Task Force staff had visited a number of developments
in England and Wales (see above p.108). Moreover this was not a one-off
process. The team were constantly engaged in 'watching the horizon' for new
developments and opportunities. In particular they began to observe the growth
1In terms of the SWD's rejigged organisational plan, by 1984, the development section
which this official headed, reported directly to the Director of Social Work.
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of community care initiatives in England and Wales. In 1981, the DHSS in
England had issued a Green Paper on Care in the Community and by 1983 a
guidance circular had been issued. More significantly, the All Wales Working
Party on Services for Mentally Handicapped People was established in December
1981.
'The starting point for the All Wales Strategy was the question "Why
is it that successive governments have failed to do what they said
they wanted to do for the Cinderella services?'
Tony Pengelly Former Under-Secretary for Wales and Chair of the
All Wales Strategy (speaking at a conference - paper undated)
This working party reported in July 1982 and led to the swift adoption of its
recommendations and more significantly the allocation of relatively substantial
resources. A ten-year development programme was envisaged which would
adopt the main recommendations of the group. These included:
a) Mentally handicapped people's right to normal patterns of living
whilst receiving help to enable them to develop their maximum
potential for independent living - what became known as
'normalisation'.
b) similar access to services as other people.
c) no hospitalisation unless continuous medical care was needed.
d) ordinary housing rather than purpose built hostels
e) the development of day-care and recreational and social facilities.
f) a lead role for social service departments in developing joint
plans for the development of comprehensive services with grant
aid available from the Welsh Office.
The public consultation period on the recommendations ended in October 1982.
By December that year LA Official 7 had arranged to visit Glamorgan County
Council SSD.
'Just me on my own. (The Director) allowed me a two-day visit
round there and I began to meet people and suss out what was
happening down there. And that in turn helped me inform
ourselves collectively about what was going on in Wales. It gave me
a feeling that it was worth pressing ahead.'
LA Official 7
Task Force had begun to experience a growing sense of frustration that moving
people out of hospital seemed so difficult to achieve. What the All Wales
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Strategy did was to give impetus to ideas about inter-agency co-operation and its
role in achieving improved services for mentally handicapped people. Clearly
its instigators understood the nature of the problem:
'If you want to understand what is wrong with Joint Planning - why
it isn't there when it should be and why it doesn't work properly
when you have it, you have to look into the social and political
context of the services and not at the services themselves. You
have to understand why we fail to start from what the client needs
instead of, as we do, start from what the services have to offer.'
Tony Pengelly (ibid)
The problem was that what people need does not always fit neatly within
bureaucratic boundaries; and it was this that the All-Wales Strategy sought to
address. This fitted with Task Force's vision.
Given the nod from the top, LA Official 7 started to develop a strategy. He saw
that two things had to happen. The ideas themselves had to be developed from
their rudimentary form and the Health Board had to become engaged with the
issue of transfer of resources. He realised, because much of the initiative for
service development was coming from voluntary organisations that they
needed some locus in these discussions. Indeed obtaining their initial co¬
operation was quite easy. He was able to capitalise on the relationships Task
Force had already established in the course of developing supported
accommodation. In this process, the opportunities to discuss wider initiatives
presented themselves and were taken. Voluntary organisations with an interest
in mental handicap, provided a sounding board for LA Officials 6 and 7 to
develop their ideas.
'The voluntary sector was most useful as far as discussions were
concerned .... because the mental handicap strategy required to be
thought through further.'
LA Official 7
Innovators in the SWD needed some voluntary organisation input for one very
basic reason: the department lacked expertise with a clear focus on client groups
rather than service delivery, (as noted above p.106, p.143) Thus it was almost
impossible for it to overcome the sectional interests between residential services
division and field services. There was no one in the department with the
authority to be recognised as an expert in certain client group areas. These were
particularly the newer, less prestigious areas of work, of which mental handicap
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was one. It was this failing which enabled the development officer to move into
this area - there was a policy vacuum.
♦
Voluntary organisations, however, had developed very specific areas of
expertise. The Action Group was now recognised, not just locally, but nationally
as an authority on innovative work with mentally handicapped people.
Similarly City Housing Association, who featured later in this negotiations had
particular expertise in developing housing provision for people with special
needs (see below p.213). But perhaps more important was their ability to
publicise their efforts. Both these organisations provided a crucial sounding
board in developing and establishing the general principles of the mental
handicap strategy. It emerged later (below p. 182) that a very specific role, as a base
for a divisional co-ordinator came to be envisaged for the Action Group.
And the voluntary organisations responded enthusiastically
'To be talking to somebody like that (LA Official 7) about notions of
trying to bring large numbers of people out of hospital, that was very
much the kind of ideas we wanted to talk about.'
AG Worker 1
Plainly, the attraction for the voluntary organisations was to acquire the scarce
resources of authority and money to operate in the areas they were seeking to
develop. Moreover being an insider group gave the Action Group some distinct
advantages:
'We were working with people in the (SW) department around
particular things .. the Doorway thing, discussing with them some
kind of supported accommodation thing that we could take on, at
the same time being consulted about aspects of a strategy they were
putting together - which must come about because they think we're
worth talking to, knowledgeable. We were getting pretty tuned into
what was happening in relation to the strategy and that's the kind of
thing you benefit from.'
AG Worker 1
As AG Worker 2 explicitly acknowledged
'Knowledge is power.'
7.3.2 Negotiations at Cross Purposes
However, involving the Health Board was to prove more challenging.
Although the Social Work Department had had minor involvements with the
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Health Board over Support Finance since 1979 and there had been mutual
consultation at a political level between the Region and the Health Board
through the Joint Health Liaison Committee (JHLC) - the Mental Handicap
Strategy was to intensify and change the nature of that involvement.
As one Social Work Department official observed - one of the major problems
was that in 1983 the issue was not on the Health Board's agenda.
'The initiative from here was probably strategically unwise in that
we had a fairly overt bash at, putting it very crudely: "Let's shut
Riversdale!" Curiously that didn't get received with a lot of
enthusiasm. (Laughs)'
LA Official 5
The initial focus was on transferring resources from the Health Board to Social
Work with SWD officials arguing that if Riversdale was to reduce its capacity
then the transfer to them of the costs 'saved' would accelerate the development
of community resources. This proved to be a very difficult set of negotiations.
The starting point was difficult for the Health Board officials. The SWD officials
acknowledged, with hindsight, that the aim of reducing the number of beds at
Riversdale created anxiety by implying that they thought:
'it's a duff place and all the staff here are terrible people who are
nasty to the mentally handicapped.'
LA Official 5
although this was never said openly. This official thought some of the problem
stemmed from the fact that the SWD were too far ahead.
'(We) had gone to the Health Service people and said "Hello, we've
had some ideas. How about joining us?" I've been on the receiving
end of that process and it doesn't feel all that comfortable. You feel a
bit caught. People don't really want to know what you think anyway.
They've made up their own minds. They just want you to co¬
operate.'
LA Official 5
Certainly the HB Administrators could see no good reason why they should give
money to the SWD.
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'f the Health Service saves money in mental handicap there are
other SHAPE2 priorities where the pressure is on the Health Board
rather than the local authority.'
HB Official 1
There was a suspicion that the SWD were pursuing this avenue to make
provisions which they should have made anyway.
'Even under the out-of-date criteria of the Peters Report, local
government didn't meet their targets of places in the community ....
and there is an argument that - all right for the bit that goes beyond
that - the patients who in the old days would have been in hospital,
so they need a transfer. But it's not for that other category who have
only been in hospital because of the lack of local authority
provision.'
HB Official 1
Health Board staff saw NHS resources being used inappropriately in all the
SHAPE areas because of the failure of the Region to make community
provision.
'We have a lot of acute beds that are filled inappropriately with
elderly people. But the problem with elderly people in the Plains
area is that there is a very gross deficit in Part IV accommodation
(old people's homes) which is the responsibility of the local authority
and if they provided the recommended number of places ... there
would be no problem about the elderly in Plains. Now one could
argue - why on earth should the local authority want support finance
from the NHS when they have never, ever provided the funds they
should have done to house the elderly?'
HB Official 2
Thus the HB staff were suspicious of the SWD's motives in seeking to develop
the mental handicap strategy. It was not unreasonable to think that shortage of
money might be a motivating factor in this initiative. LA Official 7 realised that
it was going to take a lot of careful planning to secure the HB's co-operation - or
at least acquiescence to the plan.
'It has been a case of softly, softly catchee the monkey.'
LA Official 7
2SHAPE (Scottish Health Authorities Priorities for the Eighties) was the SHHD's
strategic plan published in 1980 for shifting resources from acute medicine to the so-
called Cinderella services for the chronic sick: the elderly, the mentally ill,
mentally and physically handicapped people.
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7.3.3 Joint Planning is Needed
The obvious forum for debating this issue was the Joint Health Liaison
Committee (JHLC) which had been established in 1976 after the re-organisation
of both health authorities and local government. Like the housing links
committee mentioned in CH 6, it was supposed to provide a forum whereby the
authorities could debate matters of mutual concern. Until October 1983, this had
been a fairly benign body. It met on an infrequent basis, usually at the Regional
Chambers and it was preceded by a sherry reception.
'They all sat around and slapped one another on the back. There was
nobody there except local authority reps and it was not even a
quarterly but sometimes a six-monthly occasion when one meeting
was chaired by (the Chair of the SW Committee) and the other by
(the Chair of the Health Board). No substantive business was
conducted because there was more or less a recognition that by and
large they didn't do much planning together.'
HB Member 1
The prospects for policy innovation in a body such as this were slim. However
in October 1983, what can only be described as a 'coup' took place. The 'Buggin's
Turn' method of chairing the meeting was challenged by the Labour Party who
had supporters there as Councillors and as appointed members of the Health
Board. When the SW Committee Chair and the HB Chair were nominated for
their usual positions they were challenged by a Labour District Councillor (who
was also a HB member) and another Labour member of the HB and defeated by a
margin of 15 votes to 2.
The motive seems to have been political. In 1982 Labour had lost control of the
regional council and had gone into opposition against a Tory/Alliance
administration. In June 1983 there had been a disastrous General Election defeat.
'It was seen as one of the few places in which Labour politicians
could strike back at the Tory administration of the region and at that
time of the Bigtown District. '
HB Member 1
'It was a recognised committee of the council that the Labour Party
had a majority on. There weren't too many of them.'
Politician 1
This predominance arose because the JHLC had devised a new constitution in
order to involve the district councils more fully. The dominance of Labour in
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the landward areas of Plains gave them a majority and unlike the Tories on the
Region, District Labour groups took all the seats for themselves, instead of
dividing them according to the composition of each council.
'When I was Chair, it was 2, 2 and 1 and I would not change that. But
whenever Labour got in, out the door went all the agreements and
we got nothing. '
Politician 2
Secondly, Labour Health Board members wanted to pressurise the HB officers.
The latter were perceived to be reluctant to promote community care which had
begun to be raised as an issue in the JHLC.
'In my experience of being a Health Board member (until) two or
three years ago, (1987) the Health Board was anti any sort of shift
which involved using Health Board money to fund developments
in the community.'
HB Member 2
'It was possible to use (the Regional Strategy for the Mentally
Handicapped) in a way, as saying that the Health Board had to be
seen to be involved in the process of the development of services for
the mentally handicapped and the only way of doing that was
through some joint mechanism.'
HB Member 1
'It changed) because of the need to identify a body that was going to
put pressure in the Health Board in part. The Health Board was not
very good at speaking to people and to other bodies and tended to go
its own sweet way. A lot of its policies were
a) not in keeping with some of the thinking at the time but
b) conflicted sometimes with local authority policies.'
LA Official 12
And the third factor was, that with the lack of government initiative in Scotland
in the field of community care:
'There was huge political capital to be made of it. The Government
was not allocating money .... Potential to embarrass John Mackay
(Minister for Health and Social Work) and nobody was going to let
go of that.'
HB Member 1
Thus there was now a potential mechanism with a political approach to forward
the Mental Handicap Strategy which Social Work sought to develop, albeit one
riddled with pitfalls. However, it was likely to meet more frequently and be
more business-like.
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7.3.4 The Bones of a Strategy
LA Official 7 had the capacity, it will be recalled, to take a long-term perspective
on development, and whilst there was suspicion, the HB officials at least agreed
to enter into discussions about formulating a strategy. The Director of SW's
support was crucial. He briefed councillors and thus enabled the issues to be
raised in the JHLC. From October 1982 onwards a series of reports were tabled
under the title of Transfer of Care and Associated Costs.' It was through these
that the Mental Handicap strategy was defined.
The negotiations were to prove difficult and protracted. The development
officer sought to focus on a modest target:
The transfer of people from hospital and in parallel with that 200
places in the community by 1987 and another 200 by 1990. '
LA Official 7
and agreement was sought on a set of objectives that bear the hallmark of the
Welsh Strategy:
'that further developments in service provision be planned
according to the normalisation principle.
a commitment to co-operative planning and action on the part of the
statutory agencies in conjunction with the voluntary sector.
the secondment of staff to undertake the planning and
implementation exercise.'
[Joint Report no 279/1983/84 p.l]
[my emphasis]
The strategy consisted of these broad objectives and the definition of the
organisational and financial means of achieving them. The organisational
means sought were:
a) the establishment of a Joint Co-ordination Group on mental
handicap services composed of senior HB and SWD officers but
with participation by voluntary organisations.
b) mental handicap policy co-ordinator posts in the HB and SWD at
senior level.
c) co-ordinators of mental handicap in six divisions (one of which
was West Bigtown) alongside
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d) the establishment of community mental handicap teams on the
area basis.
e) the drawing up of local plans
f) the setting of priorities within these.
The financial package was vague but expressed hopes of various sources of
funding - including DHSS board and lodging payments for staffed residential
facilities which could cover cost if the project was run by a voluntary agency.
Thus one key role for voluntary agencies was that they had access to resources
denied to the local authority. However LA Official 7 observed in particular that
'these organisations are not constrained by political masters. They
can go outside and campaign and lobby in the most ruthless kind of
way, if they want and they can get away with it, whereas officials in
here can't.'
LA Official 7
Also, as another official noted, it gave a greater degree of freedom within the
planning mechanism. He observed that the composition of a committee affected
the kind of report which could be written.
'There's a lot of good professional people working in voluntary
organisations... They don't have the political or policy shackles and I
think that gives them the ability to make statements and move
about a wee bit that people in the statutory sector don't have (he
goes on at great length)'
me: 'Let me get this clear - what you're saying. If you've got a group
which say, consists of HB, SWD and voluntary sector, then that




Moreover, as an enthusiastic partner in this endeavour, there was a specific
contribution envisaged for the Action Group. By now LA Official 7 knew them
well enough to know that their views on the direction in which policy should
develop were congruent. A key criterion in improving community based
provision was locally-based action. The Region was to be divided up into six
areas (basically compilations of area teams) and a divisional co-ordinator would
convene groups of interested people locally who would feed their views into the
Regional Co-ordination Group. Just as in its initial stages the Action Group was
tied into the Area Team, this aspect envisaged
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'tying the group in more closely with divisional activity.'
LA Official 7
The development officer was keen to give consumers of service a voice and saw
this as an opportunity to allow this to happen.
'Local planning and consultation and co-ordination are things that
many of our staff and certainly many HB senior managers prefer to
ignore. Taking note of consumer views ... is not something that we
normally do in social work to my great regret.'
LA Official 7
Moreover the Action Group, from its previous history, seemed to offer a model
for achieving this if it would expand its boundaries by taking in Divisions 4 and
5.
'Again the influence of the Action Group was considerable, because
it had started from the bottom-up, but it was quite a useful local
group, a focal point for action in different ways, covering quite a
chunk of (the town), that fairly well coincided with one of our
divisions.'
LA Official 7
By suggesting the AG expanded their boundaries (see previous chapter), and the
group so doing, they gained legitimacy to be the location and the operator of the
West City divisional mental handicap group. Because they had been involved in
the initial discussions, the AG was well aware what was on offer:
'In the thinking behind the strategy was for some of the divisions, it
may be a voluntary organisation with the lead role and certainly that
is what he (LA Official 7) hoped the Action Group would do. There
was also this thing about the post, the divisional co-ordinator, and
there was an expectation in this division that I would do that, which
at the time I thought that sounds interesting.'
AG Worker 1
In late 1983, the Action Group had already taken steps towards assisting the
fulfilment of another objective - the expansion of community-based provision,
in that its application for Urban Aid lay with the Region's Planning Department
(see CH 6). Thus the Action Group's objectives in this area matched substantially
with those of the SW Development Officer and the Task Force team. The AG
had considerable incentives to assist in forwarding the strategy, besides the
achievement of their main objective - community-based care for mentally
handicapped people.
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However negotiating acceptance of these aims proved difficult, both within the
SWD and with HB officials. The latter had not really considered these issues
before and
'(We were talking about) things like normalisation, like care in the
community and its feasibility, like saying that a lot of mentally
handicapped people in Riversdale don't actually need to be in
hospital care and non-medical people could look after them and we
can show you where its being done. That was certainly a threatening
sort of thing to be faced with.'
LA Official 5
In particular strong objections to the participation of the voluntary sector were
raised by both HB and LA Officers.
'They said "its not the normal way of doing things" and "How will
we cope if the voluntary sector... they're not under our control?"
"They'll be bloody minded and difficult.'
LA Official 7
Some local authority officials wanted to compromise and drop the idea of
voluntary sector involvement, at least until the system was up and running, but
somehow enough support was garnered to ensure that this remained in the
strategy. The growing political muscle in the JHLC of Labour supporters was
probably an important influence on this. There were, however, other objections
too; the targets were too ambitious, and there was resistance to the idea of
transfer of resources being automatic.
But gradually there came to be acceptance of at least going through the forms of
co-operation with the local authority on the part of HB officers. LA officials
r
however observed great ambivalence about these issues on the part of both
officers and professionals.
'Those) at the top in (HB HQ) ... are all saying "its organisationally
complicated - we're struggling to keep our heads above water. WE
don't want to get involved in new initiatives and anyway they
probably won't work. It's all getting very political and look what's
happening in England. Anyway the government in Scotland aren't
forcing us to do anything like they are in England, so we don't have
to do it.'
LA Official 7
Some of the officials who were party to the negotiations then, were plainly still
not convinced when interviewed for this research:
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'But another thing, they're going to find out in due course is the
public's opposition to having hostels here, there and everywhere.
That's never been mentioned yet and in theory it's fine, but in
practice you're going to get people saying "I'm not wanting a hostel
for the mentally handicapped round the corner" ... so that's never
been examined yet.'3
HB Official 3
There was also some ambivalence on the part of some consultants in mental
handicap, feeling that sitting in meetings discussing objectives distracted them
from the 'real' task of caring for their patients.
'The politicians have become more important than the clinicians.
My example is, there's someone bleeding to death, no-one to look
after them. My example is the mentally handicapped person is
bleeding to death - let's have a discussion about why his bleeding
time is ... why he fell down in the street, why the street has got no
parking, why there isn't a pedestrian crossing and all the rest of it.
Let's have a discussion, not today, but in a week's time.'
HS Professional 1
Whilst consultants in mental handicap had doubts about the capacity of joint
planning to deliver the goods, community medicine specialists were seen by a
number of respondents to be outright hostile. This medical speciality (CMS) was
established under the NHS Act in 1974 and amalgamated the former public
health service doctors and the hospital based administrative doctors. Their task
was to gather and interpret medical advice which was fed into the Health Board
by the Chief Administrative Medical Officer (CAMO). Thus these doctors were
3It was difficult to get officials who had 'lost' the policy struggle to admit that they were
initially opposed to what became the new policy. (See CH3) However an example
which was the more common response in the HB was
'I think we are all fairly committed in the HB to joint planning and moving
people into the community at all levels. '
HB Official 2
Although one doctor who participated in the joint planning process observed
'When the new faction had finally won the day and the HB itself had
finally overthrown the officer faction and come down on our side, (HB
Official 2) actually sounded genuinely upset that money was being made
available for mental handicap .. it was a sort of mock tearful quiver.'
HS Professional 2
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part of the medical strand of consensus management (to be discussed below
p.188) and played a key role in influencing the medical advice given.
There were however a number of problems in their role. Whilst it had been the
government's intention that these people be the Health Service's planners and
epidemiologists; looking at needs and the optimum ways of meeting them and
being medically qualified, able to discuss projects with other medics; in reality
this role became re-interpreted as administrative.
'The CAMO was (seen as) responsible for all the medical services ...
(Thus) the CAMO in Plains (began) to assume enormous importance
and the more power the CAMO had, the less power the Board had to
actually make decisions.'
HB Member 1
Secondly this speciality was perceived negatively by some respondents.
'There was a ghettoisation coming across. It became something you
went into if you were male and you were no good at your job.
Seriously, if Bloggins is getting past it - he's a bit senile or he's a bit
fond of the bottle or you don't want him on the ward - but he's a nice
chap and we look after our own - then we nudge him sideways so he
can do admin, work.'
HS Professional 2
Although at the time of this study a new breed of younger more committed
CMS were beginning to emerge, it was the older generation who at this point
had the 'ear' of the CAMO and the key ones in the field of mental handicap
believed:
'that (mentally handicapped) people had to be in institutions.'
Vol. Org Worker 2
Because
'it is too often a cruel world: therefore it's always a cruel world.
Therefore it's cruel to raise people's hopes and then dash them.
That's quite simply how [HS Prfessional 4's] operated. People were
better off living as battery hens than having their hopes dashed or
thrown out in a cruel uncaring world. It's a whole belief in a
sanctuary. '
HS Professional 2
Others were less kind:
'(They are) the dead hand of the NHS. They are in many ways the
instruments of inertia. [All this is prejudiced opinion on my part - I
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find them a pain in the ass.] Their immediate reaction to anything is
"How can we stop it happening?" And their cast of mind is really
very different. There's no excitement, no enthusiasm, no wish to
develop new ways of providing services - only to maintain the way
in which they've always been provided. '
HB Member 1
These doctors tended to give priority to acute medicine and to see their concerns
as hospital based services:
'The Health Board as such is not really in the business of community
care. The Health Board's in the business of hospital care. '
HS Professional 4
7.4 Why was the Health Board reluctant to co-operate?
As the previous section makes plain, Health Board officials were observed to be
antipathetic to the idea of jointly planning mental handicap services. In order to
understand why this was so, it is necessary to go beyond individual motives and
to spend a little time examining the nature of the the Health Board as an
organisation.
Superficially it was a similar type of organisation to the local authority. It was
bureaucratically organised and responsible to a committee - in this case of Health
Board members. However a number of factors combined to make health
authorities different from local authorities.
Hunter (1986) observed the undue emphasis in the post 1974 NHS on a 'so-called
mechanistic industrial model' of management. He saw Health Boards adhering
to a traditional Weberian model of 'naive bureaucracy' which ignored conflict
and paid little attention to power. Overall there was a commitment to
rationality which saw the political as a failing. This Hunter perceived as naive
and pointed to the need for theoretical pluralism.
Therefore, whereas the local authority officials recognised the political nature of
the process they were involved in, Health Board officials did not. Or they saw it
as an aberration from 'proper' decision-making. The adherence to this rational
bureaucratic model, Hunter argued, is important not so much for its ability to
account for the Health Service policy process, as the fact that such assumptions
underlie officials' approach to decision making. He says
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'Managers are not very comfortable with the possibility that most of
what happens in the implementation process cannot be explained by
the intentions and directions of policy makers, which is why they
adhere to the top-down rational approach. '
p.22 Hunter op.cit.
Many respondents in this study commented on the discomfiture of HB officials
and members in the 'political' environment of the JHLC.
'The Health Board people were particularly taken aback at politics
entering the arena. Officials of the Health Board couldn't cope with it
particularly well. They clammed up in meetings from then on for a
while because they felt under attack from the politicians. They were
under attack from the politicians. It's just that they weren't used to it,
not in a more open forum like that. '
LA Official 7
Generally, throughout this period, HB officials handled the political aspects of
the JHLC as an ostrich would. They tried to pretend it was not there.
Me: 'I went to a meeting (of JHLC) about a year ago and I noticed that the
Health Board didn't vote...'
Resp:'We quite often didn't because it was obviously political and we just
said right we're having nothing to do with this.'
HB Member 3
They could afford to do this because JHLC decisions were only advisory to
participating authorities. By taking no part in this process, this left the HB free to
continue going 'its own sweet way.'
The reason that HB officials (and most members) had this apolitical perspective
stemmed from the relationship between members and their employees. When
asked what difference they observed between LA officials and HB officials, those
interviewees who had experience of both systems contrasted the political
accountability of the former with the lack thereof of the latter. They felt that
whatever HB officials* rhetoric to the contrary, the latter tended to see HB
approval as a formality and the members were frequently referred to as a 'rubber
stamp.'
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'I think there is a tradition of accountability in local government that
doesn't exist in health services amongst officials, because officers in
local government do understand that there is a political force
controlling their council and they must carry out the policy whether
they like it or not.'
'In the Health Service there is no such tradition and officers by and
large are accountable to no one. I suppose they're accountable to
Health Board members but they're not elected in any way and they
don't understand accountability.'
HB Member 2
The reality was that the way Health Boards were structured would make it
extremely difficult for members to exercise authority even if they wanted to.
Hunter refers to this as 'the curious confused role of board members', (p.10
op.cit.) Unlike councillors who were elected as political representatives of an
area, with a clear responsibility to that electorate, HB members were appointed
by the Secretary of State as individuals. They had little scope to enforce decisions
as they did not represent anybody and their role was unclear. They lacked
authority. Although HB officials claimed that Plains HB was unlike others in
Scotland, in that members took the decisions the reality was probably nearer
Hunter's conclusions from his study:
'board members experience considerable role uncertainty and have
difficulty holding officers to account.'
p.202 Hunter (1980)
Central to understanding this HB member/official relationship was the notion
of consensus management. This was introduced in the 1974 Health Service Act
as a compromise, because the government was unable to obtain agreement on
the appointment of a Chief Executive for each Health Authority. The
disagreement centred on what constituted required qualifications for such posts:
would medical skills suffice or were management skills more important? This
stemmed from another tension in the health service, between professionals and
administrators (discussed below p.191).
Whilst it is impossible to explain the operation of consensus management in
full here (it merits a thesis on its own) the features important to this argument
will be highlighted. An analysis is to found in Hunter (1980) and his
unpublished Ph.d thesis. (1979)
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Consensus management was vested in an Area Executive Group (AEG)which
had collective authority to make decisions. This AEG consisted of the Chief
Administrative Medical Officer (CAMO), the Chief Area Nursing Officer
(CANO), the Board Secretary and the Board Treasurer as the senior officials in
each sector of the Health Board. Based on the bureaucratic rationalism whose
inadequacy Hunter noted (above) the theory of consensus management sought
to distinguish between policy and administration. Thus it was supposed that
Health Board members would set the broad parameters of policy, for example to
move towards care in the community, and then the officers would implement
that through a range of detailed decisions. If the officers making up the AEG
were able to reach a consensus on policy, then they had authority to make
decisions without reference to the board. Rational theory predicted that this
would lead to only the really thorny issues being referred to the HB members for
decision. The reality was different and Hunter argued that there was an
enormous pressure on officers to reach agreement and it was the minor issues
that tended to be referred to the board.
'In the case of our Health Board,... the AEG almost always came to a
decision. I never heard of a case where it didn't come to a decision -
but very often that decision, because it had to be a consensus
decision, tended to be the lowest common denominator - or the
avoidance of making a decision.... Instead of forcing the decision
upwards to the Policy and Resources Committee, I think there were
certain cases where decisions were avoided.'
HB Official 2
Thus consensus management left Health Boards with the worst of all possible
worlds. Hunter observes:
'Consensus management has been at the root of what many
observers, as well as those inside the Health Service regard as a
fundamental flaw in the 1974 model, namely the absence of
responsibility: there is nowhere for the buck to stop.'
p.22 Hunter (1986)
The Chairman of Plains Health Board confirmed this dead-hand effect:
'Consensu^ management is OK in its way. Very democratic -
democracy in its way too, never really achieves any great forward
movement, any impetus. OK, it gets there eventually but I found
that there were far too many good ideas being watered down to
ensure that the Executive Group agreed them unanimously.'
HB Member 3
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The other significant way in which the Health Board differed from the Local
Authority stemmed from the anarchic nature of the relationship of the
professional employees, in particular doctors, with the administrative arm.
Although the Health Board had a superficial veneer of bureaucratic authority,
the officials in reality had little real power and their relationship with the
medical profession was a fraught one. It is for this reason that Hunter calls the
Health Board a 'hybrid' organisation:
'The NHS is a most curious organisational creature comprising two
elements: a professional element and a bureaucratic element. Both
entail quite different management styles: the former displaying
horizontal collegial relationships and the latter displaying vertical
hierarchical relationships. That such a hybrid ever came into
existence owes more to political considerations than to sound
management.'
p.20 Hunter (1986)
The power of the medical profession in the decision making process was noted
by many respondents. Because the management structure was weak, being
administrative in approach rather than managerial, there was potential for a
professional free -for-all where
'those who shout the loudest (get) the most - or those who are most
prestigious (get) the most.'
HB Member 1
Certainly the notion of 'clinical freedom' - that doctors must be free to give their
patients the treatment they deem the best, posed enormous problems for
resource management and constrained the Health Service. Since 1979, when
cash limits had been imposed on their budgets, health boards were having to
exercise greater financial stringency.
'When they were cut-back, they (HB Officials) became very depressed
and miserable and nothing was going to happen - "it was dreadful"
and (they)' gave us a bit of information about (them). We said "Oh
good heavens! You don't need to worry about that. We've survived!
Call those cuts? You'll get through it!"'
LA Official 5
This respondent was comparing the Health Board reaction to cuts of about 2%
compared with much higher cuts in the local authority budget. But the reason
that these cuts were so disastrous for the Health Service was that they intensified
the power struggle for resources. It was almost impossible for Health Service
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administrators to exercise budgetary control, because they had so little control
over the consultants.
'You cannot issue a directive to consultants because they are not, in
the sense that you and I would understand an employee of the
Health Board. They consult with the Health Board and you can
advise consultants and suggest they might care to do so and so, but
you can't direct them to do so and so, because he will say, "That
infringes my clinical freedom. I will do what is best for my patients"
and you cannot impel them to do it.'
HB Official 2
Yet as Hunter observes:
'doctors' decisions to treat patients, commit resources such as nurses,
technicians, equipment and materials.'
p. 195 Hunter (1980)
This created an inertia with vested interests in maintaining the 'status quo', that
is, with a strong focus on acute medicine, which seemed insuperable. Moreover
the emotional appeal of certain specialties (often of the high-tech variety and
therefore expensive) which deal with life-threatening diseases, is much greater
than those dealing with the 'Cinderella' services of the SHAPE (op.cit) priorities.
"You get very few people jumping up and down, thumping the table
saying, we want more money for this particular part of the mental
handicap sector. Whereas you get people jumping up and down all
the time saying we want more money spent on treatment for
infertile people, on treatments for cancer, intensive care for neo¬
nates. '
HB Official 2
Because there were so many specialities within Plains Health Board, which also
had one the most prestigious medical schools in Britain - a 'centre of excellence'
- these competitive pressures were intensified. Besides making the Health
Service as then organised extremely difficult, if not impossible, to manage, these
pressures also made it very difficult for the Health Service to negotiate with
outside agencies on broad policy changes in any coherent way, as this account
shows. In Benson's (1975) terms the Health Service, although ostensibly a single
organisation, because of its structural complexity, resembled a 'blocked network'
or in Crozier's (1963) terms, one in which the power struggle had become so
overwhelming that the organisation simply could not function effectively. It
would certainly find it extremely difficult to shift resources to less 'prestigious'
areas of work.
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7.5 The dead hand of the Scottish Office
By negotiating a community care strategy for mentally handicapped people,
Plains Region Social Work Department and the voluntary agencies supporting
them were seeking to gain control of a domain currently mainly in the
possession of the Health Board. Moreover they were also asking the Health
Board to hand over the resources thus 'saved'. It was therefore not altogether
surprising that resistance was encountered, even without the organisational
factors inhibiting co-operation.
Benson observed that in situations where two agencies claim the 'same or
similar spheres of activity' as the mental handicap strategy typified, reaching
amicable agreement over task allocation was likely to be conflict ridden. Indeed
forceful intervention by third parties or insistent environmental
pressures are generally necessary to sustain relations of the duration
and intensity required.'
p.237 Benson (1975)
One of the most effective ways to bring about such change is intervention by
central government who can
a) introduce new programmes and agencies
b) formalise relations by 'precisely specifying linkages which have
previously been left informal or variable.'
p.245 op. cit
c) comprehensively re-organise the relations by re-arranging 'an
entire system of inter-agency boundaries and linkages'.
Ibid.
It was therefore not surprising that those seeking change hoped that the Scottish
Office would redefine and thus clarify the relationships between Health Board
and Local Authorities in developing community care provision. In short
provide the kind of leadership that had been so apparent in Wales (and to a
lesser extent in England). However the Scottish Office approach was to prove
disappointing to them, as Hunter and Wistow (1987) explained:
'At the most general level, community care has all the appearance of
a uniform policy (within the UK) as set out in numerous official
reports published singly or jointly by the three central health
departments (DHSS, Welsh Office and Scottish Office). Yet marked
differences exist in both the meaning and degree of emphasis that
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have been accorded to this goal and also in the instruments
associated with its implementation.'
p.23 op. cit.
In particular the outstanding feature of the Scottish Home and Health
Department (SHHD) was the extent to which it lagged behind England and
Wales in both policy guidelines and provision for community care for mentally
handicapped people. The frustration felt at this situation is neatly encapsulated
in a campaign document produced by the Action Group in January 1984, where
they protest that
• 'Compared with England and Wales, Scotland has a larger
proportion of its mentally handicapped children and adults
resident in mental handicap hospitals.
• It has proportionately fewer mentally handicapped people living
in residential provision in the community.
• The size of the hospital population has decreased more slowly
than that of England.
• Fewer political initiatives have been introduced in Scotland to
alter the balance of care between hospital and community.
• Substantially less resources are available to promote community
care.'
p.2 Action Group (1984)
Hunter and Wistow noted that these variations arose from different emphases
within the Scottish Office in setting targets and establishing priorities. In
particular when the initial proposals for a mental handicap strategy for Scotland
were set out in the 'Blue Book' in (SHHD 1972), there was a much greater
emphasis on accommodation in residential care, 20% higher than England and
Wales, and the proportion of hospital beds was to be three-quarters of the total,
compared with a fifty/fifty division down south (op. cit. p.100) At the same time
whereas England had a 577% shortfall in local authority residential places in
1970/71 compared to guidelines, Scotland had a 3629% shortfall, albeit based on
different criteria (but the targets were also lower), (ibid.)
This emphasis on hospital and institutional care was reinforced in the Peter s
Report 'A Better Life' (SHHD and SED 1979), the Scottish Office's revised policy
document. Indeed it even argued for a higher level of hospital and residential
care provision and increased the target. Fundamentally Hunter and Wistow
conclude
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'policy in Scotland has consistently placed more weight on hospital
services than in England and Wales and this remains the Scottish
Office preference.'
p.102 op. cit.
Why should this be so? The explanation the authors offered meshed with and
mirrored the problems this study identified as existing at a local level. Hunter
and Wistow cited a Scottish Office official defending the long-stay institutional
sector thus:
'We reckon it is better. This is an unfashionable view with the
voluntary agencies, that there are people [the mentally handicapped
and the elderly with mental disability] being looked after in hospital.
It may not be the ideal place, but they are being looked after...'
p.94 op. cit
Note the similarity of this view to that of Community Medicine in the previous
section. Martin (1984) observed that in the field of mental illness there had been
'an excess of complacency and a lack of self examination both in the
central departments and in the relevant professions.'
p.72
Hunter and Wistow think that this applies in Community Care policy making
generally and suggest a number of sources of this complacency: in particular
national culture and the relatively comfortable resource position and see these
as generating
'no incentive or compulsion to take stock of the limitations of
institutional provision or to look afresh at the goals of services for
priority care groups. SHAPE and other policy statements may have
provided all the right notes but the lack of commitment and follow
through is remarkable unless one appreciates that the professional
and service context is so different from England and Wales and has
been for over a century.'
p.94 op. cit.
This opinion was confirmed by the Director of Social Work who observed that
whilst there seemed to be government commitment to community care policies
in England and Wales:
'In Scotland the same government for one reason or another does
not see 'Care in the Community' in the same way. Part of that is
cultural: the Scots have got bigger prisons, bigger psychiatric
hospitals, bigger institutions of every description than the English
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and Calvin lives to the extent that one needs to be punished for
these defects.'
LA Official 4
A further factor identified was the different financial allocation procedures
adopted by SHHD in sharing out NHS finances. This will be discussed in
relationship to Support Funding (below p.199).
There was also little doubt that the reluctance to pursue Community Care
policies was not a result of the foibles of politicians, but stemmed from, at best, a
lack of enthusiasm amongst civil servants and an ambivalence about the role of
government.
'The official policy is disengagement; that local needs are best left to
local decisions, therefore we don't interfere. But the reality is that
there is considerable engagement, for example rate-capping. Thus the
policy becomes hypocritical.'
Civil Servant 3
Interviews were not unfortunately conducted within the SHHD, but there was
considerable evidence in Hunter and Wistow's book that this ambivalence was
indeed present within that department and a speech by an Assistant Secretary on
behalf of the Minister for Health and Social Work to the Association of Local
Health Council s'Annual Conference in June 1986 confirms the limited policy
aims in respect of community care:
'Many definitions of community care have been offered. We see it as
enabling people to remain within their own homes (not necessarily
the family home) rather than having to enter hospital or other
forms of institutional care which take away the sense of belonging.'
Asst. Secretary (SHHD) Conference Speech
There was no mention of taking people out of hospital. Secondly there was a
narrow perception of the potential for government intervention:
'Working through committees and plans can be an exhausting and
exasperating experience; above all because there is no one at the top
who can bang heads together. The process has to be co-operative.'
Ibid.
This approach typified the Scottish Office's policy-making and placed far too
much emphasis on co-operative strategies to the exclusion of other factors. As
Mc Keganey and Hunter (1986) observe:
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'it would be quite wrong to regard co-ordination as the solution to
every organisational and professional problem. Ambiguous
legislation, organisational inertia, confused aims, and professional
resistance can all influence the extent to which co-ordination can
work successfully. Yet such factors are virtually ignored....'
p.337 op.cit.
Thus it is necessary to return to Benson's fourfold analysis of the factors which
inhibit joint working when there is not agreement about the roles of the
participating agencies, the nature of the task, professional respect and how work
is to be co-ordinated. (Benson 1975 p.235). There was a convention that the
Scottish Office was a unitary department but it is probably more illuminating in
this context to conceive of it as an inter-organisational network. It must,
however, be noted that this conception is not acknowledged by government
ministers, who when questioned about inter-departmental issues,
conventionally respond that the Scottish Office is one department and co¬
ordination is undertaken by the Secretary of State. The practice is that
relationships between Scottish Office departments reflect all the competition and
disparate goals so evident at a local level.
Both the SHHD and SWSG - the two key departments in relation to Community
Care - are composed of administrative civil servants, who move from one
department to another, and professional civil servants (SHHD - doctors and
nurses, SWSG - social workers) who do not. These professional civil servants
then develop a departmental ethos - or in Benson's terms an ideological
commitment about the nature of their task.
Moreover, Hunter and Wistow note that the two departments have quite
different relationships with their respective peripheries and
'these factors shape the respective styles of the SHHD and the SWSG.
Whereas the SHHD is more directive in its relationship with Health
Boards.... the SWSG's stance is essentially advisory and persuasive
since local authorities cannot be cajoled and ultimately must be left
to determine their own priorities.'
Hunter and Wistow p.34
Those involved in trying to persuade the Scottish Office to become more
directive about the regulation and finance of Community Care observed
'the only time they seem to get together, is when we ask for a
meeting with them and they don't have pre-meetings. They haven't
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even sorted out their line beforehand... You get contradictory
arguments (it's quite funny watching it) .... Arguing amongst
themselves. You feel like saying: Shall we leave the meeting for a
moment while you sort this out? '
Vol Org Worker 3
Plainly little had improved since Wiseman (1979) noted that
'officials experienced difficulty in handling conflicts and working
across administrative boundaries.'
cited on p.34 of Hunter and Wistow
The inability of officials to 'get their act together' was compounded by political
failings. Because Health and Social Work were two separate departments, with
SWSG being a sub-group of the Scottish Education Department (SED), they were
potentially the province of two different ministers. Practice since 1979 has been
to give both briefs to one Minister. However those on the ground observed a
distinct lack of intra-personal co-ordination. One respondent throughout an
entire interview insisted (jokingly) that John McKay, Minister of Health, was a
different person from John McKay, Minister of Social Work. What was apparent
was that any failures at official level were compounded at ministerial level.
Thus there was little likelihood of official reluctance being challenged by a far-
seeing politician, as seemed to have happened in Wales. The reluctance of the
Scottish Office to move forward on developing community care policies,
stemmed from a complex of over-lapping factors which included the following
areas:
a) Historical: there was a strong tradition of institutional care in
Scotland and generally the buildings were in better repair (being
stone- built) than their English equivalents.
b) Professional: Culturally Scotland had a longer tradition of respect
for higher education and the professionals it produced.
Numerically, a higher proportion of doctors were trained in
Scotland compared to the South, Bigtown being one of several
prestigious medical schools in the country. Thus doctors, formed
a more powerful lobby relative to Cardiff or London and
combined with the 'small-town' nature of the capital, this gave
the medical profession great authority in relation to the Scottish
Office.
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c) Administrative: The 'hands-off approach in the SHHD, which
was larger and more prestigious than SWSG in the Scottish Office
network, led to a greater willingness to 'hear' counsels of caution
from medical advisors rather than those urging action from the
social welfare side.
d) Political: There was no likelihood of a political challenge to this
attitude because it was not in the nature of the ministerial
incumbent to do so. He was inclined to follow official advice.
Moreover, changing the policy would increase the involvement
of local authorities at a time when government was aiming to
decrease their responsibilities.
e) Organisational: It was organisationally complex to take action
because policy change involved crossing organisational
boundaries within the Scottish Office and working in ways not
normal in the Civil Service.
f) Financial: There was a clamp-down on increasing public
expenditure and different allocation methods in Scotland meant
it was much more difficult, than in England and Wales, to
identify monies which could be moved to fund community care
policies, (discussed below) even if the Scottish Office had had the
motivation to do so.
All these factors combined with the fundamental problem belief; that those with
the power to effect change did not believe that the changes being proposed in
England and Wales were solutions which worked, with the result that there was
little chance of resolving the hiatus between the Health Board and the Local
authority by any redefinition of the rules.
7.5.1 Forceful intervention by third parties
The preceding factors were going to make community care policies much more
difficult to achieve in Scotland. However, when the DHSS in England published
its Green Paper on Care in the Community in 1981, the Scottish Council for the
Single Homeless (SCSH) (on whose committee LA Official 7 happened to be, for
this organisation, too, had grown out of the Central Area Project above p.102)
contacted SWSG and asked what was to happen in Scotland. SWSG responded
that it was their intention to produce a similar document. When eighteen
months later, the white smoke had not risen from St. Andrews House, SCSH
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decided that the time had come to start applying pressure for some action by the
Scottish Office. To this end it called a meeting of representatives of national
voluntary organisations and professional associations with an interest in
community care.
'The Care in the Community Working Party (CCWP) was born out of
a frustration with the lack of care in the community initiatives in
Scotland.'
LA Official 7
The group was a loose federation of those organisations who subscribed to a set
of general principles aimed at expanding community care in Scotland. It
deliberately had no constitution and was serviced by SCSH. Those participating
included the professional bodies for housing and social work, the Association of
Local Health Councils and the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities
(COSLA), as well as the major national voluntary co-ordinating bodies eg Age
Concern Scotland.
Fortuitously, as the first meeting of the CCWP was called in December 1982, the
government published a draft bill, the Health and Social Security and Social
Services Amendment Bill (HASSASSAB) which was a rag-bag of administrative
amendments, but included the proposal to extent the Support Finance
mechanism to allow voluntary organisations to become applicants.
Support Finance was the main means whereby health service finance was
transferred to community-based initiatives; until this point to Social Work
Departments. The initial scheme had been introduced in Scotland in 1980 (some
four years after similar arrangements in England). It was seen by the Scottish
Office as pump-priming money: to enable local authorities to begin to develop
community-based provision for priority groups by providing 60% of the finance
for particular projects. This money came from the NHS budget by top-slicing,
holding back a proportion of the allocation and this sum was transferred to local
authority budgets in the first year and tapered to 0% over 5 years. As Hunter and
Wistow observe, this kind of scheme could only work if there was policy
coherence within government between community care policies and local
authority finance, which there was not. Since Social Work Departments had to
find 40% of project costs initially, there was great difficulty persuading them to
take on schemes, particularly those run by voluntary organisations.
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There is some evidence that the Scottish Office was never keen on
implementing Support Finance in Scotland. The Director of Social Work in
Plains observed that the original circular was published by a freak chance:
The Scottish Office civil servants were suppressing the circular that
was to mirror the English circular of six years before [actually four
years]. (The minister), for all his limitations, was an ex-Gurkha
officer and a man of honour. And he made the mistake of saying at
his first meeting (with the Association of Directors of Social Work
(ADSW)) "Good heavens, if its like that, I'll make certain that this
circular be published" and so it was. But the medics loathed it from
the word "Go" because they had to have their money clawed back
and re-distributed.'
LA Official 4
The Support Finance mechanism was seen as a way of obviating the
problems associated with allocating funding through the Rate Support Grant.
One Plealth Board official observed that:
'the proper way for the government to (increase community care
provision) is to put more money into local authorities rather than
the health board try and do it through the Support Finance scheme.
But politically, they don't like to put into local authorities, because
they can't direct them how to use it.'
HB Official 1
Nor did the government wish to increase the spending in this area at a time
when the emphasis was on reducing local authority spending.
The amendment proposed in F1ASSASSAB was part and parcel of this
government hostility to making provision through local authorities. As in the
Urban Programme, (discussed in the previous chapter) the government
preference was to lay stress on provision by voluntary organisations. However
whereas in the Urban Programme any voluntary agency application had to be
processed firstly by the local authority, the new proposals for Support Finance
meant that
'The voluntary sector and housing (associations) could apply
through the Health Board network without getting ... local authority
agreement, although obviously the Health Board and the Scottish
Office in administering Support Finance would want to know how




More importantly, HASSASSAB was seized on by the Care in the Community
Working Group as the 'wedge' (in Wildavsky's terms) with which to open the
door to improved community care policies.
'There was a change afoot in the form of HASSASSAB in '83. You
could build on that and HASSASSAB went formally to COSLA - we
were just edging it along a bit further.... (and thus we prompted)
other agencies to make statements and do things. We prompted the
ADSW (Association of Directors of Social Work), prompted COSLA
itself... We were pushing it along because of the broader concept of
Care in the Community and I think some people saw the wider
things. Others focussed on the unfairness of how Scotland was
getting mistreated in this grant budget.'
LA Official 7
The Scottish Office found itself bombarded by pressure from all quarters as the
CCWP built up a head of steam. Although this group was restricted to national
organisations - there was also a forceful lobby building up within Plains Region,
as a number of voluntary agencies were beginning to develop community care
schemes.
'People took up this issue of Support Finance with great gusto - local
politicians in the Plains area, the people on the JHLC got torn into it
and there were applications, or they tried to have them, to the
Scottish Office.'
LA Official 4
Amongst these groups was West City Action Group which produced a campaign
document in January 1984. The Action Group had never had limited horizons
and were frequent correspondents/embarrassers of government ministers and
the Scottish Office. They certainly did not confine their interest to the local level,
but felt that they should use the experience gained there to effect national
changes.
'It seems to me looking back (that the Action Group recognised) that
there's different levels at which we need to have an influence/effect
in order to succeed. And it's not just that we've got this local group
and we try and do things locally, because we recognise that we'll run
up against obstacles and these can't be solved locally. They can be
solved by the level above that - that's the Region and even at that
level you'll run into obstacles, there'll be things stopping change and
that's maybe a national thing.'
AG Worker 1
Thus when the opportunity arose, the Action Group took it.
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'We'd always fancied Support Finance but that had never been
possible.... (the system in Scotland) was always abysmal and based on
the supposition that the Region would share some of the costs
initially. They didn't have the cash. So what we were doing, again
wearing a separate hat as a pressure group, was lobbying the Scottish
Office to change the rules; writing newspaper articles, press releases,
briefing the TV and other media - so there was a constant stream of
critical comment about the government's handling of Support
Finance.'
AG Worker 2
The document they published was part of this campaign. It gave a brief history of
policy proposals for mentally handicapped people in Scotland and contrasted
this with the situation in England and Wales. It identified the major problem in
changing the balance of provision as finance and therefore made demands for
an improved system of Support Finance. It was clear, easy to read and was
recognised as
'a useful further bit of pressure.'
LA Official 7
and was
'quite effective as far as the government was concerned ... It was
something MP's could quote. It actually had data in it and (MP s)
could say "The Right Honourable Gentleman said... but this is what
the position actually is.." '
Vol Org Worker 2
The document had this authority because it was a distillation of official
information from Government reports and Hansard. Much of th«s«.official
sources had been obtained by the local MP through Parliamentary Questions on
behalf of the group.
The Action Group was also involved in briefing numbers of national voluntary
organisations (particularly the Scottish Society for the Mentally Handicapped
and the Scottish Association for Mental Health) on the issues involved in this
campaign.
'We briefed them - they were lobbying MP's .... (but) there was a lot of




The campaign led by the Care in the Community Working Party, did, however
bear some fruit. A draft circular entitled 'Community Care: Joint Planning and
Support Finance Arrangements ' was issued by the SHHD, SED, SDD and SWSG
in July 1984 for consultation with interested parties. It was however more a
capitulation to pressure than a conversion. Hunter and Wistow (op.cit) quote a
civil servant in the SHHD thus:
'It's very difficult for government departments to resist that sort of
pressure entirely, and sooner or later, the Minister feels he has to buy
them off.'
p.142 (op.cit.)
They felt they were under 'tremendous political pressure'
'to imitate England where the original notion of (Support Finance
as) pump-priming was almost immediately forgotten in the sort of
trendy notion of developing community care at the expense of the
health service, because the English saw mileage in transferring
people from hospital to community care.'
Ibid.
7.5.2 The Minister buys them off
The draft circular which emerged reflected this lack of enthusiasm in the
Scottish Office. NHS 1985 (GEN) 18, as it was to become, proposed a number of
changes to the current operation of the Support Finance and Joint Planning
arrangements. It re-affirmed the Secretary of State's desire to promote:
'closer collaboration between health boards, local authorities,
voluntary organisations and other organisations; extend the scope of
the support finance scheme to include payments in respect of
housing and education; and makes various changes to the terms on
which support finance may be made available.'
p.l SHHD (1985)
and detailed two main areas, where changes should occur. Because there was a
commitment to 'effective co-operation', which the circular acknowledged had
not been uniformly evident to date, the Secretary of State requested that the
Health Boards, the Regions and the Island and District Councils prepare joint
plans for each of four priority categories - the elderly, the mentally ill, the
mentally handicapped and the physically handicapped.
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Secondly, the time limit and taper on the scheme was to be changed to allow
Health Board funding for the first three years of Support Finance to be 100% and
then to taper over four years to full local government funding. The range of
appropriate recipients was extended to include projects in education and
housing and
'voluntary organisations will have access to Health Boards to
negotiate for Support Finance.'
p.4 op.cit.
Significantly, the circular changed the way in which Support Finance was to be
allocated, in line with the Scottish Office's "hands off" policy. Whereas,
previously, the NHS budget had been top-sliced to retain a centrally held fund,
to which Health Boards and Local Authorities could apply for funding for joint
projects, the new scheme meant that each Health Board would receive its full
allocation of money and Support Funding was to be found within that.
'Health Boards will, in future, be expected to meet all Support
Finance payments, whether capital or revenue, towards the cost of
projects .... from within their normal financial allocations.'
p.4 op.cit
The circular was rather vague about which projects would qualify for Support
Finance, leaving it to the 'complete discretion' of Health Boards (p.4) but
including the caveat that
'health boards must be generally satisfied that the proposed
expenditure would be more beneficial in terms of total care than an
equivalent amount spent on health services in the community.'
Ibid.
LA Official 8's observation in respect of the Urban Aid circular 'How will we
ever know that?' could equally apply to this statement (see above p.153)
The circular was subjected to a barrage of criticism by the CCWP who, in October
1984, submitted a detailed critique of the proposals. This paper was additionally
supported by some 33 locally based organisations which included the Action
Group.
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The major criticisms were:
a) the lack of any national policy or strategy for the implementation
of community care.
b) the lack of clarity in goals and targets.
'There is no way of avoiding the conclusion that what is required,
first of all, is a strong national lead from the Government on this
broad and complex subject .... In many ways the draft circular simply
proposes changes and improvements on points of detail to be
applied at a local level. Useful though some of these changes may be
in theory, without the national energetic push and a national
framework for the vigorous development of community care, they
can be characterised as minor tinkering.'
p.2 CCWP (1984)
c) the lack of compulsion in the circular.
d) the lack of clear guidance on the mechanisms to be employed in
producing joint plans.
e) the lack of any fundamental requirement that mainstream health
budgets be adapted to joint planning and
f) the small sums of money and the lack of incentives in the
Support Finance scheme.
Thus
'It may be that various factors will combine to ensure that despite a
general wish to promote community care, demand is not translated
into pressure on the available allocation of Support Finance monies.
These factors include:
a) the devolving of approval of projects to Health Boards, who will
be able to spend the allocations in other ways, if they think fit,
thus effectively containing demand
b) uncertainties about future revenue funding, which will make
local authorities reluctant to enter into projects and
c) continuing restriction on the level of public expenditure with




The commentary notes in passing that amongst others, under the Scottish
Health Authorities Revenue Equalisation (SHARE)4 formula, Plains Health
Board would receive 'no additional monies upon which they could act on their
indicative allocations.' (p.12 op.cit) One must concur with the commentary's
observation that
'The Secretary of State wishes to see the development of joint
planning, but is to let go of the carrot, while failing to provide
himself with a stick. There is to be no central fund for pump-
priming, or pilot schemes, no resources allocated nationally to
develop the mechanism of planning and no direct pressure on
Health Board s to use this money for projects which will release
people from NHS institutional care into specially tailored
community-based care.'
p.11 op.cit
The critique notes in passing that there was virtually no discussion of
community care per se in the draft circular and this failing is observed, not just
in Scotland, but in most policy initiatives in this area. Walker (1982) noted that
'Underlying the precariousness of community care policies,
therefore, is first, the absence of a clear and consistently applied
definition of community care in public policy.... In fact the term's
durability and attractiveness probably owes as much to its
manipulation to encompass the widest range of institutions - it is all
things to all politicians and policy-makers.
Secondly, when clear statements have been made, the objectives of
policy have been poorly defined and not related to a strategic plan
intended to achieve them ... Any major shift in policy requires a
detailed analysis of the transfer of resources and the man-power
implications of policies Successive planning documents on
priorities in health and personal social services have not provided
these plans.'
p.19-20 Walker (1982)
This confusion was also reflected in Plains:
'A lot of people are very woolly about definitions. (Community Care)
means a lot of different things to different people. But some people
4SHARE: The Scottish Health Authorities Revenue Equalisation Report (1977) was a
method of attempting to shift resources to less well-off health authorities. Plains
was a net loser under this scheme.
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think its this blob, other people think its that blob and other people
see that the blobs overlap.'
LA Official 75
Whilst the Scottish Office digested these and other criticisms Plains SWD set
about the creation of mechanisms to forward the Mental Handicap Strategy.
7.6 I'll be the Leader
In April 1984, prior to the issue of the draft circular, the Social Work Department
had secured agreement in the JHLC to the Mental Handicap Strategy (above
p.180). The problem now faced by the protagonists was how to translate the fine
sentiments expressed in the strategy into reality.
Throughout the negotiations, LA Official 7 had been keen to maintain
commitment to the basic principles: normalisation, co-operative planning
between agencies including the voluntary sector and staff seconded by both
health and social work to plan and implement the strategy.
One of the critical factors in enabling progress to be made was the assumption of
a lead role by the Social Work Department.
'(It) was slightly cheeky really. We... realised... that unless we kept a
grip on things in the early days, that it would just fold. So we wrote
into the report, that because it was about Care in the Community, it
was probably reasonable for the local authority to take the lead in
convening the thing and servicing it.'
LA Official 7
Given the lack of enthusiasm noted earlier, it seems likely that without building
in this opportunity to keep pushing forward on developing the Strategy, it
would simply have been allowed to slide gently into oblivion. It was becoming
apparent by this stage was that agreement to the principles of the Strategy in
April 1984, was not the end of the struggle.
5More significantly, the phrasing of the title of the circular implied connections that did
not necessarily follow from each other. Community care whilst an important feature
of joint planning was not the only area of work requiring to be jointly planned.
Moreover there are aspects of care in the community which can be tackled without
joint planning. Secondly, this confusion implied that support funding was the
mechanism by which such services might be financed, whereas in reality it was
never likely to be more than a very small contribution. The big sums of money
required to make a real shift in policy were not being made available.
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'At an early stage we thought, we'll get it all agreed by the politicians
and that '11 be the turning point. And it wasn't. You have to go over
the next hurdle and the next hurdle.'
LA Official 7
The likelihood of the implementation of the Strategy was enhanced by the fact
that the member of staff seconded by the Health Board to this task turned out to
be another product champion and therefore an ally for LA Official 7. HS
Professional 2 was then a Registrar in Community Medicine who was not cast in
the same mould as his superiors. He was an innovator who sought out new
experiences.
'I was looking ahead and thinking - six months from now there's
going to be a gap in my workload and I'd like to do something that's
as different as possible from what I'm doing now.'
HS Professional 2
As he also had a degree in Computing (having done a degree in this subject
whilst also studying for his medical degree!), he was attracted to the idea of
working in the mental handicap field, with a specific remit to introduce
information systems. Just as AG Worker 1 had come to mental handicap years
earlier (see Ch.5 p.96) with no prior experience and therefore few pre¬
conceptions
'I made a note to myself saying "Acceptance of the status quo is
indefensible." Before I came into this I'd no experience of mental
handicap in terms of clinical or a relative having Down's. I hadn't
any experience at all, so I started with a completely empty mind....'
HS Professional 2
Moreover, he shared the aims and ideals of the other innovators including the
Action Group. When he first got involved he was presented with the
background papers , one of which was the Action Group's proposal for
Supported Accommodation
'And I thought this is smashing because they're thinking the way I
like to think and the way I'm trying to teach other people to think.
They're actually looking at population levels and not just at
individuals... They'd said... "Here's a district. We estimate the total,
for this district to be that. So, there are so much resources, but there
are lots of problems. We're asking for that bit, but if the resources
become available, we could do that, that and that." And that's how
the jig-saw starts to add up.. It immediately struck a chord and added
to their credibility as an organisation.'
HS Professional 2
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The first task that confronted these two officers was to establish some
mechanism for jointly planning mental handicap services. Plainly the JHLC was
too general a forum. There was however, already in existence within the Social
Work Department, a Regional Co-ordination Group on Services for Mentally
Handicapped People. This had had a chequered career. It had begun in about
1980 and
'attempted to do some work on mental handicap services generally,
stuttered a bit and died out..'
LA Official 5
It had been revived when Task Force began to raise issues about mental
handicap such as supported accommodation, care in the community and
normalisation. This was the obvious place in which to site the joint planning
process and representatives of the Health Board were invited to meet with
representatives of Social Work to begin the process of jointly planning services.
However it was a joint planning process in which the Social Work Department
had given itself the upper hand. The Health Board officials probably conceded
this because they did not think the issue very important:
'(They may have thought,) "It may well fold anyway. Let them silly
buggers knock themselves stupid with it. Don't let's put ourselves
out." ...but equally it did give us a slight edge in calling the meetings
and taking it on to the next stage. Whereas if we'd been a bit more
reasonable and said "Well, we'll share the convenorship" - I think it
might well have fizzled out, you see. They'd still have been arguing
about who did what and how to do it.'
LA Official 7
7.7 Voluntary Organisations United?
The final strand in establishing this mechanism, was to devise a means of
involving the voluntary sector. The two officials responsible for implementing
the Strategy called a meeting of all interested voluntary organisations in April
1984 in the Board Room of the Scottish Council for the Single Homeless to
discuss the proposals and in particular, how the voluntary organisations were to
select and support people to represent them in the Regional Co-ordination
Group.
It was recognised by LA Officials 6 and 7 that there was a need to involve the
voluntary organisations in this development in a more coherent way. Task
209
Force had been involved over its life-time, in a variety of rather ad hoc
discussions with voluntary organisations about opportunities to develop
Supported Accommodation for various client groups and as the issue rose on
the political agenda a number of agencies began to climb on the band-wagon.
Whilst it was clear that Task Force wanted its allies to lobby for their agreed
strategies, there was also an increasing need to control a more wayward element.
A particular problem at this stage was that there were a number of agencies who
had 'spare capacity' in terms of residential provision. This had arisen from the
rapid decline in demand for residential child care services and thus those
agencies who had traditionally met this need were seeking a new role. Mental
handicap seemed to offer a much needed development opportunity.
A church organisation, particularly, was perceived by those pushing the strategy
as problematical. Its approach was instrumental rather than stemming from
commitment. It had empty properties and it wanted to fill them. They were in
the business of designing services to fit buildings and the reasons for that were
pragmatic.
'We were left with building stock .. but it had to be adapted ... We
were very reluctant to lose them because ... if you let these buildings
go, you then have to buy other more suitable property, but you then
have to get planning permission and you have to work with the
hassle.'
Vol. Org. Worker 4
Working on this basis, in 1982, the church had sought to develop a hostel for
mentally handicapped people in a former home for people with epilepsy. But
they had not done this through the 'proper' channels. Whilst there may or may
not have been a mutual antagonism between the church's director and the
Director of Social Work, there is little doubt that the way they pursued their
objectives lacked political sensitivity, as far as the Region was concerned.6
As a well-connected organisation, they had the ear of officials in both the Health
Board and the Scottish Office. There is a sense in which they were the kind of
organisation the Health Board understood. (See below p.242) They therefore
6Being a national organisation seeking to develop a range of projects, they argued they
had less time to spend on getting this right, than a locally based organisation.
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pursued the most obvious route to secure their objective - which was to deal
directly with a consultant at Riversdale Hospital. They-agfeed Health Board
officials that the Board would fund the costs of 20 patients being moved into the
community-based hostel.
However, by failing to take account of the broader policy context within which
this kind of development must operate, they alienated the Social Work
Department. A particular bone of contention was the failure to take account of
the effect on day-care services of moving 20 people out of hospital.
'We (SWD) immediately had to go and get 20 more ATC (Adult
Training Centre) places in the area so that the guys could be properly
looked after/
LA Official 4
'The Health Board said "We did tell you we were talking to the
church" and I said "Yes, I know you did, but that's not
consultation"... when we heard about it, it was all finished and set up
and what you then wanted was 20 odd ATC places and that made us
feel fed up and angry because we didn't feel consulted.'
LA Official 5
There is no doubt that the Social Work Department officials were very angry
indeed about this episode and it coloured their relationships with the church for
a long time.
'In a sense that was a further stimulus to the need for a strategy,
because they were just doing their own thing privately with Plains
Health Board. Not even with the Board, they were doing it with
individual consultants and not consulting with the Board on policy
and financial issues.'
LA Official 7
It was this 'degree of disarray' in the voluntary sector that the establishment of a
voluntary sector group was designed to obviate. A meeting was set for the end of
April 1984, just before the meeting of the JHLC to agree the final draft of the
Strategy.
'And we needed in any case to say "And we have consulted with the
voluntary sector and they are interested in the whole thing. They are




Both LA Official 7 and HS Professional 2 were engaged in the task of selling the
strategy to the wider voluntary sector. There were two issues for the group to
decide:
i) How were they to select one or two representatives to the
Regional Co-ordination Group?
ii) How were they going to back up those they nominated?
Into this breach stepped the Director of the local Council of Voluntary Service. It
seems strange that the potential role of this co-ordinating body was not
appreciated in advance by the officials, but that does not appear to have been the
case. This initiative fitted with VO Worker l's long-held view that when
voluntary organisations participated in any negotiations with statutory agencies,
it was preferable that they represent a pre-agreed position rather than, as he saw
was frequently the case, little more than their own prejudices. Moreover, he
perceived the opportunity being offered
'to ensure that if there was to be a process of planning services , that
the voluntary sector was not invited to boo or cheer after the event,
but would actually have to be part of that process.'
Vol. Org. Worker 1
The group that was established was ostensibly
'all of them (ie groups interested in mental handicap) .. but it turned
out to be ... those that were the most vociferous.'
Vol. Org. Worker 1
which, of course, included the Action Group.
This group however, did have trouble selecting a spokesperson. They had to
have two attempts at it. The first time no-one wanted to do it. The second time
they turned to VO Worker 1 and asked him to be their representative:
'with a clear understanding on their part that I would be there, not
because I had a particular involvement in the field of mental
handicap, but really in a role similar to that of a political whip, and
that the condition of being able to do that was that the voluntary
sector would ... provide a reference group for me and that wUuld
meet about once every six weeks.'
Vol. Org. Worker 1
212
What was apparent was that within the group of organisations called together by
the Social Work Department, no one was willing to concede dominance in the
network to anyone else, to the extent of allowing them to represent the group to
outside agencies. There was a need for someone to hold the ring who did not
have an axe to grind because
'They didn't want to push themselves forward. They didn't want to
tread on toes. Equally they didn't want to push other people forward,
because they thought there were vested interests.'
LA Official 7
However, insofar as the group was prepared to accord any authority to another
agency, it was accorded to the Action Group, as they elected AG Worker 1 to
chair their meetings.
In electing VO Worker 1 to represent the voluntary sector however, the group
made an additional gain in that he was also an appointed member of the Health
Board, who had a clear understanding of the opportunities such overlapping
roles (see below p.222) gave him to make the bureaucracy work to the advantage
of the voluntary organisations:
'It needs to be recognised that .... the nature of the appointment is not
actually done with castrating shears - you do actually bring some
equipment with you, as it were and you can't actually leave that at
the door. '
and
'We can use that. It's a way of unblocking the system, actually using
people in different roles in different places to try and move things
further along.'
Vol. Org. Worker 1
The group proceeded to try to establish which areas of work the voluntary
organisations might develop by sharing information about
'the plans people had in their filing baskets.'
Vol. Org. Worker 1
Through this process it became clear that two organisations led the field in terms
of relatively sophisticated proposals which had been thoroughly worked out: the
Action Group and City Housing Association. The latter were looking at ways of
extending their Good Neighbour Scheme which had been originally intended
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for physically disabled people into the field of mental handicap. All these two
agencies needed to proceed was some money.
7.8 You can lead a Horse to Water...
From the moment the Health Board and the Social Work Department began the
joint planning exercise envisaged in the Mental Handicap Strategy, the officials
of the latter sought to secure the Health Board's commitment to a partnership in
the development of community care policies. The reality was still more that of
an arranged marriage, however with one partner keen on the match, having
more to gain; the other only giving the absolute minimum commitment
necessary to go through the motions of co-operating.
'It's got a long way to go before its actually joint planning... So far it's
been an exercise in bullying the Health Board into accepting certain
basic principles and dragging them into certain positions from which
they would maybe come along...'
AG Worker 27
Booth (1981) identified four factors which inhibit joint working:
a) differences in perspective about the client or the nature of the task
b) differences in priorities about the weight to be given to specific
developments
c) differences in funding: how and when money is allocated to each
organisation affects their capacity to plan jointly
d) differences in structure and methods of working.
Some of these factors have been discussed already and there was little doubt that
the Health Board, both officials and professionals found it difficult to engage in
this joint planning exercise and that this inhibited the development of services
7Others sensed this capacity of the Health Board to go through forms in public which
perhaps lacked any real meaning in their internal plans. Talking of their
relationship with the voluntary sector, one respondent observed
'I think its like people who are beginning to speak a foreign language ... They
don't understand what they (vol. orgs.) are about. You have them using the
words so they can get the pronunciation right, but the actual substance: it's
like listening to Linguaphone records.'
Vol. Org. Worker 1
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for mentally handicapped people. In particular, because of its anarchic structure,
the Health Board was unable to present a coherently agreed set of policies which
all in the organisation would accept.
me: 'Was there a Health Board view in the Regional Co-ordination
Group? Were there any pre-meetings where the Health Board




'I know that in the Joint Working Party (successor to the RCG) those
on the local authority side usually have a pre-meeting to develop a
consensus view. We've never done that. I think probably because we
could never produce a consensus view. We'd probably spend all our
time arguing and never agree. The people at Riversdale would never
agree with the people at HQ.'
HB Off 1
This exchange highlights a difficulty in the conventional approach to inter-
organisation theory, which tends to treat the constituent organisations in a
network as coherent entities, when the reality is more fragmented as Zeitz
observes:
'A further feature of inter-organisational networks is that behind the
unit actors lie unorganised and semi-organised interests consisting
of individuals, groups and classes.'
Zeitz (1980a) p.74
The Social Work Department officials involved in the RCG found that they had
to revise their assumption that the Health Board was a similar type of
organisation to their own.
'The key to working with the Health Board is to appreciate that up to
now there's been no clear accountability system. So there's no use
thinking that if you talk to somebody who appears to have an
overview that they are going to tell anybody else what to do, because
they won't.'
LA Official 5
In particular these officials found that negotiating an agreed policy with the
Health Board on admission to Riversdale involved negotiation with each
consultant individually.
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'We talked about admission policy, getting quite a good debate going
with (the Physician-in-Charge). Then, a few months later something
happened, that was quite out of line with that and we'd say "This has
all went wrong." He'd say "Ah well, that's X's ward." "So?" "Well,
that's X's policy."'
LA Official 5
But the particular difficulty they had to get over was their assumption that
people with seemingly similar roles had similar authority within the Health
Board system.
'Although, superficially you seem to be linking with your own level,
the authority and responsibility people have at that level is totally
different.... We did a lot of work on the Mental Handicap Strategy
with Community Medicine Specialists and other people from (HB
HQ) on the naive assumption that they were the (HQ) equivalent in
Social Work and actually took decisions and could get them
promulgated. That wasn't the case either.'
LA Official 5
Like LA Officii 7, this official found that agreement to the Mental Handicap
Strategy had simply got the two authorities to an agreed starting line. One
particular problem was that information simply did not flow within the Health
Board and SWD officials found that they had to take on responsibility for
circulating material to staff, for example nurses, something they had assumed
would be done by Health Board officials.
The funding of the health service also produced problems in planning services
jointly:
'Their financial system is quite different from ours and they do have
a problem, in not actually being told what their budget is until well
into the financial year. Whereas we know in advance before the
financial year starts, because the rates have to be set., so you begin
planning for youfnew financial year with a very clear idea of what
your budget is going to be. In the health service they don't have that
and I think that's very difficult.'
LA Official 5
Health Board officials, on the other hand were most struck by the lack of fit
between their priorities and those of Social Work:
'The other thing is.. 90% of Social Work interfaces with health, but
90% of health doesn't interface with Social Work. There are other
people who have other priorities that don't touch Social Work at all.'
HB Official 1
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'We have got an obligation to maintain our hospital services as
well.'
HB Official 3
So superficially, the issues Booth raises seem to reflect adequately , the problems
in co-operating perceived by both Social Work and Health Board officials. But
underlying all these problems was the fact that the Health Board officials lacked
the will to overcome these difficulties, for none are insuperable. To understand
why this impetus was lacking it is necessary to turn to Wilson's (1963) views on
innovation. There were simply not enough rewards for the Health Board in
moving towards the Mental Handicap Strategy to make the pain of change
worthwhile. Thus no one of any seniority was willing to force the pace.
This attitude was evidenced by the Health Board's tactic over the impending
SHHD Circular. Once the draft circular was published in July 1984, the Social
Work Department officers began to pressurise the Health Board to make plans to
implement it, including establishing a budget heading for funding support
finance schemes and devising a system for dealing with applications from both
statutory and voluntary agencies.
The Health Board had never before had to deal with vetting and assessing
applications from voluntary organisations on any large scale basis. Although
they funded a number of voluntary organisations, the grants tended to be small.
Until the advent of Support Finance, any organisation seeking funds from the
Health Board simply applied and there was no acknowledgement by officials
that the assessment of voluntary organisation grant applications was in any
way a political process:
(Me: Commenting on the complexity of the Health Board as an
organisation.)
'It shouldn't be complex for people who submit applications to us,
because it's all internal. We go through a process of discussion which
should not be complex for the organisations at all ... They submit
applications and it goes through due process.'
■ HB Official 4
Insofar as there as there was a system, it operated on the collegial relationship
observed as a feature of the health service by Hunter (see above p.190). The
CMS's, who had responsibility for advising the Board, would seek the views of
colleagues to whom the agency making application was known and if these
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doctors were prepared to 'vouch' for the voluntary organisation, then that was a
powerful commendation. (See below p.229)
However, the Social Work Department officials, who were anxious to press
ahead developing the Mental Handicap Strategy, realised the necessity of the
Health Board establishing systems in advance of the implementation of the
circular, if more valuable time was not to be lost. They felt it was vital that
everything be ready to start as soon as the final version of the SHHD circular was
issued. In late 1984, LA Officials 5 and 7 met with the Health Board and offered
the benefit of the Social Work Department's experience in these matters.
'The Health Board people, to be fair to them, hadn't had this kind of
money to dish out before either and they weren't very sure about the
process that was set up. "We again naively offered to help them set
them up. We had endless years of experience of Urban Aid, which is
a similar sort of thing. We'd worked out processes, processed
applications. We are not experts but we do have a familiarity with
the system. It might be useful to you if we got involved in trying to
draw something up." We had a couple of meetings and then they
said "It's been awfully helpful. You can go home now.'"
LA Official 5
This official thought that the reason for this lack of willingness to a
mechanism for Support Finance, stemmed from a fear of a SWD take-over.
Certainly they wanted to influence the shape the mechanism took, which was
probably not unreasonable given that the ultimate financial responsibility lay
with the local authority. They also understood the need to lay down guidelines
to avoid unnecessary hassle with voluntary agencies otherwise
'its seen as a pot of cash you might get something out of, so you have
a bash. But then people on the receiving end get lots and lots and lots
of stuff and they've got the problem of writing to lots of people and
saying you don't meet the criteria, which they then think you've
evolved after you got the applications.'
LA Official 58
The fundamental problem remained the Health Board's lack of commitment to
the idea of community care. Nor did the new mechanism of Support Finance
8Note the difference of approach from that taken by the Scottish Office with Urban Aid
(above p.140), where they encouraged the maximum number of applications.
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appeal to them. (See below p.230) This was compounded by the difficulties they
were facing as a result of expenditure restraint. As has been observed, Health
Board officials worked in a system that lacked any clear lines of responsibility
and therefore officials were not in control of it. Thus issues like Support Finance
were perceived as difficult and
'their reaction first of all, is to do all kinds of manoeuvres to try and
avoid having to deal with this.'
LA Official 7
It was easier for the HB officials to do nothing and nothing was precisely what
they sought to do.
'We went along to the top senior people saying "What are you doing
about it? How are we going to handle Support Finance applications,
now that they're going to be revitalised? You're going to be flooded
with voluntary sector approaches...." They talked about some of the
implications, they talked about sending out notifications to the
voluntary sector etc., etc. But they never quite did it.'
LA Official 7
This inaction was compounded by the failure to establish a budget heading for
Support Finance.
'We asked them why they hadn't budgeted something around
Christmas time, before their final budget was struck and the answers
were just unbelievable. "We didn't know we should have done."
"We didn't think of it." "Anyway the Secretary of State hasn't told us
what the indicative allocation is going to be..." At that point without
being terribly ruthless, they can just walk away from it.'
LA Official 7
The power of doing nothing was recognised by the Health Board officers, for one
commented that when the time did come to implement the circular
'We could have turned round and said "We're not going in that
direction." It wasn't in our budget by that stage.'
HB Official 1
However the insistence of the Social Work officials together with pressure in
particular from some Board members with voluntary sector connections did
inch the development of the system down the next step of the way.
'They just-dragged their heels and feet so much. They, in a desultory
fashion, put out some kind of letter over Christmas or thereabouts to
219
the voluntary sector. I think they put a notice in (the CVS magazine)
saying "Send in your projects."'
LA Official 7
And that was precisely what the Action Group along with a large number of
other agencies did.
7.9 Keeping up the Pressure
The reality was that these SWD officials, via the JHLC were attempting to push
the Health Board towards implementing the Care in the Community circular.
Part of this strategy was the maintenance of pressure from voluntary
organisations. In line with this the Action Group submitted its Supported
Accommodation project on 24 January to the JHLC via the Regional Co¬
ordination Group. This was passed promptly to Plains Health Board who replied
on 28 January that they anticipated the formal circular on 1 April 1985.
'The objectives of your project would certainly make it eligible for
consideration for financing under the joint planning and support
financing arrangements as at present drafted. It would be
inappropriate at this stage to give detailed consideration to your
application, but we would certainly consider it along with all the
other applications received. You will of course realise that there
could be competing proposals which require to be considered to see
which would in the Board's view be most beneficial to its own
services.'
Letter from HB Official 1 to AG
Being well in touch with events, the Action Group timed their application to
coincide with a JHLC meeting.
The tactic of inching the Health Board along the road to co-operation was quite
simple. The two key officials in the SWD submitted reports which had been
agreed at officer level with the Health Board. These were then passed by the
JHLC on which the Labour Party now had a huge majority, and on which it will
be remembered the Health Board officials never voted but
220
'the HB were absolutely forced to fall into line ... We'd embarrassed
them, we froze them out, their chairman began to be embarrassed by
the attitude of the officers.'
Me: Embarrassed about what?
'Because it was a public forum. The reluctance of officers to co¬
operate in any joint development/planning.'
HB Member 2
The reports were then submitted as recommendations to both the Region's
Social Work Committee and to the Health Board's Planning and Resources
(P & R) Committee for ratification. In this way slowly the SWD could push its
policies into the Health Board's decision-making system.
The report submitted to the JHLC on 25 January was part of this process. This
document set out estimates of the likely indicative allocation (in the hope of
getting the Health Board to set a budget for it), identified the main subject areas
as those specified in SHAPE: mental illness, mental handicap, physical handicap
and elderly; defined who could apply for the funding and outlined a process for
dealing with the applications. Thus rather than this process being developed
within the HB, it was developed externally by another agency, albeit with input
from HB officers and then presented to the HB P&R Committee for ratification.
The suggested procedure for dealing with applications was firstly, that the HB
would collate them and these applications would then pass into the Joint
Planning mechanism to be assessed by a 'multi-disciplinary group of officers
convened by an officer of the board.' All participating bodies in the joint
planning process would be represented on this assessment panel and the
projects would be assessed on the following criteria:
a) value for money
b) their fit with SHAPE priorities
c) their relevance to the Health Services.
After the assessment, it was recommended that there should be full consultation
within the JHLC and the final decision on the allocation of monies would then
be taken by the Health Board.
Vol. Org. Worker 1, the Director of the local council of voluntary service (CVS),
played a key role in the implementation process. At this point he represented
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the voluntary organisations on the Regional Co-ordination Group, he was a
member of the Health Board and represented it on the JHLC, being the elected
Vice-Chair. As a Labour Party member, he also attended the Labour Group
meetings which preceded the JHLC.
He was a means of keeping the pressure up on the Health Board and trying to
prevent them reneging on agreements.
'(He) is very able, very articulate. The difference between him and a
member of the SW Committee would be .... (he)'s much more a free
agent than someone who was a member of the council, who would
have to adhere to a party line and adhere to the council's line. (He)
had a wee bit more independence. That made him arguably more
influential.'
LA Official 13
His strength lay in his ubiquity. The Health Board officials found it more
difficult to continue the game they had been playing of saying one thing in the
RCG and going back to the Health Board and doing something quite different.
'He had a very nice habit of picking on the points that the officers
obviously didn't want to ventilate.... It must have been awkward at
times for the officers in the different sub-groups when (VO Worker
1) turned up, because he was just as liable to say what the officer had
said in Committee at the Board meeting and this is just not on.'
HB Member 3
The value of a free agent then in these circumstances is enormous. Dalton (1959)
saw formal and informal aspects of organisations as 'interdependent aspects of
the same phenomenon'. The connections between these two spheres were made
by a number of factors which included:
i) Official Meetings which he observed are usually used for
purposes other than those officially stated.
ii) Transitional Roles by which he means
'Someone with an official role who carries out temporary functions
that become more important than expected.'
p.230 op. cit.
Clearly LA Official 7 had made a career of this and at that point HS Professional 2
was operating in a similar capacity in the Health Board.
iii) Two-way Funnels which Dalton defines thus:
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'The role functions to communicate things that no-one wants to
assume responsibility for knowing, doing or being associated with.
The person who fills it is not chosen for loyalty or wiliness, but for
almost the reverse - his aptness in "talking out of turn" and in
carrying secrets to the right people which assures most predictable
communication.'
p.230 op. cit.
This role was undertaken within the RCG by VO Worker 1 - who facilitated
communication between a variety of participants which would not have been
possible simply using formal channels. But this role, it could be argued was one
played by a number of participants in the voluntary organisation network which
had been created, so that the information gained by VO Worker 1 in all his
capacities, was diffused to a much wider audience than ever he could manage
alone. Thus 'gossip' assumes enormous importance for those seeking change.
Almost every respondent emphasised the importance of the role that this
person played at this stage. However some noted the discomfiture of the HB
Officials because
'he was there with a foot in two camps... there was an employee/
employer relationship there and it was a bit difficult, just observing
the dynamics, difficult for some of the officers of the HB to be
entirely free in the discussions because their decision-maker, a
member of their decision-making board was there in another hat.'
LA Official 13
'He's been able to give a second opinion on the HB. When HB
Officials have said "We can't do this" or "The Board policy is such
and such", they've known that VO Worker 1 was in the room and
that he would either correct them if it was wrong or he would take
(issues) back to the Board and try and get it changed.'
LA Official 7
Thus VO Worker l's role was crucial in blocking the HB officials' escape routes
and gradually easing them towards the policy on Support Finance which was
desired by both the SWD and the voluntary organisations. By March 1985, there
were the bones of a policy for implementing the circular in place.
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7.10 What Support for Projects from the Health Board?
The Action Group had now submitted their application and the next stage in
stalling the implementation of the circular was now entered into. Having rather
half-heartedly called for applications:
'then they didn't do anything with them and we (SWD) had a
further meeting in January or February 1985 saying "Let's prioritise
them now" - but they didn't.'
LA Official 7
One of the problems shared by almost all outsiders to the Health Board was their
lack of understanding of how to apply pressure to the organisations decision¬
making processes. It seemed not to play by the bureaucratic rules with which
they were familiar.
'I am confident, that if I write a letter to a Director of Administration
or a Regional Secretary and say will you bring this to the attention of
your Housing or Social Work Committee, it'll be done... but I'd have
no confidence in the Health Board. If you write to the Secretary of a
Health Board and say will you bring this to the attention of the
Board, it hardly ever happens.'
Vol. Org. Worker 2
This lack of comprehension was a problem for those in the Action Group
wishing to promote their project.
'I wasn't that familiar with the way the HB worked.'
AG Worker 1
Given this gap in communications, the Action Group relied on the contacts it
had developed over the years with the consultant psychiatrists at Riversdale.
Just as mutually beneficial relationships had been developed with officials in the
SWD at various stages in the Group's life, similar contacts had been built up
over the years with some staff at the hospital.
Although the mental handicap strategy had at times seemed to threaten their
future and had certainly provoked a fair degree of opposition from some staff,
observers felt that this had tended to come from the nursing side.
'The doctors have actually gone along with it, because they have




This defensiveness, he said, stemmed from two factors: firstly that it was the
nurses who bore the brunt of criticisms when scandals erupted over long-stay
institutions and secondly because of the failure of the HB to reassure the nurses
that they would have a continuing role in any move into the community.
On the medical side however, two influential consultants supported the Action
Group. Both had had contact with the organisation since its early days; both saw
its usefulness in helping to shift resources towards their patients:
'They're very able people.'
HS Professional 1
'They have been a vital stimulus to improve the standards of care.'
HS Professional 3
The latter, who also had a number of overlapping roles, found the Action Group
useful in a number of ways. Besides his consultancy, he had sessions as a
university lecturer, was academic editor of a journal and also an advisor to the
Mental Health Foundation. As a result of all these activities, he had a number of
important visitors from time to time, often from abroad. He found the Action
Group a useful place to take them, to show them developments in Scotland.
'One time a party of Romanian doctors asked if they could visit and
there was a problem about language. As it happened we had a
Romanian speaker, one of the volunteer's husbands. Little things
like that impress people.'
AG Worker 1
Both consultants were keen to see more mentally handicapped people move
into the community. However what emerged was they differed from officials in
SWD about the criteria that such provision should meet. They gave highest
priority to moving people out of hospital. That is not to say that they condoned
poor quality care, but whilst they might share the idealism of LA Official 7 and
the Action Group, that such provision should be as 'normal' as possible, they
were both more pragmatic in reality, taking what they could get.
'I'm still sure that whenever someone comes up with a respectable
community care option, the Health Board, they'll take it - whether its
the church, Action for Crippled Children, Barnardo's or whoever.
They won't mind the variety, they'll go for it irrespective. It's a way
of shrinking and becoming a manageable institution.'
HS Professional 3
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The Director of Social Work, however, thought that there may have been an
ulterior motive in the HB wanting to free beds at the hospital because
'they were going to be able to put some mentally handicapped people
from (a mentally handicapped hospital which closed) into (a new
mentally handicapped Hospital in Plains), but they also wanted to
put some of them into Riversdale, so they wanted to get some of
them out.'
LA Official 4
Nonetheless it does seem that there was genuine support from these doctors for
the Action Group's proposals and HS Professional 3 thought it offered
something better for mentally handicapped people than the hospital could
provide and supported it accordingly. By this time the group also had the
support of the Community Psychiatric Nursing Officer, who had first got to
know the Group through the Doorway Project. Both these people were prepared
to vouch for the Action Group within the HB system.
HS Professional 3 was well aware of the difficulty in acquiring resources for
mental handicap. The democratic mechanism by which doctors fed into
consensus management was the Area Medical Committee. However for all the
reasons discussed above (see p.190) it was difficult for low prestige areas of
medicine to be heard in the fierce competition for funding. They lacked the
power to obtain the resources.
'The Area Medical Committee is not generally much use to a tiny
speciality like this'
Me: Because of the dominance of the (main teaching hospital)?
'Yes, not that there's anything against us, its just that we are a very
tiny nation in a vast United Nations. It's like being Swaziland - who
can hear you? '
HS Professional 3
The high prestige consultants seemed to have it all sewn up:
'For two or three years my husband was Chairman of the
Consultants and Specialists (committee) and the little hierarchy
group who were the top people, the Executive I suppose, used to
come here and meet and I used to feed them coffee and goodies
while they decided what they were going to push through at the ...
committee ... It was like pawns on a chessboard. They knew if this




Recognising his relative powerlessness to gain resources through this formal
mechanism, HS Professional 3 saw that one way to get resources was to grab at as
many promising schemes as possible and try to get them funded:
'I've got to be Machiavellian... I... have got to be aware of (all the
limitations) and go for the best buy I can get quickly off the counter,
because it might not be there tomorrow and if it's better than what
we have at the moment, then I'm sorry about the ideology, but - it's
not that one doesn't approve of it, it's the yardstick by which you
measure, but it shouldn't be purist.'
HS Professional 3
Thus he promoted and spoke for a number of schemes within the Board,
including the Action Group's proposal. By chance, the Group had found the one
effective means of getting Board approval for their project.
'They're a bit anonymous to say the least, the Health Board people,
and I was assuming that things were getting fed into them anyway,
maybe from other directions because people at Riversdale knew
about it and might well be talking about through their programme
planning groups. But we didn't really know who the key persons
were to send them copies or chase them, the way we chased other
people.'
AG Worker 1
But HS Professional 3 did and he was prepared to lobby for them. This was
immensely important in getting them onto the HB's agenda. To understand
why this was so, it is necessary to examine the interplay between the formal HB
procedures and the informal. This highlights the hybrid nature of the Health
Board, as discussed above (p. 190).
The tripartite nature of consensus management was reflected at the hospital
level too. Each hospital was run by a triumvirate composed of a Physician-in-
Charge, a Nursing Officer and an Administrator. The formal decision making
process was that if an issue arose on which a hospital consultant wanted a
decision from the Board:
'If he did it in the right way (my emphasis), ideally it should be
submitted through the Physician-in-Charge and would then have
come through the Unit Administrator, who would write to the
Secretary and say "This request has been received, I'd be grateful if it
could be considered." The Secretary would then, ... if it's a question of
medical development, refer it to the CAMO who'd then probably
refer it to HS Professional 4, the CMS, who would then submit
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advice to the Area Executive Group. Obviously, if there was
significant financial involvement, it would also go to the Treasurer.'
HB Official 2
Given the complexity of this route, it is not surprising that this official was
interrupted by his companion at the interview, who said:
'There was another route whereby the consultants went straight to
the CAMO.'
HB Official 4
In other words, there was a tendency for doctors to rely heavily on the collegial
relationships of the medical profession, in order to achieve results, rather than
involve other officials.
'There are formal and informal networks. HS Professional 3 would
have operated very heavily on the informal network.'
HS Professional 2
Which he did.
'Its what you say in public and what you do in private. The lobbying
process is slightly different from the local authority. I'd have made it
known to SHHD officials and officials at the Health Board.'
HS Professional 3
In particular, besides informing colleagues at Riversdale, he spoke to one of the
senior CMS' (although not the CAMO). It was something of a joke in the Health
Board that these kinds of inputs tended to take place on the golf-course.
'Because of the way things work in the medical empire in Bigtown...
They work in a strange and mysterious way and you have to be in
the Health Board for about three or four years to even begin to
understand it. But there are various pressure groups which exert
influence through dim and mysterious ways - usually over the golf-
course with the CAMO, or something like that, or in a bar
somewhere.'
HB Official 2
The CMS who had responsibility for mental handicap confirmed the importance
of these contacts:
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Me: 'The Action Group ... has quite close ties with people at (the
hospital), were those factors?'
'Oh, yes, very important, because you can speak to them and say
"What do you think of that organisation? Are they doing a good
job?" and if they say "Definitely, yes!" well great.'
Me: 'You ask people to vouch for the organisation?'
Tes, very much so.'
HS Professional 49
And from this process, not unlike the means of choosing the Pope, somehow
the white smoke emerges and decisions are made.
It is clear then, that the Action Group had that support from key consultants and
nurses at Riversdale. To this group, the circular was a bonus, specifying sums of
money to be spent in SHAPE priority areas. The pivotal factor therefore, was the
lack of compulsion in the circular and thus everything hinged on whether, in
the end, the Health Board could be persuaded to implement the circular.
7.10.1 Giving Health Board Money to a Foreign Power
On 25 April 1985, the SHHD jointly with SWSG, SDD and SED, issued the long-
awaited circular Community Care: Joint Planning and Support Finance, with
only minor changes from the draft, despite the comprehensive critique to which
it had been subjected. Hopes that the Health Board might become more
enthusiastic now the circular was issued were soon dashed. There seemed to be
two major obstacles.
Firstly, community care was not high on the HB's priorities, as has been
discussed in earlier sections of this chapter:
9One HB Official pointed out that this process of relying on collegial opinion did at times
put an unduly narrow medical flavour on what might be considered an appropriate
thing to fund:
'I don't subscribe to that frankly because a lot of what goes on in the




'There is a feeling within some officials that the function of the
Health Service is to take care of its own and its own are those things
that are defined as hospital care and community health services; and
anything else is not their responsibility.'
HB Member 1
Thus the section in the circular which dealt with the choice of projects, seemed
to offer some support to this view:
'Since the resources available to boards are voted for health
purposes, they should support community projects only where these
are likely to make a significant contribution to health care and the
development of the strategic planning priorities of the area.'
p.4 SHHD (1985)
Indeed the following sentence, as noted above, seemed to offer a recipe for not
implementing the circular if so desired:
'Moreover, health boards must be generally satisfied that the
proposed expenditure would be more beneficial in terms of total care
than an equivalent amount spent on health services for the
community.'
Ibid.
There were two problems with this approach. The circular rested on the
assumption of the possibility of clearly defining health/non-health issues. Just
as social work and housing had had problems (Chapter 6) defining where
housing support became social care, there were similar problems in health.
Indeed some would argue that mental handicap per se is not a medical problem
at all, not being amenable to cure.
Secondly, the criteria for choosing projects were so vague, that it would always
be possible to make a case for retaining the money within the health service,
rather than offering it to local authorities and voluntary organisations.
These problems of definition were compounded by the second serious fault in
the circular. The new method of financing the scheme placed obtaining
resources firmly in the political free-for-all that represented the reality of Health
Board decision-making. Whilst the previous method (above p.199) had had its
drawbacks, particularly the short taper and the amount of money which needed
to be found by financially straitened local authorities; the new scheme, whilst
improving these aspects, shot itself in the foot by abandoning the principle of
top-slicing.
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Top-slicing meant that annually a certain proportion of HB finance was retained
the SHHD and ear-marked for a particular purpose, in this case community care
schemes. Its merit was that it could only be used for that purpose, thus
removing community care from the competition for funds within the Health
Board which was generally won by more powerful specialities. Moreover Plains
had done quite well out of the old scheme: whilst having reservations about the
principle of giving money over to social work under the old scheme, officials in
the health board had taken a pragmatic view
'Our view was that this money had been taken off the top anyway,
therefore we might as well use it.'
HB Official 1
Since other HB's in the main had not availed themselves of the scheme, the
lion's share of the available finance had in the past gone to Plains.
Under the new scheme however, each Health Board was to receive an
'indicative level of expenditure'. This meant that in future, SHHD would make
allowances for a sum of money based^ a calculation of the composition of the
population within each HB's area. This sum of money would then form part of
each HB's global allocation from Central Government. For 1985/86 the
indicative allocation for Plains Health Board was £432,000, a paltry sum in the
context of a multi-million pound budget, but even this was hedged about in the
circular:
'These sums should not be regarded as either maximum of
minimum levels of expenditure... '
p.4 SHHD (1985)
Health Board officials had an expectation that some additional fund would be
forthcoming. The circular stated that
'the uncommitted balance of funds which would previously have
been retained by SHHD for support finance purposes, will be
revalued and distributed to health boards in proportion to their
baseline levels of revenue expenditure on hospital and community




The Treasurer of the Health Board expected to receive an additional £172,000
under this mechanism as he had been notified by letter from SHHD that this
was Plains' share but
'That didn't happen in actual fact. I think the explanation that was
given was that although the circular was eventually sent out on 24
April 1985, it had obviously existed in draft form for a long time and
the allocation (ie the normal health board funding) that was sent out
on 7 March.already reflected that (amount). But you'd think if that
had been the case they might have said so on 24 April.'
HB Official 5
Financial officers of the health board felt they had been 'had'. Not only did they
not receive the additional allocation that the circular implied they could expect,
but the indicative allocation was itself included in monies received on 7 March,
which had already been allocated to other priorities. The failure to budget for
Support Finance in advance of the issue of the circular, which had been a feature
of the officials'resistance to implementation, now meant there was effectively
no money for the scheme. Therefore any decision now to implement the
scheme would involve clawing money back from other areas of HB operation.
In the subsequent battle to change this situation, it emerged that there were two
schools of thought within the board. There were those opposed to community
care on professional and ideological grounds, distrusting the motives of the local
authority. Secondly, there were those opposed to implementing the circular on
financial grounds - arguing that now the money came from within the HB's
allocation, the money would be better spent within the HB.
The move to community care then, challenged some very basic views about
how the health service ought to work. One doctor saw the divisions as lying
between professionals and administrators, with the medical side essentially
opportunistic:
'There was a clinical faction, who would always back, go with, the
side they felt was going to get the loot.'
HS Professional 2
This was contrasted by a board member with the officer faction who were caught
up in trying to define health as narrowly as possible because things that are
'based in the community and not controlled by health... (lead to) a
feeling among some people that it (HB) is giving money away to a
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foreign power. That's a fairly extreme way of presenting it, I know,
but there is something of that about it... the business of the NHS is to
hold onto the money that it's allocated and to continue what is has
always run, preferably in better buildings than in has run them in.'
HB Member 1
Whilst the Treasurer's problem was basically pragmatic: how to recoup the
monies allocated to other projects, his problem was a wonderful excuse for
inaction by those whose objections were more fundamental. It was against this
background that the JHLC sought to secure the implementation of the new
circular.
7.10.2 The Last Lap
It was agreed that, in the absence of the yet-to-be established joint planning
structures, applications for Support Funding from organisations in the mental
handicap field would be prioritised by the Regional Co-ordination Group, which
would make recommendations to the JHLC and these would then be passed to
the Health Board, with whom the final decision rested.
There was a problem about what to do with the rest of the applications as the
Joint Working Parties in the other client group areas were yet to be established.
Although the HB lacked any real mechanism for assessing voluntary
organisation applications other than the collegial consultations undertaken by
the CMS (above p.229), it was decided that the non-mental handicap
applications would be sent straight to the Health Board.
Within the existing joint liaison structures, this arrangement did give projects
for mentally handicapped people an advantage over others in two ways. Firstly,
the voluntary agencies involved in the mental handicap strategy, had been
engaged in information sharing and thinking about potential projects since May
1984, through the group convened by the CVS. Most of the agencies involved
with other client groupings were unprepared and the projects they had
submitted at short notice were rather thin and ill- considered:
'I think the more difficult thing for us was that the (other) schemes
hadn't been well thought up, hadn't been tried against the priorities
of the Board and Social Work, which weren't very clear at that time -
but all these things showed up the quality of the mental handicap




'Those (mentally handicapped) bodies that were ready to act and had
ideas to take off the shelf were those that had been thinking about
the strategy. The strategy had given impetus to a variety of groups of
people both in the statutory sector and the voluntary sector to start
thinking about the ways in which services need to be improved and
people had come forward with projects of varying sizes. These were
on the stocks because people were working them up.'
LA Official 13
The RCG latched on to the wording of paragraph 11 of the circular, which stated
that
'Support Funding is appropriate for projects which are the statutory
responsibility of local authorities, but which have been identified in
joint planning arrangements as being likely to make a significant
and cost-effective contribution to the discharge of a health board's
responsibilities.'
p.3 SHHD (1985)
By arguing that projects must be jointly planned, it was possible in 1985, to
justify confining eligibility almost entirely to projects for mentally handicapped
people.
'It's true that the circular said anything to be jointly financed had to
be jointly planned. The phrase was used perhaps to suit. It£ not quite
the case to say our proposal was jointly planned. I mean we drew it
up and plenty of people had a chance to look at it and let us know
whether this was going against anything else they wanted to do. And
it didn't ... whereas other people who shoved them in at the last
minute, probably hadn't been around long enough for everyone to
have a look at it and get their agreement or had been drawn up in an
isolated fashion.'
AG Worker 1
By 21 June 1985, some 26 applications had been received, although some of
these, like the Social Work Department's own application, were for multiple
schemes, having 10 separate proposals. Altogether there were 24 voluntary
organisation submissions and 22 statutory schemes to be considered, (see
Appendix A for list)
The Regional Co-ordination Group set about establishing its priorities and
immediately ran up against yet more delaying tactics from the Health Board.
'We wrote to the HB and asked for criteria we might use. We said,
we've agreed the process and we would like you to do this. And we
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wrote and wrote and wrote asking for criteria by which we could
evaluate.'
LA Official 13
When the RCG did eventually extract a reply, it was in terms of, 'it's up to the
working party to devise its own criteria'. And that was just what the RCG did.
LA Official 7 and HS Professional 3 had a very clear idea what they wanted out of
the meeting and set about achieving it.
The group adopted a tactic of measuring the applications against the Mental
Handicap Strategy and projects were evaluated
'not just in terms of their relative priority, but in terms of their
intrinsic value... you know, would you spend any money on this
even if you'd got lots of it, on this particular project.'
LA Official 7
The composition of the membership of the RCG gave the priorities of the
strategy a built-in advantage in this forum. Although technically the two
departments were evenly matched in terms of numbers,10 the SWD had an
advantage in that they were likely to be supported by both the voluntary sector
representative and the Senior Registrar seconded to the Joint Planning exercise.
Whilst there was not any grand design on the part of the SWD as a whole
'Given all these disparate disciplines and attitudes, I certainly never
saw Social Work as a monolithic grand force. I felt it was an
organisation that was seriously looking on some levels at how to do
things a bit better and they were further along the line than the HB
in that process.'
HS Professional 2
The method of making a decision was quite simple:
'It was a sequential voting process, everyone ranked their own
priorities for all the projects and we checked out what everyone's
view was and came out with some overall agreed priority ranking.'
LA Official 7
Given the schemes that were referred to the RCG, it seems likely that there was a
high degree of consensus within the group.
10See Appendix B for membership.
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'We were looking, I think they went through two areas. Firstly
things that would help us in organising treatment for the mentally
handicapped in the community - things like Mental Handicap co¬
ordinators, register that sort of thing. Secondly there was a strong
feeling that we should get some bricks and mortar on the ground, so
that we were beginning to put people out into the community.'
HB Official 2
and this official confirmed the assessment of each project on its merits. However
one doctor who was later also to become involved in the Joint Planning
mechanism, queried the validity of voting in this context:
'I don't think its democracy at all. The decisions are then taken on
board by people who are not elected or chosen for their knowledge
of any balances... there is a pretence of democracy surrounding it
which probably does not exist ... Say some facility comes up,
somebody suggests a revolutionary or a new type of facility... the one
that'll come up, the ones that'll be noticed are the ones that are the
pet schemes or who have a supporter there.'
HS Professional 3
In these terms the Action Group project was well placed. It had the support
probably, of all the SWD staff, as well as the voluntary sector vote. It was also
supported by the Community Medicine staff and the Physician-in-Charge at
Riversdale. The Mental Handicap Co-ordinators were seen by Social Work as
essential to forward the Strategy and the Register was the pet scheme of HS
Professional 2, as a graduate in computing as well as medicine. The list of
priorities arrived at by the RCG reflected these interests:
1. Mental Handicap Strategy - Divisional Co-ordinators
2. West City Action Group - Supported Accommodation for
mentally handicapped people in ordinary dwellings
3. Mental Handicap Register
4. Support workers in hostels for people with a mental handicap
5. City Housing Association - to provide a neighbour support
scheme for the physically disabled (sic)
6. Centre - Community services for the mentally handicapped
7. Counselling services for families with mentally handicapped
children
'We got the priorities we wanted - one co-ordinators, two (the Action
Group), three City HA, four register. [He got the order slightly wrong]
I think it panned out like that and given the list the one we
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absolutely wanted was co-ordinators. We couldn't do anything else
without that. We'd probably get the other two. The register would
probably drop off. West City would be a show-piece (and they'd get a
Co-ordinator) ... City HA was across the board and it did deserve to
get funded.'
HS Professional 2
7.10.3 Meanwhile back in the Health Board
It had been agreed when the guidelines were set in March 1985 that the final
recommendations to the JHLC would be made 'by a multi-disciplinary group of
officers convened by an officer of the Board.'11 This meeting was called on 7
August 1985, and it became abundantly plain that the battle to convince the
Health Board of the merits of inter-agency co-operation and to show its
commitment by backing that with money, was by no means won.
It emerged that a meeting of the Health Board's main policy-making committee,
the Planning and Resources Committee, had on 25 July debated two options on
Support Finance which were as follows:
'a) Agree that no funds should be made available for Support
Finance in view of the over-riding need to open as many beds as
possible at the (geriatric) Hospital.'
[Paragraph 18 of NHS Circ. No. 1985 (GEN) 18 Community Care:
joint Planning and Support Finance states:
"'Moreover, health boards must be generally satisfied that the
proposed expenditure (ie Support Finance) would be more beneficial
in terms of total care than an equivalent amount spent on health
services in the community.'"
or
'b) Defer a decision on the amount to be devoted to Support Finance
until the Special Committee meeting due to be held on 29 August.
At that meeting members will be presented with a list of possible
Support Finance projects in order of priority.'
Minutes of Multi- Disciplinary Officer Group
^Unlike the Regional Co-ordination Group, which the Social Work Department could
dominate with the support of the voluntary organisation representative and those
health service staff who favoured the development of services for people with a
mental handicap, the Multi-disciplinary Officer Group had six health board
representatives from the administrative centre, two SWD staff, three education




Whilst the P&R Committee had opted for the second option, the ambivalence of
the HB officers about this issue is evident.
'It's more than ambivalence, its reluctance.'
LA Official 7
In Wildavsky's (op.cit) terms they were 'satisficing' (satisfying and sufficing),
trying to get by and avoid trouble. They were using strategies 'designed to
capitalise on the fragmentation of power.' Firstly they were playing both ends
against the middle. By raising the spectre of the geriatric hospital, they were
highlighting that the 'authorised' programme ie those priorities that lay clearly
within the Health Board's own domain, were not being funded - yet here they
were being asked to decrease their budget and give money to these non-health
groups.
Secondly they were playing 'You choose', for by putting these recommendations
to the P&R Committee that had hoped that HB members would choose the in-
house project. •
Thirdly, they were playing 'They made me' for the other issue they raised at the
multi-disciplinary group related to the difficulties caused for the HB's funding by
the Government's (political) decision to refuse to authorise the closure of a
small hospital as it lay in a marginal Conservative constituency.
'the savings accrued from which would have gone to opening the
geriatric wards.'
Para. 6 Multi-Disciplinary Officer Group Minutes
(There was, of course, no guarantee that the P&R Committee on 29 August
meeting there would be agreement to give Support Finance. The decision was
only to defer a decision until then.)
This meeting also endorsed the guidelines which had been agreed by the RCG
namely:
a) that priority be given to projects that had been jointly planned
b) that projects eligible for joint (ie continuing) funding not be
considered for Support Funding
c) that priority should go to new schemes
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d) that projects should fit into the broad SHAPE areas with the
addition of multiple deprivation
It was then at 7 August meeting, that the HB Officers produced, like a white
rabbit from a hat, their own list of priorities, which was as follows:
1. Mental Handicap Strategy - Divisional Co-ordinators
2. Church project - the establishment of a hostel for the mentally
handicapped
3. Scottish Association for Mental Health - the establishment of 8
community based places
4. The Action Group
5. Mental Handicap Register
6. Church project - the establishment of a (second) hostel for the
mentally handicapped
7. Abbeyfield - the installation of 2 chairlifts
8. Education Department - new swimming pool hoist at School (for
physically handicapped children)
There were a number of significant changes from the RCG's list. These were the
dropping of the three voluntary organisation schemes (from City HA, and nos 6
and 7 on the RCG list (above p.236)) and the insertion of the two church
schemes. The Social Work Department's scheme for support workers for hostels
was dropped and three one-off schemes added; SAMH, Abbeyfield and the
Education Department proposals.
There were immediate protests about the church schemes from the SWD
officials. It was pointed out that these had not been considered by the RCG and
that they were not a priority - but to no avail. The SWD officials did not have
the influence or support in this group that they had in the RCG. The multi¬
member officer group accepted the HB officers' priority list as their submission
to the Joint Liaison Committee.
The emergence of this list was surprising as there was some overlap in
membership between the officer group in the HB who devised this list and the
RCG. Thus the question must be posed, why this significantly different set of
priorities? It was difficult to get a clear response from HB officers on this in
interviews. One seemed to suffer from amnesia over this issue, although his
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memory was quite clear on other aspects. When asked how the church schemes
got into the priorities, he did not tell me of the existence of an internal officer
group, of which at that point I was not aware, but said
'Well, the answer is somebody managed to get them in as a late
entry.'
HB Official 2
Yet he was a member of that internal group. Similarly when pressed over
changing decisions he said
'I've forgotten that. It's a long time ago.'
HB Official 2
Others offered the excuse that
'We as a health board, have got to have our own look at things.
You've also got your RCG, but the JHLC had the voluntary input and
all the rest - they looked at it with everything .... but the board could
have legitimately declined to accept that.'
HB Official 3
and
'We have the last word.'
HB Official 1
The argument ran that they needed to have their own system of assessment
because, in this the first year of joint planning, only the area of mental handicap
had a co-operative mechanism in place. Their right to make their own
assessment is not denied. What is significant is that they did not reveal that they
were doing this.
It is also possible to argue that there was no forum except the JHLC in which this
issue could be raised, but given that at the end of the process of Support Funding
it was the SWD which paid for the schemes, it would seem like only common
courtesy to consult them over these priorities. It is therefore surprising that the
existence of this internal HB assessment procedure was not mentioned in the
RCG. There are thus two questions to be addressed: why did the HB not reveal
the existence of their own internal evaluation procedure? And why did they
want this list rather than the RCG one?
The answer to the first question seems to lie in an antipathy to working with the
local authority - seeing them as out to fleece the HB for their own purposes.
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'There was certainly a feeling that SWD's shouldn't be benefiting
from support finance to undertake what was in some people's views,
mainstream social work activities anyway.'
HB Official 6
But there was also still a failure to accept that joint working entailed sharing
information and on a basis that enabled real dialogue with the other agencies.
This official went on to give other examples besides this one where HB officials
had not told the local authority of plans which would have a direct effect on
their ability to provide adequate services
'They sat in the Joint Working Party (part of the new joint planning
mechanism established in September 1985) and didn't say anything
about (closing) a clinic (for mentally ill people) either. The proposals
on (a mental illness hospital) were leaked. They were sent to the
Joint Working Party by someone who's now a Unit General Manager
- much to the disgust and annoyance of a member of the JWP...
There's still even a year or so ago, a reluctance to share information...
There were people from the Board who were flying their own kites,
who represented themselves and their own views, because they were
strong within the board.'
HB Official 6
It was apparently also not unknown for the HB when making new proposals to
offer the local authority only the minimum statutory consultation period of
twenty-one days in which to respond, which was quite unreasonable given the
local authority operated on a six-weekly cycle of committees.
The attitude was
'it's our money and we'll do it. To hell with the Social Work
Department. I suspect it was a bit of that because I can't tell you the
animosity that existed between the HB officers - there was no
animosity on behalf of social work and housing officials. There was
nothing but co-operation and a willingness to work together. But I
think the HB officials felt very threatened because they'd never had
to sit round a table and open their minds to see another point of
view. They always did what they knew was right and that was
rubber-stamped by the HB members.'
HB Member 2
In other words, it was part of a rear-guard action to be as minimally co-operative
as possible, because in Benson's terms there was not ideological congruence.
These officials did not believe in the policies they were being pushed to
implement.
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Thus they sought to limit the projects supported to those endorsed by their
'own' people. The alternative list, then, stemmed from two sources. On the
policy side, besides wishing to exclude what was perceived as what ought to be
mainstream social work funding (hence the disappearance of the Support
Workers proposal) the three voluntary agency schemes excluded were ones
which did not at that point have members of the medical profession vouching
for them, unlike the Action Group which was supported by the consultants at
Riverdale.
Until the advent of support finance, the HB had had
'a) very little contact with voluntary agencies and b) the contact they
did have was very medically oriented - the Red Cross, they give a
grant to and hospices and what not. Actually it was just a payment
they made. There was no relationship as they have in the SWD...'
HB Official 6
Thus there were here two issues. Firstly a lack of understanding of voluntary
organisations, particularly the newer type of community development ones and
there was therefore suspicion of those not supported by professional opinion.
Secondly as was apparent from the minute cited above
'the HB reps were actually... hooked on a bit of the circular which
said they must satisfy themselves that money spent of support
finance was better spent than it would be, if it was spent on
mainstream NHS facilities.'
HB Member 1
By taking an unduly narrow definition of health, an issue which is contrasted in
the Black Report as an 'engineering' rather than a 'life-style' approach
(Townsend and Davidson 1982) it was possible to limit support finance to
schemes which would have an obvious and measurable effect on HB services.
The church proposals fell into this category. This was what the HB understood a
voluntary organisation to be: traditional, staid, peopled by individuals like
themselves. Some staff were church officials. It was in other words an
organisation the Health Board could deal with. And they were offering to take
substantial numbers of patients out of hospital.
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'I would be a supporter of the church ... recommendations.'
Me: 'Why?'
'Because it's a way of getting people out of here, (the hospital)'
HS Professional 3
Thus this consultant had been Machiavellian in his terms and used his
influence to grab what he could for his patients (above p.227). Certainly it was
how other observers explained it.
'They (the church) were encouraged to put in an application by
professionals in the HB who were working in the field of mental
handicap.'
LA Official 12
The proposal to include an Education Department project made no sense in
terms of the criteria set by the circular, but did make sense in terms of securing
their support for the package.
'(The) senior officers of the Education Department, who've never
been there before (were there).'
LA Official 7
'I think they'd stuck in things ... to spread them out a bit - one for
physically handicapped children in the Education Department
(which was a one-off payment too). Ridiculous - its not really a
graded transfer of responsibility from one agency to another.'
AG Worker 1
The other motivation for this list was financial. The Treasurer's preferred
option was to spend no money on Support Finance (above p.232), but given that
there was already intense pressure coming from some members of the health
board to implement the circular, there needed to be a contingency position.
Therefore the stance adopted by the Board's financial officers was that of damage
limitation.
'There was a number of both members and officers who I think, felt
because the circular had come out so late, because of the shortage of
time and because if we accepted a scheme for more than one year
(we'd be committed to on-going funding) we would really be better,
not to start recurrent schemes more than we had to in 1985/6.'
HB Official 5
Out of the eight schemes proposed by HB officers, three sought single payments:
only Scottish Association for Mental Health, Abbeyfield and the Education
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Department. The Mental Handicap Register and the Action Group's scheme
were both limited to three years. This concern arose from another delaying tactic
that the officers had thought of.
'There was an element ... that unless you can give cast-iron
guarantees about where the funding will come from in the future,
we shouldn't proceed. Which was a recipe for doing nothing except
one-off capital payments like (the school) swimming pool.'
LA Official 13
Certainly the Treasurer's Dept at the HB thought that
'It was clearly an option to say that in view of the doubts over
funding and in view of the fact that it was already far too late to get
anything sensible going for 1985/6, it might be perfectly reasonable
for the board to say, "We'll start planning now, but we won't give
any money till next year.'
HB Official 5
The Social Work officials present at the meeting were appalled at this list and
particularly at the inclusion of the church projects. This application had come in
at the last minute and had not been part of the considerations of the RCG. The
provision of hostel places was not high on the RCG's agreed priorities because
'There were 115 hostel places in Plains and the majority of these
were silted up, because there was nowhere to move on to. So if you
had to say what was the priority - the priority we saw was to unglue
the hostel places by providing the next stage on, other housing
options than that.'
Vol. Org. Worker 1
The minutes of the Officer Group confirm that although it was agreed that the
RCG would examine these proposals at their next meeting on 13 August
'it is understood that the Joint Group accorded no priority to these
schemes.'
Para. 10 Multi- disciplinary Officer Group
Moreover the real reason for not wanting to support the church in their
previous track record (above p.211) where they had been perceived by the SWD
officials as doing private deals with the health board.
'What the church ... had done, was to make a direct approach to the
HB, got this all sewn up, people started moving out and the SWD
didn't even know it was happening. They really blotted their copy¬
book about that upset. Terrible! Astonishing really, stupid,
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ridiculous... (Now) they had these two other properties - they did the
same thing again... incredible!'
AG Worker 1
Certainly the SWD was angry about the church's first escapade to the extent that
they had refused to top up the DHSS Board and Lodging payment because
'That's just been a rather childish way of punishing them.'
LA Official 4
and this hostility was noted by one of the CMS'.
'The church ... doesn't seem to get the favourable response that
either of those [the Action Group and City HA] would get [from
SWD]. I don't know why. There may be some difficulty between
officers in social work and officers in the church .... - they just don't
see eye to eye... So that while there were church ... schemes, there
always seemed to be a sort of — well— about it.'
HS Professional 4
There were certainly those within the church who thought that personal rivalry
between the Director of Social Work and the Director of the church's committee
on social work was a factor but also admitted that perhaps they could have
planned their approach better.
It is therefore not surprising that when the issue returned to the RCG on 13
August, the group agreed that the church proposals should not be included in
the already presented list of priorities, but rather should be deferred until the
1986/7 cycle. What is surprising is that it was agreed unanimously. It would
seem that the HB officials were still proceeding on the basis of not taking the
joint planning process seriously.
'The officials of the HB who were members of the RCG were
considerably embarrassed at having been party to that.'
Vol. Org. Member 1
Certainly, no defence of the HB's action was offered. In reality
'They were saying one thing in one place and another thing in
another and the CMS was just flapping in the breeze in each place.
I'd think that the traditional/financial (position) was where they
really stood and in the meetings being held... in (the SWD) with a
SW Chairman, in that atmosphere, they were manoeuvred round
and were going along with this process.'
HS Professional 2
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As one HB member observed talking of consensus management
'If you couldn't get a consensus then you just went ahead and did
what you bloody well liked!'
HB Member 1
The JHLC, meeting on 23 August, exercised the judgement of Solomon in this
situation. It welcomed
'the steps taken to identify priority areas for expenditure of monies
under the Support Funding Programme during the current financial
year. However in accord with the priorities agreed by the RCG, it
proposes^hat the two projects of the church .... be referred back to the
RCG and^their place, the previously agreed priorities (City HA and
Support Workers) be inserted.'
Extract of minute of 23 August 1985
Thus the final list of recommendations made by the JHLC to the health board
was
a) Mental handicap co-ordinators (6)
b) Scottish Association for Mental Health
c) City Housing Association
d) the Action Group
e) Mental Handicap Register
f) Abbeyfield
g) Hoist for school for physical handicap
h) Support Workers for Hostels
Of the original RCG proposals only numbers 6 and 7, the two other voluntary
organisation submissions were omitted. Most of the original recommendations,
and certainly those that mattered most to those pursuing the Mental Handicap
Strategy, had survived this assault intact. There was now however, grave
anxiety about what would happen when the final decision came to be taken by
the Health Board alone.
7.10.4 Everything with Knobs on
The procedure now that the fate of the JHLC's recommendations lay with the
health board, was this. The main debate on the issue would take place in the
Planning and Resources Committee on 29 August 1985. This meeting was not
open to the public. The normal procedure was that the decision taken by the
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P&R Committee would then be ratified by the full Health Board, meeting in this
case on 12 September, although these two committees had the same
membership.
The Area Executive Group, in its recommendations to the P&R Committee
maintained its stance of antipathy to the notion of Support Funding. Despite
having agreed to the RCG's recommendations and not having opposed the
JHLC's recommendations, the papers stressed the
'over-riding need to achieve maximum possible savings in order to
open the (geriatric hospital), Phase III.'
Papers for P&R Committee 29 August 1985
and re-iterated the clause from the circular that HB s must be satisfied that the
proposed expenditure would be more beneficial in terms of total care than an
equivalent amount spent on health services in the community. Therefore, the
AEG concluded there were only two options open to the Health Board:
a) to allocate no money to Support Finance and to spend the




i) To fund only 3 of 6 Mental Handicap Strategy co-ordinators
(and)
ii) To allocate funds to cover the non-recurring capital costs
requested (only).
Thus only the Scottish Association for Mental Health, Abbeyfield and the school
would get any money.
Setting Support Funding against the hospital was seen to be a very effective
strategy by observers:
'Whether that was a genuine way of putting it or not, I don't know,
but it was probably, if not genius, pretty clever of someone on the
Board to put it like that, which, I think made it hard for people to
then say, "Spend it on projects in Support Finance," and not open




Moreover supporters of the JHLC position, who were on the Health Board saw
that this juxtaposition was part and parcel of the officers' usual strategy for
managing HB members.
'It's a scare tactic. They're quite good at scare tactics.'
Me: 'They use scare tactics?'
'Oh, they use scare tactics.'
Me: 'In order to get the decision they want out of the Board? '
'Yes, that's frequently done and unless you're a political animal you
don't see through that.'
HB Member 2
'You see the reports we got in the old days (ie pre- General
Management) from the HB were ghastly. They were very much
steered to make you make a decision and very often the decision was
made before you flaming well got to the meeting.'
HB Member 4
And the politicians on the Board (from both left and right) were united in
bemoaning the increasingly apolitical nature of the Secretary of State's
appointments
'They've brought in more and more business people whose
allegiance to our party, I suspect we don't even know. I met up with
one new one yesterday I'd never met before, whose background is
the CBI. I've no doubt he probably votes Tory but I don't think he's
politically motivated enough to vote on a party line for example.'
HB Member 4
Whilst this Conservative member prided herself on her independent stance, she
was a supporter of the implementation of Support Finance. Labour members
observed of the newer appointments to the Health Board by the Conservative
Secretary of State that
'You got people who were bank managers etc., but they were never
political animals who understood accountability, who had put
themselves up and said this is what I stand for, elect me or not. The
majority of them are just awful.'
HB Member 2
248
'It's a degree of naivety on their part, - you can hear the sort of ripple
goes round anytime we're voting, "What's all that? What are we
voting for?"'
HB Member 1
The recommendations of the JHLC, whilst attached to the agenda for
information were not included in the options the officers put to the Planning
and Resources Committee. The chair of the health board argued that this was
quite commonplace as the final decision rested with the full board meeting. It is
important here to note two things. Firstly, it seemed that the Health Board,
unlike the local authority lacked consistent standing orders for debating
resolutions.
'The board proceeds in terms of voting in a most idiosyncratic way.
In fact anyone who's watched local government in practice, I think,
finds it extremely difficult to work out the Board's voting pattern. It's
not laid down in their standing orders.'
HB Member 1
This meant that the procedures were much more flexible and therefore
potentially more manipulable than local authority procedures. The decision
about how any particular debate was to be conducted lay with the chair and the
likelihood was that he would seek to support the officers as he was party to the
AEG decisions. He was a supporter of the compromise position.
'I was part and parcel of that... I believed in it because I'd seen it right
from the beginning.'
HB Member 3
Secondly, as there was disagreement, by arranging that the JHLC
recommendations only be put to the full Board, that left the original proposals at
a distinct disadvantage. For if a decision in favour of one of the other options
was taken by the P&R Committee, then a very strong case had to be put up to
overturn it.
The anxiety of those seeking funds that this could be a possibility was already
apparent for attached to the agenda were three letters. The first was from the
chair of the RCG which sought to exclude the church proposals (although in fact
these never made it as far as the agenda). The second was from the local Health
Council which urged particular support for the City HA proposals and
commented:
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'The Health Council feels that particularly in the present economic
climate, the Government's decision to lump Support Finance money
into the Health Board's annual budgets was wrong and it deplores
the fact that only £170,000 was put into Plains Health Board's budget
for this programme, whereas expected expenditure was £420,000.
Nevertheless, because of the long-term importance of getting people
out of long-stay institutions and into well-supported community
facilities, the Health Council urges the Health Board to allocate the
full £420,000 to support finance schemes.'
Letter from Health Council Secretary. 22 August 1985
The third letter was from the Action Group
a) explaining the term 'Supported Accommodation',
b) stressing that they would remove people from hospital, as well as
making a community provision,
c) mentioning approaches for services from Riversdale hospital,
d) supporting the notion of Divisional Co-ordinators.
The stage was set for a battle royal.
There is little doubt that the debate which took place at the P&R Committee was
acrimonious. HB Member 1 was noted for his mordant wit and it was not
universally popular.
'(He) can really go over the top. One of the reasons he's not on the
board (now) is because he went over the top at a personal level too
much. You're really better to stick to the actual policy. I think that
was a factor.'
HB Member 2
In fact, the Chairman of the Health Board saw this as a factor he could
manipulate. Whilst he acknowledged this member's contribution as a hard¬
working board member:
'The problem with HB Member 1 was the longer he spoke, the more
damage he did his case and I'll be quite honest,.... If I didn't want (his
proposal) to go through at all, I'd let (him) come in more than he
was really entitled - knowing fine what effect it would have.'
HB Member 3
Nor was this acrimony all one way, for HB Member 1 claimed that the
Chairman accused him of religious bigotry for opposing the church proposals.
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It is always difficult to gain an accurate picture of debates which precede
decisions. Suffice it to say that at this meeting it was minuted as a 'full'
discussion, which in diplomatic terms usually means there was some rather
heated argument. One HB member who supported the HB recommendations
explained it thus. He said that there had been a very animated argument prior to
the resolutions being put, about whether Support Finance should be set against
opening the geriatric hospital. Thus when HB Member 1 proposed, seconded by
HB Member 4 that the HB should implement the JHLC recommendations with
the proviso that only three Divisional Co-ordinators be funded, it was perceived
as the former
'as usual, wanting everything with knobs on.'
HB Member 5
It was certainly a disadvantage for the JHLC's proposals to be debated first, as at
that point there had been no opportunity to test whether the P&R Committee
supported the options set out by the AEG. The JHLC proposals including the
Action Group's projects were defeated by ten votes to three, the three votes for
being the two officers of the JHLC, (the Chair and Vice-Chair) and the
conservative chair of the region's Social Work Committee.
The first option of the AEG's recommendations was then moved; namely to
allocate no money to support finance and that the money should be used instead
to open the geriatric hospital.
'This resolution was introduced as a tactic to be defeated, to establish
that HB members did indeed want to spend money on support
finance.'
HB Member 5
And this seemed to be established for the Board members voted nine to three
against this proposition. The Chair then proposed the final option on offer,
which was for a token gesture to support finance with no long-term
commitment and this was carried by nine votes to four.12
12These were not roll-call votes, so there is now no adequate means of establishing who
voted for which option. As people did not want to seem to oppose a policy which has
now gained ascendancy, there was a marked reluctance on the part of those
identified as being hostile to this policy to remember how they voted or to claim to
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7.10.5 Mobilising the Network
The decision appalled those advocating support funding as a means of
advancing joint planning. Essentially the HB decision left the Social Work
department and their supporters with almost nothing that they'd wanted.
Although there might have been a willingness to sacrifice three divisional co¬
ordinators and get the rest of the package, to get three divisional co-ordinators
and nothing else was another matter. The HB, however, saw this as a decision
they were entitled to take, because, as they hadn't voted in the JHLC, they were
not committed to its recommendations:
'Decisions were never binding on us. We reserved the right, because
it was our money, it hadn't been specifically identified, it was the
allocation we got for running services and we just said - this is not
on. We would tell them, we'll take it back to our board and we'll see
what happens there. You never know, the board might go along
with it.'
HB Member 3
In this case it seemed that they did not go along with it. On the other hand local
authority officials felt that they could do little more. They were inhibited by their
roles from taking part in any overt political lobbying of the HB although
'I was aware that it was going on.'
LA Official 4
The Chair of the RCG felt that he had done all he could in writing to the P&R
Committee because
'As for looking at the aftermath, following up decisions, I was aware
of having to be quite disciplined and say OK its not our
responsibility, we've done our bit of it. We've made our
recommendations. I'll hear in due course. I hadn't time to do it. I
couldn't influence it. Having made our recommendation, there was
nothing more we could do.'
LA Official 13
This officer did not have the same commitment to policy change as either the
Action Group or those officials who played the role of product champions,
seeking to innovate. Even so those with a local authority post were limited in
the extent to which they could lobby. Whilst LA Official 7
have voted for it, when simple arithmetic demonstrates that someone is either not
being truthful or has a faulty recollection.
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'was involved in various discussions.'
LA Official 7
about what to do, in the 14 days before the policy would become final if it were
ratified by the full Health Board meeting on 12 September, it was left to the
voluntary organisations to mount a massive lobby of the political and health
board networks, in an attempt to persuade board members to amend this
decision and support the JHLC recommendations. The Action Group's heavy
investment in word processing technology was to prove beneficial. The over¬
lapping roles of those involved in lobbying for change, were used to advantage.
What was envisaged was a mass letter-writing campaign but
'the material that was drafted, was drafted by AG Workers 1 and 2
and myself.'
Vol Org Worker 1
The Campaign was designed to make it seem like a massive upsurge from the
grassroots. Letters were sent from the Action Group itself, signed by their office¬
bearers, whereas AG Worker 1 wrote in his capacity as Chair of the Forum of
Voluntary Organisations working with Mentally Handicapped People.
There were three levels to the lobby. Firstly the instigators wrote themselves to
all Health Board members in an attempt to change their mind. Secondly to try to
mobilise the voluntary sector network to do the same. To this end they wrote to
over 100 voluntary organisations in the area asking them to write both to HB
members and to MPs. Thirdly they wrote to the three MPs in whose
constituencies, the Action Group's area lay, asking them to contact the Board.
'It was very successful insofar as the majority of lobbies of the health
board tend to be very standardised and at times you get printed post¬
cards... and that is probably counter-productive... the reaction is like
buying a raffle ticket - it doesn't hit home. But what they, (HB
members) got was really personalised letters from quite prestigious
organisations saying "This is a heaven-sent opportunity. Why on
earth are you turning your back on it?'"
HB Member 1
This health board member, who was a known supporter of the scheme received
at least 10 letters supporting the JHLC proposals. All the MPs the Action Group
contacted, spoke to the Board Chair and the Board Secretary.
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At the same time, using their medical contacts (via marriage), City HA were also
lobbying within the professional networks of the Board and through these
contacts knew about four members of the board other than those who were on
the usual voluntary sector networks.
When the issue came up for ratification at the full board (which met in public
unlike the P&R Committee) on 12 September, an amendment to the P&R
Committee minutes was moved by a Labour Councillor and seconded by HB
Member 1,
'that the recommendations of the Joint Liaison Committee as
detailed ... (ie the full recommendations) ... be approved.'
HB Minutes 12 September 1985
This amendment was carried by eight votes to six. After two and a half years, the
Action Group had got their funding for the Supported Accommodation project:
£11,866 in 1985/86 and £27725 in 1986/87 along with almost all the other
recommendations of the RCG. This was an unprecedented decision. One Hea^h
Board official commented that in his experience a recommendation of the P&R
committee had never before been overturned at the full board.
How, then, did this volte-face come about? The naive assumption by those who
lobbied the board was that as a result of their campaign, HB members changed
their minds and in fact switched votes, but the more informed seem agreed that
'I don't think there was anyone who switched their vote.'
HB Member 1
'If you asked me why that happened, I would say that there were a
different set of people at the P&R Committee than were at the Board
meeting.'
HB Official 2
The two committees shared the same membership. There were people absent
from the full board who were at the P&R Committee and four people present
who had missed the sub-committee. It does also seem that a couple of people
either abstained at the P&R Committee or left before the vote was taken, given
that there were 12 votes cast, but 14 people present. It is possible that some
people may have moved from abstention to a for vote.
254
The HB Chair thought that the reason the original decision was over-turned was
that
'there couldn't have been a very full Board meeting.'
HB Member 3
and in this he was possibly right. Out of 22 Board members there were only 15
present. When asked what difference the lobbying had made, he was of the
opinion
'not an awful lot, honestly.'
HB Member 3
However this was an unprecedented decision. HB Member 1 thought that there
were various tactical games being played by some members. Certainly that was
the drift of HB Member 5's account. What is clear is that the opponents of
support financing were unlikely to lobby board members in quite the same
way as the proponents. It was certainly unlikely that they would have tried as
hard to make sure that their supporters were present.
'(When I proposed something) I wouldn't even know if I'd get a
seconder, because that's one thing.. I don't know about anyone else,
but I would have never said "Would you second me"?'
HB Member 3
It also seems plain that some 'non-political' members of the Board, had been
persuaded by the campaign to get the SHHD circular implemented by the Board.
The consistent ways in which the issues had been raised both within the Board
and within the Joint Liaison Committee had increased awareness by Board
members of the issues. It seems likely therefore that the decision of the Board to
overturn the P&R Committee decision, whilst seemingly fortuitous in terms of
the immediate lobby, was the product of the longer-term campaign to shift the
stance of the HB officials on the broader issue of inter-agency co-operation.
By the time the issue came to the full Board meeting
'it was almost not a tenable option to say "we're not going to spend
any money," because they'd had the government circular and ...
they'd committed themselves to mental handicap and more recently
to joint planning and here was a whole package of things on mental
handicap that had been prioritised and were being put forward - not
a vast amount of money.'
LA Official 7
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A positive decision was vital as it was seen as a mark of the Health Board's
commitment to the whole project of joint planning. Without some significant
injection of finance local authority officials felt that the whole fragile edifice that
was being constructed was likely to falter and collapse, perhaps irretrievably. It is
evident that HB officials did not attach the same significance to this decision for
they continued right up to the end trying to
'sabotag(e) everything right, left and centre.'
HB Member 2
and at the time of the decision, the Director of City HA remarked that
'We may have the Health Board's money, but we don't have their
hearts.'
Vol. Org. Worker 3
7.11 Conclusion
At the end of the day, the decision to fund the Action Group's Supported
Accommodation proposal rested on merits
'not to do with this project, but to do with the generality of the whole
issue of Support Finance.'
LA Official 7
Whatever the merits of each of the individual applications, once they had been
accepted as priorities by the RCG, those merits were secondary to the debate
about support finance. It is remarkable that despite pressures on the Board
members from officials who did not really believe in jointly planning and
financing services with local authorities; who had no commitment to the
provision of services in the community, relying on a narrow medical definition
of health; who lacked, if not the ability, then certainly the will to counter the
professional free-for-all that passed for a budgetary process in the Health board;
who failed to budget for support finance - despite all these pressures the Board
ended up deciding to fund a package which was bigger than those lobbying
would ultimately have settled for. For they had cut their demands, realising that
there was likely to^some slippage, before projects could get started. This had all
along been the argument of the Treasurer's department in the Health Board.
'In 85/86 most of the projects slipped by miles. The SWD required
virtually nothing... We did make a payment for the mental handicap
register but only as a payment for equipment... The SAMH, we didn't
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pay them a penny... City HA didn't require anything like as much as
they were allocated and the NEAG didn't start until March 1986/
HB Official 5
But others saw this as the next stage in minimal co-operation.
'The Treasurer says "Oh no, I'm only parting with the money, almost
in exchange for invoices for the work having been done... It takes
forever and it is actually basically a very simple process that is
needed. They've still got instruments of delay built into support
finance.'
HB Member 1
It does seem that in terms of money what divided the two camps was a very
small sum indeed. Thus the real argument was over principle and in the end
the interpretation depends on belief. All involved thought that the real solution
lay in the government putting more money into community care policies, and
had this been the case there is little doubt that HB officials would have been
more amenable to the local authority's case. But in a situation of diminishing
resources, they did not see why they should be obliged to hand over their
resources to another agency with different priorities.
From the voluntary organisations point of view, it is clear that they were now
involved in a scenario where the stakes were much bigger than simply the
funding of one small community care project. It is evident from this chapter
that they played a fairly small role in terms of the actual negotiations for money
for they knew that they were on the priorities of the local authority. It was others
who fought for their schemes within the joint planning mechanism. There is a
clear sense in the observation of the official responsible for servicing the joint
planning machinery that
"the application (for money) should be the very end of the whole
process and that projects coming through on support finance will
have been worked up and discussed as part of a joint planning
process.'
LA Official 12
Those who lobbed in applications opportunistically failed. The strength of the
Action Group lay in the work which it had put in over the years in establishing
itself as an organisation which would work with those inside the local authority
and the Health Board in seeking to bring about change.
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7.12 Post Script
In contrast to the labyrinthine process on which some SWD officials and some
voluntary organisations had expended enormous amounts of time and energy
over some two and a half years, the Action Group's application to Social Work
Services Group to part-finance the Supported Accommodation scheme merits
exposition.
On 18 January 1985 the Secretary of State for Scotland had announced an
increase of some £2.1 million in grants to voluntary organisations under s.10 of
the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 stating that
'the principal intention of the scheme to which this letter refers, is to
stimulate the emergence of new initiatives (including provision for
respite care) to enable families and others to'continue to care for
elderly and disabled persons in the community.'
Circular letter from SWSG (undated)
The advisor in SWSG felt strongly that very few applications for projects for
mentally handicapped people had been successful in obtaining mainstream
Section 1013 money from central government. He had encouraged the Action
Group to apply (unsuccessfully) for their Supported Accommodation project
(circa late 1984). When this new scheme became available, this existing
application was put forward by him, despite the fact that the project was not
about respite care and that the Action Group was much more interested in
relieving carers of their duties than enabling them to continue. Thus the project
did not readily fit the criteria.
'He did seem keen to help us and took more of an interest in the
proposal than I'd expected.... (We thought) we had a pretty slim
chance of getting Scottish Office money ... so I think that really
explains the fact that I don't think I paid much attention to it.'
AG Worker 1
Thus it came like a bolt from the blue, when in October 1985 they received a
letter from SWSG announcing their intention of funding the project to the tune
13Section 10 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act is the legislative means by which
voluntary organisations are funded by central government.
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of some £18,000 over three years. When asked how the Action Group managed
to fit into this scheme, the advisor explained that they
'did so with some difficulty. Here you come to work by an
individual, to wit me... It was the first time in my professional life I'd
had money in my pocket. (When the scheme appeared) I approached
people and said put in projects. (But) I had no projects waiting for
money except the Action Group.'
Civil Servant 3
Here again the Action Group benefited from 'insider advocacy' in this case
seemingly without even trying. It is clear that for this civil servant they
provided an interesting project (like an oasis in the desert, he said, given the
quality of many other voluntary sector proposals), a chance to discuss ideas and a
place he too, could send his visitors who wanted to see something of interest.
The difficulties which had been experienced over Urban Aid, in squeezing the
project into criteria which did not apply, did not recur. In this instance the





















Consultation by DHSS in England and Wales on
Community Care
Welsh Strategy on Mental Handicap initiated
Series of reports to JHLC on joint work on mental
handicap
LA Official 7 visits Wales
Care in Community Working Group formed in Scotland
HASSASSAB proposes making support finance available
to voluntary agencies
DHSS issue Care in the Community circular (not
applicable in Scotland)
Political coup on JHLC leads to Labour dominance
Politicians and HB visit Wales to see the strategy JHLC
agree to a target to reduce beds in Riversdale and increase
community provision Action Group publish 'Mentally
Handicapped People in Scotland - A Case of Political
Neglect?'
Voluntary Sector Mental Handicap Forum established
JHLC agree Mental Handicap Strategy
Draft Circular, Community Care: Joint Planning and
Support Finance published
Action Group makes application to Health Board for
Support Funding
JHLC agree broad criteria for funding projects
New circular issued









HB's P&R committee defer a decision on Support Finance
Multi-disciplinary Officer Group supports HB priorities
RCG re-affirm their priorities
JHLC compromise, but without Church of Scotland
projects
Planning and Resources Committee of HB vote for
minimal package
HB overturns P&R Committee recommendations and




Criteria for a successful voluntary organisation
This thesis has presented a case study of a voluntary organisation which
attempted to secure funding from statutory agencies and to work in partnership
with them. It is clear from the preceding story that this was a very complex
relationship and therefore a difficult one to manage. It required sophisticated
skills and knowledge on the part of those who for various reasons wanted it to
work. The focus on the funding relationship has enabled this complexity to be
explored in some depth.
The chapter therefore examines a number of issues; firstly, the factors which
seem to have been important in the success of the West City Action Group in
particular; secondly, other issues which emerge from this study as worthy of
note; thirdly, the usefulness of the theoretical approach and the research strategy
and finally it attempts to identify aspects which would merit further exploration.
8.1 Factors affecting the success of the Action Group.
When a problem is identified by a group in society, there is no guarantee that it
will be dealt with by those with the power to offer resources for its solution. In
order to achieve that, a number of conditions have to be satisfied. Firstly, the
problem has to be recognised as such by the wider society and specifically the
state. Secondly, the means to resolve it has to be available. Thirdly, it has to be
placed on the policy agenda. And lastly, the means to fund the solution has to be
available. The case examined highlights these stages.
It follows from this that there are a number of different stages in the
development of a project by a voluntary agency and in securing funding for that
project. Not only does the problem have to be perceived and considered to be the
business of government to remedy, but the agency espousing any solutions has
to be accorded the legitimacy to make an application. The solutions which any
agency advocates also have to be seen as practical and feasible and the will to
implement those solutions has to exist. Finally the proposal has to be fit with
available sources of funding or new means of funding have to be identified.
262
The way in which the project developed by the West City Action Group fitted
these criteria and illustrated them, suggests that this has been a useful case to
explore. Firstly, the group had to help to place mental handicap issues on the
policy agenda in Plains and nationally. Secondly, community based solutions for
mentally handicapped people had to been seen as a preferred option espoused by
central and local government. Thirdly, supported accommodation had to be
shown to be a workable proposition which both local and central policy-makers
deemed sufficiently important to both espouse and fund. It is noticeable that in
this case, the espousal proved easier to achieve than the funding.
In achieving success clearly there were both factors unique to the Action Group
and those which perhaps were generalisable to other agencies. It is obvious that,
at least initially, the Action Group were extremely lucky. The placement of a
student who had the necessary understanding to lay the foundations for the
group so well and the fortunate juxtaposition of personnel who went beyond
the call of duty to bring the group into existence, were clearly things which could
not be pre-planned. The timing of the group's foundation was also fortuitous, as
the Job Creation Programme enabled them to avoid difficult questions about
what they actually did in the first year. Once they had established themselves, it
became easier to argue for other sources of core funding. The establishment of a
charity shop early in the group's career also gave them a measure of
independence of funding bodies which might otherwise have curbed their vocal
criticism.
However, there were other features which could be considered by other agencies
or those seeking to establish such agencies to have intrinsic merit. The Action
Group started with a clear focus on the problem. From the outset the parents
wanted to see better services for their mentally handicapped young people. In
this they were assisted by the alliance which emerged with the Area Team and
in particular with the senior social worker. One feature which ran right through
the study was the importance of alliances between workers in statutory services
and the voluntary organisation in seeking to achieve changes in provision,
which would enable those in need of services to have their needs met, and help
workers who wanted to change and augment the services provided.
From the Action Group's perspective, it was clear that professionals could help
them to identify the most fruitful means of attaining their objectives and for the
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professionals, the parents' arguments legitimised their case. Their experiences
were hard to refute. There were clearly a number of stages in this study where
such symbiotic relationships existed. In the early days the alliance of parents
with the local area team not only enabled the group quickly to identify and
secure sources of statutory funding, but it also enabled the area team to make a
case for resources within the Social Work Department for an additional worker
and to make a variety of new provisions themselves, such as the playgroup.
When the group began to work with Task Force on Supported Accommodation
benefits again flowed both ways. Task Force gained an enthusiastic advocate for
their proposals and the Action Group gained access to a group within the
statutory sector who could direct some resources towards them and provide
some indication of the kinds of projects undertaken in other parts of Britain.
In seeking Urban Aid, the Group were also espousing a more general argument
about how and for whom, such funds were available. Although they lost that
argument, had they been successful, a wide range of other organisations would
have benefit ed and the local authority could have put forward other projects.
Later in negotiation with the Health Board, the Group formed part of a much
larger co-operative network, in which they stood to gain funding if the Health
Board could be persuaded to implement support finance mechanisms, but
equally the Social Work Department would gain the participation of the Health
Board in a much wider range of desired projects and even the Community
Medicine registrar would get his computer system.
The Group's clarity about their objectives from the outset is remarkable. They
had principles; namely to work for better services for mentally handicapped
people and that these services should follow the principles of normalisation.
They also believed, at least in the early days, that services should be provided by
the state. The parents' conception of 'self-help' did not extend to making
provision themselves except on a small-scale. The development of such clear
principle was not fortuitous. It stemmed from the involvement of a social
worker to facilitate the group's discussion about policy objectives. (The group
still uses this means of setting priorities.) Having identified these and the
particular facets they wished to see developed; housing, employment and club
activities; they went on to identify the means of achieving those objectives. The
pronounced emphasis on pressure group activities in the early stages was very
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important in assisting the establishment of the Action Group as a legitimate
representative of parents of mentally handicapped people. It drew them to the
attention of local voluntary funding bodies as well making both local and
national politicians feel that they might be influential.
The fund-raising capacities of the Group were quite remarkable. In part this
stemmed from the way the parents, who formed the first management
committee were recruited. It seemed that little was left to chance. The social
workers put in considerable work before the first meetings to try to ensure that
the group worked successfully. One fundamental lesson seems to be the
importance of planning a venture like this as thoroughly as possible. The
observation that mental handicap was no respecter of class boundaries was also
as important as the group contained some very articulate parents.
The recruitment of staff who had backgrounds other than social work seems also
to have been important. Space to define one's job is another feature which ran
through this study. Clearly the project co-ordinator started as a naive outsider,
which meant perhaps that rather than conceiving the tasks of a self-help group
in the ways which might be prescribed by current professional practice, he
simply started from the problem as perceived by parents and sought to help
them to address it. Later the scope which LA official 7 and HS Professional 2 had
to define their jobs seemed equally significant.
From the outset the group sought to gather and disseminate information about
issues relating to mental handicap. Because their work was perceived to be
interesting and exciting they attracted to them, those who wanted to achieve
changes for this client group. In so doing they built up networks of friends in
useful places. These included politicians and some within the various statutory
agencies including the health board and the Scottish Office, as well as their
existing friends in the Social Work Department. They used these contacts to help
push their concerns onto the agenda, but they were also very accommodating,
always willing to show visitors the work they were doing.
Perhaps stemming from the clarity with which their goals were defined, the
group were determined, but pragmatic. They always kept their ends in view and
if methods of achieving them failed, they looked for other means, rather than
taking the view that 'they'd tried it and it didn't work.'. They were committed to
their purpose (unlike the church who mainly wanted to use their buildings) and
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flexible (unlike Shield who had a seemingly non-negotiable programme), to the
extent that when the political situation changed and it was no longer tenable to
argue for statutorily provided services, the Group decided without too many
qualms to venture down the road of staffed service provision.
These factors seem to have made them attractive partners for statutory agencies.
However, equally, there were features of the statutory agencies which made the
'insider advocates' of change turn to voluntary agencies for help. These people
wanted to change the ways in which their agency provided certain types of
service or, having seen a new way of providing a service in a disputed boundary
area, to gain control of a new domain.
The initial problem, as noted in chapter one, was the tendency of policy makers
to overlook the organisational means to achieving the ends willed. There was
little thought given, when establishing social work departments to how they
were to relate to the community they were supposed to serve. Creating your
own community, in this case of parents of mentally handicapped people is one
way of overcoming this obstacle. It has the additional benefit of legitimising the
case the statutory organisation can make to provide new services.
Secondly, as Hatch and Mocroft (1983) note, hierarchical bureaucracies with
fairly specific ranges of tasks, were not best suited to matching the diffuse and
wide-ranging needs of a client group such as mentally handicapped people.
Moreover even if there was a desire to make new provisions, the difficulties in
achieving consensus within bureaucracies can seem insuperable, never mind
trying to achieve agreement across organisational boundaries. In these
circumstances, voluntary organisations can become very valuable simply
because they have a freedom of manoeuvre that those working in large
bureaucracies generally lack. Although many innovators in statutory agencies
themselves held fairly loosely defined jobs (as noted above), nonetheless there
are quite formally defined channels of communication within and between
bureaucracies and particularly with politicians, that it can be difficult to
circumvent. Voluntary agencies need not be so constrained. They are able to
engage in dialogue across boundaries and between levels of hierarchies without
necessarily threatening either status or territory.
Additionally, in both the Health Board and the Social Work Department, there
were organisational problems which made change difficult to achieve. In health
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the lack of power of the administrators and the patterns of dominance within
the medical profession made acquiring money for mental handicap difficult.
Equally, in the Social Work Department, the vested interests and the lack of
client specific foci made it difficult to create a lobby for change within the
department. In these circumstance^the participation of sympathetic voluntary
agencies in official working groups can be invaluable. They can help to achieve
movement by arguing cases which it is difficult for officials to argue without
being viewed as 'political'. However, it is important that these agencies argue the
'right' case, hence the importance of being able to trust them.
A voluntary agency is likely to fight for its project. When this falls in a new area
of work, this fight can become symbolic. In gaining the voluntary organisation
project, the whole objective, in this case the mental handicap strategy, became
validated.
Clearly there was a partnership in this case as benefits flowed to both statutory
and voluntary agencies, although it did not take the form that rhetoric about
such concepts would indicate. It was a dialectical process in which 'product
champions' bounced ideas about the direction which development of services
might take and each then proceeded to seek to achieve these ends within their
own contexts, often receiving help from the others to do so. Equally, this kind of
partnership is not open to every voluntary organisation in a locale.
8.2 Other issues
The picture of voluntary/statutory relationships which emerged from this study
challenges the common sense view of separate spheres of operation and exposes
the way in which the fate of voluntary organisations is inextricably linked with
that of statutory agencies at both service and funding level. Additionally it
emerges that voluntary organisations can play a significant role in helping the
development of policy.
The case also shows that the achievement of these ends was not a one-sided
process in which the voluntary agency pressurised and persuaded unwilling
statutory agencies, but a much more complex and inter-active process. There
were those within as well as outwith the statutory sector involved in advocating
and testing out new solutions, some of which proved not to be viable and
therefore required to be rethought and revised.
267
In order to achieve these ends, in each case alliances were formed between those
working within statutory agencies and those in voluntary organisations.
Initially the groupings were quite simple but as the solutions sought grew in
complexity, so did the composition and nature of the alliances. In particular the
study illustrates the usefulness of intermediary bodies, like the local Council of
Voluntary Service and the Scottish Council for the Single Homeless, in holding
the ring to enable organisations, voluntary and statutory, to work together.
Working together produced a number of benefits. As noted in chapter two,
change can be painful and therefore may be resisted. Those espousing change in
large organisations often admitted therefore to feeling isolated and vulnerable.
There is little doubt that the network of innovators provided moral support for
each other. Secondly it helped them to be better informed, gave them a positive
sounding board for new ideas and thus made them more effective in pursuing
their strategies. It is also clear that each benefit ed in terms of improved resource
flows for their own particular area of work.
When innovators succeed, generally they do so because they have a very acute
assessment of the political and organisational context within which they
operate. It also seems that they are not afraid to seek change in that context
where the climate is inimical to their ends. They know the rules of the game
and have a sense of the rules which they must tolerate and those which they
could negotiate. It is this feature which has made this such an interesting and
exciting piece of research to undertake.
The role of a voluntary organisation in this context can be seen to change over
time. Initially the Parents' Group was on the outside of this process as far as
senior policy makers were concerned and thus it sought to influence that process
in the only way it could, by lobbying politicians and and through media
campaigns. However, as it became drawn more closely into the policy process, it
became a more muted insider as the price of 'rocking the boat' rose. Although
the Group may have had more influence as insiders, the price of this seemed to
be restrictions on freedom of manoeuvre.
One issue clearly raised by this study is the extent to which it is possible to
'persuade' an .intransigent government department to change its policy
objectives. The remedies sought by the innovators were not ones in which civil
268
servants believed. If seeking funding is viewed merely as a re-active process,
with agencies applying for available sources of funding, then there would have
been many points in this study where capitulation would have been in order.
Yet one thing which stands out clearly from this case in the extent to which
innovators set out to create their own environment. Pressure and persuasion
was applied at all levels. However it was notable that some organisations were
better able to insulate themselves from these activities than others. The Scottish
Office seemed to be particularly impervious to influence and at the time of the
study, participation by local representatives on the Health Board was already
beginning to take second place to business management objectives.
8.3 Theoretical strands
The focus in this thesis was not on decision-making theory or pressure group
politics, but set in inter-organisational theory. This was chosen because of the
lack of attention given to such issues in the social policy context. It seemed
important to attempt to offer some analysis of the processes underlying the glib
words which so often slipped off the tongue like partnership and co-operation.
In Chapter Two, the theoretical framework sought to offer a number of levels
for analysing the nature of the funding relationship between voluntary and
statutory organisations. Benson (1975, 1977) offered a broad framework for the
understanding of inter- organisational relationships and tt>e suggestion that the
appropriate focus is on the network, enables the analysis to avoid the one-
sidedness which usually typifies studies of the funding relationship. Within this
broad structure the middle range approach of Crozier (1964, 1976, 1980) focused
on a more specific facet, namely the locus of power in organisations and its
nature. At the micro-level the analyses of both Wilson (1963) and Wildavsky
(1964) shed some light on the strategies adopted by participants within these
structures in order to develop new areas of work and gain the funding to sustain
them. However none of these analyses is adequate alone. It is the relationship
between them that allows each to shed light on different facets of the process of
negotiating funding which together point to a more complex and hopefully
realistic picture of voluntary/statutory relationships.
Benson argued that inter-organisational relationships took place on two levels.
The issues of co-operation and partnership were the superstructure but they
were underpinned by the real issues which were about resource acquisition and
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the most significant of these were money and authority. In this case study, this
seemed to be a most useful focus as it immediately highlighted, for any agency
seeking money, the inseparability of success in that area from some recognition
of the right to operate in a domain. Thus it can be argued that policy and finance
are interwoven and so it seems in this study. Moreover, by abstracting the factors
which must be addressed in any co-operative venture; namely; the right to
operate in a domain; beliefs about the nature of the task; the extent to which the
other organisation's work is valued and how to work together, Benson shed
light on issues on which such ventures might founder.
An analogy in inter-organisational relationships may be made with
international politics. Whereas in the sovereign nation state powers to compel
compliance with legislation exist, international relations rest on negotiation and
self-interest which flow from the movements of international finance. Similarly
in the organisational environment, whilst sanctions and rewards can secure
compliance within organisational boundaries, relationships which traverse
those boundaries are both freer and much more difficult to manage. It seems in
the case examined that voluntary organisations played a role in assisting this
process and at the same time helped to instigate changes within discrete
bureaucracies.
Whilst Benson's initial analysis implied a rather static scenario, with
organisations seeking equilibrium in their relationships, in in his later writings,
he recognised the interactive dialectical nature of the process as noted initially by
Zeitz (1980b). However what this study shows is the complexity of the network
of inter-organisational relationships. Plainly as Benson urged, it is important to
examine the network in the context of its environment, especially those
structures which constrain the network. In reality however, organisations do
not participate in merely one network, but a multiplicity of networks. To focus
on the Social Work Department as a controller of resource flows to voluntary
agencies would ignore the extent to which it is itself constrained by participation
in a network with the Health Board focussed on community care, where the
resource flows are controlled by central government. Voluntary agencies too
participate in a number of differing networks.
The picture was rendered even more complex by the realisation that large
bureaucracies, like the Social Work Departments and Health Boards do not
participate in networks as 'wholes' but rather the struggles which take place
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within the organisation to get issues on the agenda, spill out into the inter-
organisational network and it is possible, as this study reveals to find members
of the same organisation on different sides in the struggle.
Crozier's analysis sheds additional light on the process by focusing on the fact
that all is not 'up for grabs'. It is the emerging issues and the ones unclearly
defined which feature in battles to gain resources. From the voluntary
organisation's point of view, it is these areas which offer the scope for
organisational expansion. However statutory agencies, finding themselves
increasingly financially constrained, may focus on what they regard as core tasks,
ie those clearly in their domain and seek to devolve the disputed domains to
voluntary organisations whilst conceding as little funding as possible. It may
also be that statutory agencies are less threatened by conceding domains to
voluntary agencies, hoping to be able to retrieve their control when better times
come again.
Secondly Crozier turns our attention to the role of third parties in inter-
organisational disputes. Whilst it may not be always the case that third party
intervention is necessary to help achieve agreement between different tiers of
government in France, it does seem to be the case in Britain, that where there is
difficulty in establishing to which agency certain tasks belong, voluntary
agencies can hold the ring and allow at least a semblance of resolving any
dispute over ownership of the task.
The focus which Wilson directs to the organisational contexts which may or
may not favour innovation is meshed with Wildavsky's notion that
participants in a negotiation have to develop strategies to manage those
negotiations in a political context.
The research strategy adopted in this context seemed to work well. The focus on
the network whilst ostensibly entering the setting as a student of one particular
organisation was particularly useful. Access was surprisingly easy and the story
seems to have sufficient consistency to suggest that my respondents told the
truth. In the end the interpretation placed on their accounts is mine. I would
certainly undertake any similar research in this way, although perhaps with
greater recognition of the importance of beginnings.
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8.4 Potential for Further Research
Since this is a case study, all that has been demonstrated is that this case had a
number of interesting features. However, it likely that in other contexts another
group seeking to achieve similar ends might have had to adopt different
strategies. Clearly then, there is a need for more studies of this type, focusing on
inter- agency networks, to discover whether the issues examined in this study
have more general application.
Secondly, with the shift in emphasis by government towards greater provision
of service by voluntary organisations on a contractual basis, the complexity of
the environment with which the voluntary organisation in this study had to
deal, raises some fundamental concerns for such organisations about to embark
on similar negotiations. If it is necessary to convince as many different
professional groupings of the worth of their project as the Action Group had to
do and it takes as long to do so, then the negotiation of contracts may prove to be
more complex than the government has envisaged. For what stands out from
this study is that it is not enough to be serving a priority group, the ways in
which services are provided are also significant and potential funders need to be
convinced that the approach is congruent on this level too. The sheer
complexity of the environment with which this organisation had to cope may
well presage the future for many more groups.
The personal characteristics of innovators were not a central focus of this
research. However many respondents commented on the personalities of those
involved and whilst personality at times was used to explain ill-understood
organisational issues, there did seem to be significant personal factors which
typify innovators. Most seemed to give time to their tasks way in excess of what
might reasonably be demanded by any manager. They are unlikely to be deterred
by initial failure, they instead look for another solution. They are opportunistic
and rarely miss any possible benefit that arises. However to explain why this is
so is a task for another piece of research.
8.5 And finally
This particular group does seem to have been more successful than many others
of its kind for a number of reasons. Clearly the shift in the general climate of
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ideas at the time of this study worked in its favour. There was disillusionment
with institutional solutions for a number of disadvantaged groups. More
important, however was the way in which the organisation was conceived and
constituted. Of particular value was the way in which professional expertise was
meshed with the experience of the parents. This more than anything else, made
the Parents' Group a formidable combination for any other agency to have to
face. Advantages also flowed from the wide range of people potentially affected
by problems of mental handicap as it meant that some of the parents did have
very useful skills.
Funding decisions, then, are not made in a vacuum, but have a social and
political context. If an organisation is to be successful in achieving significant
funding from a statutory body then there has to be agreement about a range of
other issues including the credibility of the organisation, the value of its work
and also a degree of fit between the organisations conception of the task auocf
that of the funding body. As one respondent observed, funding is the last stage
in the process of negotiation of a project.
Thus it is plain from this analysis that funding issues are inseparable from
policy issues. In order to understand why a particular organisation is successful
in gaining funding the policy context in which that decision is made must be
understood. From this, it emerges that the task of this case study is not simply to
describe the processes which might underpin decisions about funding, but to
explain why such decisions might be taken.
When this thesis was conceived, there had already begun a retreat from
interventionism. The present political context has until very recently, at least,
argued for a diminished role for the state and a concomitant increase in the
provision of welfare by both the private and voluntary sector. Yet the picture
which emerges ff$m this study presents a view of voluntary organisations
which have a close interrelationship at both service and funding levels with
both the local and the central state. Even in terms of policy formulation, it seems
there is a substantial role for voluntary organisations. What is evident,
however, is how that role has had to adapt as the political context has changed.
Ultimately, the success of the group stemmed from the way the staff and parents
learnt to operate in the inter-organisational environment and the alliances they
formed. It would be possible to examine their funding proposal and point to its
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sound professional and viable proposals; to show how well presented it was.
However to present that as the criterieofor funding success would omit many
vital parts of the story.
Whilst the particular policy context of this study lies in the field of the
development of community-based services for people with a mental handicap, it
is suggested that the analysis applied in this thesis could be used illuminatingly
in a wide variety of inter-organisational contexts.
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APPENDIX A (Chapter 7)
Applications for Support Funding - June 1985
1. West City Action Group - Supported Accomodation for Mentally
H andicapped People - £89,000 over three years
2. Crossroads (New Town) Care Attendant Scheme - £34,000
3. Scottish Centre for the Tuition of the Disabled - £5,000
4. Handicabs (Plains) Ltd - Transport for disabled people - £10,000
5. Day Centre for frail elderly - £43,791 pa
6. Scottish Association for Mental Health - 8 Community Care
places - one-off payment of £34,135
7. Scottish Veterans Residences - capital to expand home - £30,000 -
£50,000
8. City Housing Association - neighbour support scheme -
expansion - £159,530
9. Bigtown and District Old People's Welfare Council - extend Day
Centre, replace 7 minibuses, develop day centre for partially
confused, establish 2 further charity shops - £582,500
10. Plains Victim Support Scheme - £40,000 over two years
11. Childrens organisation - establish a day centre for single parents -
£10,000 plus 7.5% in second year.
12. Community support for mentally handicapped - £152,144
13. Crossroads (Bigtown) Care Attendant Scheme - £139,000
14. Disabled Foundation - respite care - £5,000 for one year
15. Self-help Group - pain relief - £21,012
16. Abbeyfield Bigtown Society Ltd. - installation of two chair-lifts -
£10,000
17. Vol org - staff to counsel parents of mentally handicapped -
£52,952 over three years
18. South Bigtown Amenities Group - establish variety of provisions
for disabled elderly - no specific amount
19. Prisoners' Housing Association - range of services for people
leaving psychiatic hospital - £149,100
20. Central Housing Association - two Care Housing Schemes -
£560,302
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21. West Plains District Council
a) Dispersed Alarm Schemes - no specific sum
b) Special Needs Housing Officer - £15,000 pa
22. Plains Region Education Dept
a) Assessment Unit for Handicapped Under 5's - no specific sum
b) Transfer Schools Audiological Service to HB - to be costed
c) Radio Aids for Children with Hearing Impairment - a study to
be costed
d) School for Disabled - swimming pool hoist - £7,000
e) Educational Provision for Patients leaving MN hospitals -
£328,180 (over 7 years)
f) Adult Basic Education Unit for elderly confused - £6,639
23. East Plains District Council
a) Community Alarm System - no specific sum
b) Mobile Wardens for the Elderly -
c) Semi-sheltered housing - no specific sum
d) Supported accomodation for special needs - no specific sum
24. Church projects
a) Building a unit for elderly with senile dementia - £1.25 -
£1.5millin in capital
b) Two hostels for mentally handicapped - £60,000pa
c) Counsellor, Drug misuse - £10,000pa
25. Shield Housing Association - request for building land from HB
26. Plains Region Social Work Department
a) Mental Handicap Strategy - 6 Divisional Co-ordinators - £78,000
b) Share the Care - expansion - £10,000
c) Joint Care Planning Officers - £22,000
d) Mental Handicap Register - £10,000
e) Support Workers for MH Hostels - £36,000
f) Day Care House -(New Town) - £50,000
g) Home Care Development - to avoid hospitalisation - £26,000
h) Independent Living Scheme - expand CSV scheme - £6,000
i) Drug Abuse - Detoxification Unit - £200,000
j) Occupational Therapy posts - to assist early hospital discharge -
£57,000
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APPENDIX B (Chapter 7)
Membership of Regional Co-ordination Group
Depute Director of Social Work (Chair)
Joint Care Planning Officer (SW based)
Assistant Secretary (HB)
Physician-Superintendant - Riversdale (HB)
Assistant Chief Area Nursing Officer (HB)
Community Medicine Specialist - Mental Handicap (HB)
Senior Registrar - Community Medicine (HB)
Principal Officer - Development (SWD)
Assistant Director - Fieldwork (SWD)
Divisional Director (SWD)
Voluntary Organisation Representative
Education Department Representative
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